

Master's Thesis in Sociology

A Sociological Study of the Survey of Civilian
Casualties during the Korean War

- Focusing on the Politics of Statistical Production -

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A Sociological Study of the Survey of Civilian Casualties during the Korean War

- Focusing on the Politics of Statistical Production -

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<Abstract>

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In this study, the investigation of civilian casualties during the Korean War was examined with a focus on the process of survey and statistical production. First, civilian casualties were divided into primary and secondary damages based on their type. While the primary damage was caused as a direct result of the war and was mainly death, the secondary damage was the damage caused by the effects of the war and corresponded to evacuation and displacement. The South Korean government investigated and responded to both types of damage in different ways. There are international and domestic aspects behind the damage survey. First of all, the Korean War was a war in which international attention was focused on the protection of civilians in wartime, which had intensified since World War II. In 1949, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Geneva Fourth Convention was enacted to provide for the protection of civilians, and the United Nations' intervention in the Korean War and the arrival of humanitarian aid provided the Korean War as a stage for testing the feasibility of protecting civilians in wartime. North Korea seized this point and investigated and announced the situation of civilian casualties even before the war, and actively denounced and publicized the atrocities committed by the US and ROK forces during the war. He also actively raised the issue of civilians to the United Nations and tried to make it a political issue. South Korea, on the other hand, entered a wartime regime and carried out preliminary arrests and massacres of a large number of civilians. The South Korean government's view of civilians was one of distrust. Damage surveys during the Korean War were conducted between external pressures to protect civilians in wartime and internal aspirations to control civilians as citizens.

In this study, damage investigation was divided into four dimensions: subject, timing, content, meaning, and effect. First, the investigation of the primary damage was carried out under the leadership of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Office of Public Information. The Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of all aspects of civilian affairs and conducted investigations aimed at recognizing and resolving the damages, while the Public Information Office sought to use the surveyed damages for political purposes. While the Ministry of Social Affairs led the biographical survey, the post-1.4 survey

produced lists and statistics to prosecute North Korea's war crimes under the leadership of the Public Information Office. New categories such as kidnappings and massacres have been created to exaggerate North Korea's crimes. However, the other causes of death were concealed. Injuries and missing persons were neglected.

The South Korean government actively announced the results of the damage survey, which was propaganda for the damage caused by North Korea's invasion of the South. For this reason, the census, which yielded results that the government did not want, was not made public. The results of the investigation were calculated according to the political objectives of the government. In other words, the primary damage survey was conducted in accordance with the purpose of its use, rather than an accurate survey of the damage. The process of investigation and statistical production was to classify the civilians who had been affected. Civilian casualties were categorized and hierarchized according to the cause of the damage or the perpetrator. Those who were harmed by North Korea were labeled patriots, but those who were not were excluded. However, as civilian casualties gradually lost their political importance, the investigation was left incomplete, and the resolution of civilian casualties was lost in the post-war process of social reconstruction. The investigation of the secondary damage was carried out by the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK, which was in charge of the relief of the refugees. The Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK were in a relationship of cooperation and tension over relief, and the mediator of their collaboration was information about the refugees. For this reason, surveys of refugees were carried out on a regular basis. Evacuations can be divided into the first evacuation, in which each person fled sporadically, and the second evacuation, which was planned by the government, and the first evacuation process was haphazard and therefore rarely investigated. In addition to reflecting on this, large-scale evacuations were planned and carried out in the second evacuation, and it was the vast amount of information about the evacuees that made it possible.

The survey of refugees and displaced persons was carried out in three phases. The first was to introduce refugees from the frontline areas, and in order to move millions of refugees to the rear and direct them to a specific area, the location and movement of the refugees had to be known. The second was to assess the status of the refugees, and to induce the displaced refugees to register with the refugee camps. Third, a survey was conducted to identify and coordinate the target of relief with the relief of the refugees, and the refugees and displaced persons were classified. Statistics on refugees quantified and made them controllable, and a rule of control over individuals was established through constant surveys. On the other hand, the slogans and propaganda for the refugees and displaced persons were a device to show the superiority of the free world, but it was disconnected from the painful reality of the refugees. In summary, the

investigation of civilian casualties was a tool of the state to classify and control civilians in wartime.

Key Words : Korean War, War Damage, Civilians, Damage Survey, Statistical Production, Politics Student ID : 2012-22925

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I. Introduction

1. Raising a Problem

The construction of the Republic of Korea begins with the ruins of war. The Korean War is represented in the Korean experience as an image of destruction, devastation, poverty and suffering, and the development of the nation is portrayed as a miraculous success from nothingness.

C. The experience of enormous damage and hardship caused by the war ended with the achievement of a development that completely erased the image of war from Korean society.

However, it is only the external and material aspects that have been overcome. Rather, the Korean War was forgotten without being properly explained or resolved. The years of suffering and suffering that people had to endure because of the war were replaced by the collective memory of the suffering of the nation and the success of the nation. The experiences of individuals in the war have been turned into success stories of overcoming trying times. The stories of those who died silently in the war, those who died in silence in the horrors of war, could not be told, and should not be told.

Today's Korean society can be said to be a society in which 'war is internalized' and 'war is continued' (Kim Dong-chun, 2000; 299~304). Nations formed through war continued to govern on the principle of war. Politics in Korean society has become, as Foucault postulated, "a continuation and sanction of the imbalance of power established in politics and war," i.e., "politics is a war that persists by other means" (Foucault, 1998: 34).¹ Kim Dong-chun uses the concept of 'war politics' to describe the political practices of the state in which the internal political forces are suppressed in a violent way, such as the conduct of a civil war, and the workers, the poor, or even the majority of civilians are suppressed and neutralized (Kim Dong-chun, 2013: 170). In other words, the experience of the Korean War has become a major resource for the ruling power in South Korea to control the people. The more intensely the internal conflicts in Korean society are expressed, the more violent experiences of the war are recalled. It is a warning that the brutal and enormous experience of domestic

¹ Foucault's definition is a reversal of Clausewitz's famous proposition that "war is an act of coercion on one's opponent to impose his will, which is essentially an extension of political judgment" (Clausewitz, 2005).

violence perpetrated by both the North and the South during the Korean War could be revived at any time. The damage inflicted on the vast majority of civilians in the Korean War was indescribable and unimaginable. As the case continues to unfold, a significant number of civilians were killed in the mass killings of the state. For those who were slaughtered and their families, the experience and memory of the massacre would have to be silenced for a long time. Many civilians, even those who were not direct victims of state violence, were killed or disappeared in the war, and suffered hunger and displacement. However, it is not clear how the state responded to these civilian casualties. In the formation of war and postwar societies, the discussion of civilians and their victims remains blank. Despite the enormous damage that was suffered and the damage caused by the war became a point of fundamental change in the society of the time, the process of resolving it by the state and society has disappeared.

Instead, the South Korean government investigated civilian casualties during the Korean War. And the results of the survey remain in the form of statistics. How can we explain the fact that extensive damage surveys have been carried out on the basis of civilians during wartime, and that there have been regular surveys of the victims since the surveys, as well as the fact that a large number of statistics have been retained?

The process of investigating the damage was a way in which the state, as the subject of the investigation, relate to the civilians as the subject of the investigation through the politics of the damage. Therefore, the process of research and statistical production reveals the perspective of the civilian population of the country during the Korean War and the intention to deal with the issue of civilian casualties. In addition, the characteristics of civilian victimization in the process of political settlement of the civilian problem in wartime are also implied, as well as the status of civilians themselves, such as civilians as opposed to the military, and civilians as citizens. Since the damage survey was conducted not only on the civilian population, but also on the war victims of the entire society, the location of the civilian damage can be identified in relation to other damages. If Korean society stands on the experience of violence and damage in the Korean War, then the damage caused by the Korean War is part of its foundation. The direction of the state in resolving the damage caused by the war in the process of national gender will provide a clue to the process of the post-war formation of Korean society.

Therefore, one of the ways to clearly show civilian casualties during the Korean War is to trace the process of survey and statistical production. In this study, we will examine the process of producing official statistics on the damage by summarizing the various damage surveys conducted between 1950 and 1953, when the Korean War broke out and the armistice was signed. It is necessary to examine what the political intentions and

objectives of the state were in addressing civilian harm, and how the interest and discussion of civilian harm was channeled as a result.

2. Review of Prior Research and Theoretical Resources

(1) Research on civilian casualties

War damage has been treated as an incidental part of the historical narrative of the war, and it has not been treated as a major subject of research in the study of the Korean War.² Since the 80s, when the study of the Korean War was actively conducted, a major part of war research has focused on the origin, causes, and origins of war. However, since the 2000s, interest has expanded to various sub-fields, from the humanities to the sociology. Extensive research is underway. For 30 years, it can be said that the "deideologization, diversification, and concretization" of war studies has been underway (Park Myung-rim, 201: 384).²³⁾

² Especially in traditional sociology, war has been excluded from research. Since the 1970s, sociological research on war has been dominated by sociologists such as Tilly, Mann, and Giddens (Joas, 2013).

The issue of civilians in the Korean War has been actively studied since the 2000s, when massacres of civilians began to come to light in earnest. With the revelation of the No Gun Ri incident and the gradual unveiling of genocides such as the Bodo League across

² For a summary of the history of Korean War research, see Lee Wan-beom, 2000, "50 Years and Tasks of Korean War Studies," *Economy and Society* No. 46; 2003, "Challenges in the Study of the Korean War in the 21st Century: People and War," *Memories and Prospects*. Kim Gwi-ok, 2005, "Issues and Tasks in Sociology of the Korean War: Beyond Division and War to a Society of Peace, Toward a Society of Peace," *Korean War Studies* (ed.), 『Revisiting Contemporary Korean History』, Myungin Cultural History. Kim Myung-seop, 2000, "The End of the Cold War and the Heat of Research," *Korean War Research Association*, ed., 『Re-establishment of the Korean War in the Post-Cold War Era』, Baeksanseodang. See.

³ On the activities and limitations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see Chung Keun-sik, 2010, "How Far Have We Come?: Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Activities," *Hwanghae Culture* No. 67, Kim Sang-sook, 2012, "Status and Tasks of Investigating the Massacre of Civilians Before and After the Korean War, Focusing on the Activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission," *Memory and Transition* No. 27. Kim, Dong-chun, 2013, 『This is a war against memory』, Four Seasons. Reference.

the country, interest in the massacre has increased, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission)

Since its establishment in 2005, research has been carried out in cooperation with the public and private sectors. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission submitted an annual report of its activities until its end in 2010, collecting extensive cases of massacres of civilians and unearthing primary sources.⁴⁾

Studies on the massacre of civilians have revealed a wide range of specific facts about civilian casualties during the Korean War. Massacres by hostile forces, as well as massacres by the ROK Army, the US Army, and the left and right are being reported one after another, revealing the terrible damage caused by the Korean War. However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's work has focused on the legal issue of unlawful violence by the state, and has failed to properly investigate cases of victimization that fall outside this framework. There are still some unexplained points about the general civilian toll of war beyond genocide. Nonetheless, studies on civilian harm have been conducted in terms of the pattern, form, and data of the damage. First, if we look at the study of the pattern of civilian casualties, the largest estimate of the human toll of the Korean War conflict is from Cummings and Hallide. They estimate that there were 300~4 million deaths across the Korean Peninsula and 1 million civilians in South Korea (Cummings, 1989: 202~203). However, there is no clear evidence for this assumption. Haruki similarly puts civilian losses at 1.09 million, calculated by taking into account the postwar population growth rate (Haruki, 1999: 327). In addition, Ahn Yong-hyun put 1.16 million people (Ahn Yonghyun, 1992: 510) and Kwon Tae-hwan put 1.29 million human casualties, including military personnel (Kwon, 1977: 204), but these two estimates are based on different categories of casualties, citing the South Korean government's announcement. These estimates of damage are aimed at calculating or estimating relatively accurate figures of human damage, but they do not propose new figures that deviate significantly from the damage figures presented by the Korean government. In addition, there is a limitation in the method of estimation and the calculation of damages, which is that it does not provide a rigorous or objective standard. This limitation stems primarily from the absolute lack of primary data to estimate the overall cost of war damage, but there is also a problem with the fact that the data itself has not been properly questioned.

Studies on the types of civilian casualties have mainly focused on massacres of civilians by the military and police. Research on the massacre of civilians focuses more on the illegal and indiscriminate use of state violence, even though it took place in the context of a war (Seo Jung-seok, 2011; Park Myung-rim, 2002; Kim Dongchun, 2000). Attempts have been made to broaden the scope of the massacre of civilians and to study the killing

of civilians in the Korean War (Kim Tae-woo, 2013; Yang Young-jo, 2013, Jung Byung-jun, 2013). There is also an attempt to approach the massacre from a comprehensive perspective, from the legal and political drivers to the regional and specific reasons (Kim Deok-joong, 2009, Park Chan-seung, 2010). These studies allow us to synthesize fragmented cases of damage to determine the scale and nature of civilian casualties. However, the interest in the massacre of civilians has not extended to the overall damage of war, and this is due to the limitation of the ideological approach that continues to this day in the matter of defining the object of harm and the subject of the perpetrator.

A representative study that investigated and analyzed the data on war damage produced by the government during the Korean War, and collected and analyzed the records and lists in earnest, is that of Jung Byung-jun (2010). Jung Byung-jun focuses on the official statistics and lists produced by the Korean government, and organizes and analyzes the data of the time according to categories. In particular, the object of analysis is the abductee. It is divided into abductees, North Koreans, missing persons, dead/injured, and murdered, and the process of change in each category is compared and analyzed. This allows the government to classify the statistics it produces. It is part of an attempt to supplement this through additional excavation of other materials. However, it is unfortunate that only the limited data produced by the Office of Public Information is designated as the target.

One of the attempts to collect various statistical data to determine the pattern and trend of human casualties during the Korean War is Park Myung-rim (2002). Park presents various statistics based on historical evidence, while attempting to critically touch the data of the time. In other words, he argues that we should look at the nature of the situation behind the statistics, not the statistics themselves (Park, 2002: 381). In addition, there are studies that compare the data of the US War Crimes Investigation Team with the South Korean government's statistics on the massacre of civilians during the North Korean occupation of South Korea (Yang Young-jo, 2013) and analyze them in detail, focusing on the lists of the murdered (Shin Chang-hwa, 2007; Choi Jung-ki, 2008).

The most fundamental problem facing research on the war damage of the Korean War is the lack of objective data produced during the war period. Most studies dealing with war damage have not gone far in presenting official government statistics, and additional data are needed to supplement them. Recent studies have put a lot of effort into supplementing the government's official data and verifying their reliability, such as collecting oral data and checking the registers one by one. However, there is a relative neglect of the critical approach to the data and the context of the production of the data.

(2) War and the Nation-State Formation

The Korean War was a war that broke out during the formative years of Korea's statehood. After liberation in 1945 and the establishment of a government in 1948, Korean society was changing so rapidly that the form of government was not fully formed. The outbreak of the Korean War played both a destructive and constructive role in the formation of the Korean nation. The war damage of the Korean War was not only a reflection of the state that had been destroyed, but also an indicator of the direction in which the country should recover and rebuild. The process of recognizing, investigating, and resolving the occurrence of human casualties was a reflection of the direction in which the Korean government sought to deal with the damage to its citizens, as well as the way in which the country was formed. Previous studies dealing with the Korean War and state formation have mainly focused on the growth or transformation of the state apparatus through war. It cannot be said that the modern nation-state was formed in the Western sense through the Korean War, but rather the tendency of the ruling power to maintain itself as a result of the war (Jeon Sang-sang, 2000). As a result of the Korean War, the state had a larger military and police organization than it could sustain, and most of its resources were devoted to maintaining it. This is because U.S. aid has played a crucial role in the continuation of the state or government, with the goal of hostility to North Korea, rather than the South Korean state being formed spontaneously and autonomously (Suh, 2000). In addition, this type of growth has led to a reliance on the outside rather than the people in the process of establishing the state, thus ignoring the needs of civil society (Moon, 2009). The outcome of the war was the establishment of a powerful police state or barracks state that monitored and controlled the population.

This view of war and state-building stems from the way Western academia has treated war as an object of sociology. Historical sociologists such as Tilly and Giddens have sought to elucidate the impact of war on the formation of the modern state in the West, especially in Western Europe, through a comparative historical examination. In particular, Tilly derives the proposition that "war creates the state, and the state makes the war" (Tilly, 1975), explaining that the methods of mobilizing resources for the conduct of war have taken different forms according to coercion and the deployment of capital, which has led to the formation of the state. However, unlike the Western experience, the process of state formation through the Korean War was more exogenous than intrinsic, and the relationship between the people and the state resulted only in coercion and violence. Thus, the state formed through war has become a powerful state capable of exercising brute force to maintain and strengthen its power. Therefore, the state

sought to achieve this through coercive institutions and the use of violence without any process of compromise or persuasion between the state and civil society.

In other words, the formation of the people in the Korean War was achieved through the extreme exclusion of a part of the people, such as the massacres in Jeju and Yeosu, the arrest of the Bodo League, and the execution of collaborators (Park Myung-rim, 2002; Kim Deok-joong, 2008). The exclusion of some had the effect of forcing the rest to become obedient citizens. In addition, ideological reform through anti-communist education and mobilization of the people through the conscription system were also processes of national citizenship (Kim Dong-chun, 2006). (3) Survey Categories and the Politics of Statistical Production

Statistics are a tool for capturing social facts and discovering social laws (Hacking, 1990). Society is captured in an orderly way through statistics. Even complex social facts can be expressed in the form of controllable numbers once they go through the process of indexing and counting through statistics. In modern society, the existence of statistics was an important indicator that society could be grasped by law. Once a sufficient amount of quantified knowledge about society was produced, liberals were able to discover certain social laws through a certain arrangement of statistics, which led them to believe that they understood and controlled society (Hacking, 1990).

Once statistically quantified, social knowledge has scientific authority under the guise of objectivity (Porter, 1995). Since it is not easy to verify whether or not statistics are scientifically and objectively produced, even the most poorly crafted statistics have authority and power in their own right. This is because the production of statistical knowledge is the one that best fits the rational modern society's characteristic of 'computability'. In particular, the power and authority of the statistical producer to produce statistics makes it more trustworthy.

However, in order to produce statistics, the first thing that must be done is to capture the

It is a process of categorizing (Hacking, 1990: 25). The process of creating and changing categories in the perception of an object changes the perception of the object itself. Categories can be created to give us a new perception of things that did not exist before, and conversely, the disappearance of categories can obscure facts that were previously captured. These categories also constituted the identities of the categorized subjects of the survey, which Hacking called 'making up people' (Hacking, 1986).

Categorization is combined with political intentions. This is because the categories which the state creates for the purpose of investigating and classifying certain social facts or

existence determine the social character of those categories. Categorization shows the intent and purpose of the subject of the investigation to the object being investigated, and reflects how the object of investigation will be treated and treated. Furthermore, the investigation of a specific subject itself is of a political nature. This is because to investigate certain social issues is to recognize them as social problems, and conversely, to not investigate them is to exclude them from the object of cognition.

However, this "rule of statistics" cannot be applied to Korean society during the Korean War.

This is because the development of modern statistics is based on the historical context of Europe. Modern statistical knowledge was first introduced into Korean society during the colonial period, and existing research reveals that statistics, statistical devices, and modern social surveys emerged in colonial Korea in a form that combined colonialism and modernity (Park Myung-kyu & Seo Ho-chul, 2003: 2~3). The Western statistical system, which had been transplanted to Japan, was transferred to the colonies through the Governor-General. The statistical system was combined with surveys of colonial sites, which were intended to provide accurate information about the colonies, but also to ensure that Japan was a civilized country and had modern rule.

(Park Myung-kyu & Seo Ho-chul, 2003: 117~120). ⁵ The statistical system of the colonial period had two sides of modernity. While the development of statistical systems in the West was achieved through a combination of government agencies and private statistical researchers (Hacking, 1990), the colonial statistical system was state-centered and the statistical system of Japan was biased towards the state where the statistical development of the private sector was erased (Park Myung-kyu and Seo Ho-chul, 2003: 125). This tendency continued even after liberation. After liberation, the U.S. military administration continued to combine the legacy of colonial rule with the newly introduced survey and statistical system introduced by the U.S. until 48 years under the U.S. military administration.⁴ However, in contrast to the relatively active research on statistics and social surveys of the colonial period, the 1950s, including the Korean War period, has been described as a dark age for Korean statistics (Statistics Korea, 1992a). ⁵ For this reason, studies on social surveys and statistics in the 1950s are incomplete.

⁴ During the period of the US military administration, a new form of social survey called public opinion survey emerged (Kim Bo-mi, 2012), but the format of the census and the census did not change significantly, but rather led to the establishment of the government in a form in which its capacity was greatly reduced.

⁵) While there are related studies along with interest in the statistical system and governance during the colonial period, research on statistics after liberation from the West is relatively incomplete. The History of the Development of Korean

⁵ Japan, the mother colony, used a variety of statistical devices to manage its empire. For example, during the census process in Manchuria, the categories separating Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and Manchurians continued to change, and these categories were a device for dividing ethnic categories in the region and assigning them hierarchical status (Park, 2012). In addition, the knowledge and cognitive system produced through surveys, statistics, and categories on agricultural affairs in colonial Korea were instilled in Joseon, and through this, the colonial authorities, who had risen to the position of mediators of social problems, were able to 'solve' problems (Kim In-su, 2013).

3.Object of study

This study focuses on the process of investigating civilian casualties during the Korean War and producing statistics, and analyzes the political and social implications of these crimes.

The subject of the survey, the timing of the survey, the results and content of the survey, and the social and social aspects of the survey. We will sequentially analyze the political implications and effects to see how the civilian damage that is the subject of the investigation has been investigated and resolved. First, the nature of the subject of the damage survey should be identified, and the subject's intention to investigate the damage should be explained. In addition, it is necessary to examine what kind of surveys were conducted at the time and in what historical or local context. This is because the nature of the investigation changes depending on the surrounding circumstances, such as the progress of the war. Next, the process and content structure of how the statistics are produced as a result of the survey should be clarified. The political implications of these statistics should be analyzed. Through this, the social and political significance and effects of the civilian casualties can be explained.

This study questions the political implications of 'damage surveys' in war, but due to the limitations of the data surrounding the survey, we will begin the study in the context of statistics and statistical production. In this process, we also try to discover new statistics

Statistics, published in two volumes by Statistics Korea in 1992, can be said to be an early study of the statistical system after liberation. However, this book considers the post-liberation statistical system as a 'transition period' and a 'trying period of historical progress' and evaluates it as a period of turmoil (Statistics Korea, 1992a: 207). These assessments are based on colonial rule and

and organize the discovered statistics in a time series. However, I will limit my discussion to the accuracy and reliability of the statistics, and the detailed historical implications they reveal. The statistical verification of the statistics produced during the Korean War is beyond the scope of this study.

It is in line with the view of the orientation towards 'developmentalist modernity' with conflicting views of the Park Chung-hee regime. This book defines the Japanese colonial rule as a one-sided expropriation and believes that the traditional method of statistical production that has been handed down since ancient times and the direction of modern statistics, which was able to develop independently, collapsed with the colonial rule of the Japanese imperialists. In addition, the Japanese imperialists used statistical instruments to expropriate the colonies, and even when they were liberated, they destroyed all the data and did not hand over the technology, which did not contribute to the development of Korean statistics. (Of course, the same way of describing it can be seen in the preface to the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea, written as early as 1952 by Tak Jang-je, director of the National Statistics Bureau. According to this, it is emphasized that there was no independent statistical organization during the Japanese period, but after the establishment of the government, a statistical organization was created (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Information, 1952, 『Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea, 1952』). For this reason, the 1950s is considered to be a period of turmoil in which the remnants of the Korean War and colonial rule existed, and this confusion was resolved by the dispatch of the U.S. statistical advisors in 1958, the emergence of Park Chung-hee in 1960, and the establishment of the Economic Planning Institute in 1961. It is described as the beginning of modern statistics. This narrative shows that the existing statistical history narrative has emerged in the form of a combination of the theory of intrinsic development and the theory of modernization.

In addition to the analysis of research and statistics, we will deal with the historical context of civilian casualties and their implications. We will examine the background in which the war damage of civilians emerged as an important factor in modern warfare and the universal moral requirement of civilian protection emerged. And it is necessary to understand how this is actually transmuted or transformed in the face of the concrete situation of the Korean War. In addition, how research and statistical production are given authority as formal knowledge and exert social and political influences, And how it is being transformed is also of interest. In order to see this, discourses, laws, and institutions, including the actors surrounding harm, must also be examined. On the other hand, before dealing with the content of civilian casualties, it is necessary to establish the scope of 'human damage' and 'civilian' as the object of study. The definition of a civilian in war is indistinct, and it is not easy to distinguish it. The same is true for human casualties. In this paper, we will look at the scope of civilian casualties as defined by the Korean government's surveys and statistics.⁸⁾ However, the point that this study considers is that the definition of what constitutes human injury to civilians is based on the arbitrary or intentional judgment of the subject who defines it. This is because if civilians are to be protected in war, then the judgment of whether or not a particular person should be

judged to be a civilian must also depend on the arbitrary interpretation of the state and the military. Similarly, in the case of human damage, whether to consider what is considered 'damage' or not as damage depends on the subject of the investigation, that is, the subject of the investigation of the damage.⁹⁾ On the other hand, the terminology that refers to human casualties can also be problematic. Civilian Deaths, Civilians

8) Civilians are not a socially constructed concept, but rather a legal concept defined by international humanitarian law or the laws of war. In general, people who are "not soldiers" are recognized as civilians, but they can sometimes be difficult to classify depending on whether they are armed or not, or how they are involved in the war. As such, there is no clear definition of who is or is not a civilian, and this study does not attempt to define it clearly. However, the South Korean government limited the scope of the investigation to "non-combatants, excluding military personnel" to civilian casualties. In this study, we aim to look at the damage caused to civilians according to the Korean government's investigation standards.

9) For example, Roberts (2010) suggests that there are seven types of civilian casualties in war. 1. Deaths due to the direct effects of war, 2. Injuries caused by the direct effects of war, 3. Deaths during or after war due to the indirect effects of war: disease, anarchy, and other factors of war, 4. Victims of unilateral violence: massacres of civilians by the state, etc., 5. Sexual violence caused by war, 6. Refugees, displaced persons, and 7. Deaths due to wartime injuries. These items list various types of damages, each with its own reasons for being recognized as war damage, but not all of these are always considered civilian casualties. This is because there are complex factors at work in determining harm. This complexity of determining human damage makes it ambiguous what constitutes harm. There is a problem of choosing the category of damage.

Casualties, civilian victims, and civilian victims are all similar concepts that refer to war victims, but each term has a different connotation. The issue is whether or not deaths, injuries and indirect victims should be included in the scope of the damage. For example, the term adopted by the Commission for the Settlement of Past Incidents was "civilian casualties." 'Sacrifice' goes beyond death and injury to both the direct and indirect effects of war.

This is because it can be included.¹⁰⁾

(1) Primary Damage: Death, Injury, etc.

In this study, we want to divide civilian damage into primary and secondary damage. There are two criteria for classifying war damage: the type of damage and the object. If we classify the damage by focusing on the object of damage, the damage can be divided into human damage and material damage, and the human damage can be divided into civilian damage and military damage.¹¹⁾ If we classify the human damage of civilians according to the type of damage, the primary damage is the direct impact on the life of the war and can be said to be the damage corresponding to death or injury, and the

secondary damage is the indirect effect of the war on the life of the war, and it can be said that it corresponds to the war damage caused by the war and the life of the evacuee. This distinction is made not only because of the different types of human damage, but also because the investigation of the damage was carried out in a different way. Even when the Korean government surveyed and cleaned up the damage during the Korean War, there was a complete distinction between the dead and the wounded and the refugees. Depending on the type of damage, the way the state investigated and responded differed.

10) The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was also a process in which state institutions recognized some forms of damage as damage and excluded other aspects from harm. Kim Dong-chun, who was the chairman of the standing committee at the time, recalls that the commission excluded armed partisans from the civilian population while setting the crime of "illegal mass sacrifice of civilians," which was the subject of the committee's investigation. In their case, "it is difficult to see them as unjust victims" (Kim Dong-chun, 2013: 275). In addition, in the case of 'victims', there were various forms of victimization, but only those who lost their lives were considered as victims and the truth was investigated, resulting in the exclusion of the injured who did not die at the scene of the massacre but returned alive to their lives (Kim Dong-chun, 2013: 277~278). In addition, since the target of the committee's investigation was illegal genocide, it was difficult to determine whether it was illegal or not, and individual killings were either excluded from investigation or could not be identified. In this way, the question of classifying and classifying civilian harms, and what constitutes harm and what should not be acknowledged as damages, has been repeated over and over again. As such, the human toll of the Korean War is being reconstructed anew even today.

11) This classification follows the classification of war damage presented in the National History Compilation Committee, 2013, Korean Economic Policy Data 8 (Kim Min-hwan and Kang Sung-hyun). Typical categories of primary damages include death and injury. Death or injury is the most comprehensive and widespread form of damage in all wars, and during the Korean War, massacres were investigated as a subclassification of deaths, and missing persons and kidnappings were also included in this category. However, the cause of death and injury, the cause of the injury, and the time of the injury have not been investigated or investigated to a limited extent. The investigation of primary damage is directly related to the outcome of the war. Primary damage is cumulative and does not reduce the damage caused. In other words, it's a form of damage that can't be revived or cared for by those who have already been harmed. For this reason, primary damage is usually useful in explaining the outcome of a war. This is because the various damages caused by the effects of war are difficult to identify or identify, but deaths are clearly recognizable.

(2) Secondary damage: evacuation, relocation, etc.

Civilian casualties during the Korean War are mainly examined with a focus on deaths, as previously examined in the study. However, the more widespread damage during the war was secondary damage, such as the displacement of large numbers of refugees, war-induced disasters, and starvation. In the case of secondary damage, it can be said that there is no loss of life or injury, but the person has lost their livelihood due to the war and is unable to live on their own, or their place of residence is unknown due to evacuation. Since millions of refugees were displaced during the Korean War, and there were just as many other victims of war, the most important and immediate issue to be solved from the perspective of the time was the resolution of secondary damages. In addition, the survey of refugees was directly related to the relief of refugees, which can be said to be a form of damage that must be continuously managed and resolved.

However, existing research on war damage rarely deals with evacuation or war damage. This is because the process of evacuation is not understood from the perspective of war damage, but is seen as voluntary escape or hiding. However, evacuation and displacement are common forms of damage that resulted directly from the vast majority of civilians in the Korean War. Therefore, it is impossible to get a complete picture of civilian casualties during the Korean War without considering secondary damage. On the other hand, primary and secondary damage are not completely distinguished. This is because if the primary damage is the damage as a result, the secondary damage is the damage as a process. Secondary displacement, such as the hardships caused by displacement and displacement, food and shelter insecurity, and the threat of disease, can lead to death or injury at any time. In addition, the meaning of primary and secondary is only distinguished through the form of damage, and does not refer to the antecedent relationship or the influence of the damage on each other. In this study, the two types were differentiated based on the type of damage that the Korean government wanted to identify, and the characteristics of each type are shown in Table 1> <.

<Table 1> Types of civilian casualties

Types of damage	Primary Damage	Secondary Damage
Details of the damage	Death, injury, missing persons, etc.	Evacuation, relocation, etc.
Features of damage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Destruction and loss of life as a direct result of war -Cumulative damage - Irreparable damage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threats to life and property due to the indirect effects of war -Fluid damage - Recoverable damage

4. Research materials

In this study, a number of statistics related to civilian casualties produced during the Korean War were first collected. First and foremost, the most important data are the official statistical collections or publications produced by the Korean government before and after the war. First of all, the final collection of statistics on the damage caused by the war is the "Comprehensive Survey of Damage in the Land-Io Incident" produced by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information. This survey table presents 48 statistics related to war damage without much commentary, and this is the final form of official statistics. Other statistical collections include the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952 by the Tonggye Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information and the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1954 by the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of the Interior. In particular, the 1952 edition, the first statistical yearbook immediately after the establishment of the government, contains a separate chapter on the war damage survey before the Comprehensive Damage Survey Table. The results of the war damage survey in 1950 and 1951, the first half of the war, can be found mainly in the Korean War series published by the Korean War Veterans' Association, which is affiliated with the Chung Hoon Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense. The Korean War Series, the official history of the Korean War period, has been published in a total of five volumes, from the first year to the fifth year, and each volume contains a war log, various materials and documents related to the war, and in particular, there is a statistics section at the end, which contains a large number of statistics related to the war. Some of the official publications are the "Records of the First Anniversary of the Freedom of the Six Incidents" compiled by the Central Committee for Propaganda Measures of the Ministry of Public Information and published by the National People's Assembly. Free Korea was basically created for the purpose of promoting the war, and there are some statistics on it. In addition, many of the statistics from the above primary sources are contained in the Korean Economic Policy Data 8 Translation and Statistics, published by the National History Compilation Committee.

In addition to the statistics, there are several lists that served as the basis for statistics. All of these lists were produced by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information, and the ones that have been unearthed are the "List of Victims of the Special City of Seoul", the "List of Victims of the Six-Io Incident", the "List of Abductees during the Six-Io Incident", and the "List of North Koreans in the Six-Io Incident". These lists are almost the only basic data related to the damage survey at the time. In particular, in the

case of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, it was created immediately after the restoration of Seoul in 1950 and additionally contains the results of various damage surveys conducted in Seoul. Except for the North Korean Lists of these lists.

One of the registers is available in the National Assembly Library's Electronic Library (<http://dl.nanet.go.kr>).

Statistics to fill in the gaps between official government publications were made mainly from what was published in the press of the time. The details of the various damage surveys published in newspapers are not as detailed as official statistics, but it is easy to grasp the overall trend and trend. Newspaper materials were mainly used by 『Minju Sinbo』, 『Chosun Ilbo』, 『Daesangil』, 『Donga Ilbo』, and 『Kyunghyang Sinmun』, which were composed of the Korean History Database (<http://db.history.go.kr>), Naver News Library (<http://newslibrary.naver.com>), and Jo of the National History Compilation Committee, respectively.

These are the articles that can be found in the Sunbo Archives (http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_archive/). Newspaper articles are also an important source for understanding the historical context of the war surrounding the damage. We collected a number of newspaper articles describing the government's measures against the damage and the actual situation of the damage. Primary sources other than statistics are mainly related to surveys or processing of statistics at the time, as well as the harm inflicted on civilians. First, materials that can show the intentions of the state were used in the National Archives, such as various official documents, minutes of state meetings, and reports. The National Archives of Korea provides a number of online documents, which can be found on the National Archives website (<http://www.archives.go.kr>). In addition, the National Archives of Korea provides a separate search service for the three sections, such as the State Council Records page (<http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/cabinet/viewMain>) for the minutes of the State Council, and the official gazette page (<http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/gazette/viewMain.do>) for the official gazette, which was used to publicize the government's policies at the time. In addition, the minutes of the National Assembly meetings during the Korean War were consulted, and the minutes of the National Assembly meetings are provided in the National Assembly Digital Library as they are. However, there are a number of missing pages related to the Korean War.

II. Background and Structure of the Investigation of Civilian Casualties

1. Protection of civilians in wartime

(1) Expansion of international humanitarian law

The development of the laws of war in Europe consisted in devising various rules that defined the form and content of war. The laws of war, which were aimed at defining the legitimacy and legality of war through the justification of war and maintaining the European order on this basis, gradually moved toward defining the rules of combat conduct as the war became more and more in the form of total war. The Hague Land War Act of 1907 and the Treaty of Versailles before and after the First World War in 1919 based on the concern about unlimited war, declared that there should be certain rules in warfare. Based on this, war crimes could be defined or punished.⁶⁷ This led to the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which prohibited war itself.^[13] However, the rules of war have not prevented the outbreak of war, nor have they prevented the inhumane acts that occur in the midst of war. The outbreak and course of World War II, and its conclusion, have resulted in every type of horrific killing that man can imagine. In particular, war violence at the state level was committed against a large number of civilians, and intentional killings of civilians were rampant everywhere, such as the Holocaust by the Nazis, the Katyn Forest massacre by the Soviet Union, and the massacre

⁶ Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Versailles provide for the punishment of war crimes committed by defeated Germany in international courts under the heading "penalties". These war crimes were committed against the nationals of the Allied or multiple States and were mentioned in Article 229. The prosecution was mainly against German officers who had violated the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, such as killing prisoners of war or attacking hospital ships, and the trials against them fizzled out poorly (Katko Tayachi, 2010: 17). In addition, the chapters under Article 231 dealt with war reparations.

⁷ The Geneva Protocol provides for the prevention of war in Articles 10 and 17. These provisions, unlike the existing "just war," were an attempt to prohibit and criminalize war itself. This was an attempt to dismantle the existing international law, European public law, and move toward a new form of international law, the League of Nations (Schmitt, 1995). Schmitt criticizes this prohibition of war as having a weak theoretical foundation.

in Nanjing by the Japanese military. With the goal of destroying the rear areas and breaking the will to fight, the

act of fighting itself also went in the direction of mass murder of civilians. In particular, aerial bombardment by strategic bombers led to the indiscriminate destruction of civilian residential areas and production facilities in the rear.⁸ The bombing of Dresden and the Blitz on Tokyo were deliberate large-scale bombing of civilian settlements in order to break the will to fight, and the end of these strategies was the dropping of two nuclear bombs.

After World War II, there was a strong argument for the protection of wartime soldiers and civilians under international law, along with a reflection on the war itself. The result was the Genocide Treaty of 1948, the Geneva Four Conventions of 1949, and the emergence of "crimes against humanity" in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. International law on all conflicts such as this one prohibits intentional and collective killings of civilians or unarmed soldiers. This was defined as a war crime.^{[15] [16]} In particular, the fourth of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of victims of war "The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Civilians in All Cities" was the first international law to directly regulate the protection of civilians.^[17] Although the law limited the scope of protection to the citizens of the State party to the Convention and did not target acts of violence against its own citizens by the State (Yoo, Jae-hyung, 2011), it was previously implicit. Its significance was that it elevated civilians who had been protected only as enemies to objects of protection under international law.¹⁸⁾

Emphasis was placed on indiscriminate strikes on the western rear areas. It was under this strategy that the bombing of civilians in World War II took place (Kim, 2013: 28-29).

- 15) In the case of the Genocide Convention, the intentional sabotage of a group of people is defined as genocide. However, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide, saw not only physical and direct acts of destruction, but also social acts of destruction against a specific group of people as genocide (Sunghyun Kang, 2008). The Korean government ratified the Genocide Convention in the National Assembly in December 1951. For more information on Genocide, see Ho-Keun Choi, 2005, *Genocide*, Book World. See.
- 16) The term "crimes against humanity" originated in denunciation of the Turkish genocide of Armenians during the First World War, and was coined and applied after the Second World War to punish war crimes (murder, genocide, enslavement, deportation, etc.). However, it was criticized as an after-the-fact law because it applied retroactively to the inhumane acts of World War II (Dayachikako, 2010: 108).

⁸ Due, the founder of the theory of strategic bombing, believes that bombing should be used to destroy the will to war.

- 17) For the text of the Geneva Conventions, see Korean Red Cross, 1985, 『Collection of the Four Geneva Conventions』, Korean Red Cross.

18) The Geneva Conventions do not clearly define what a civilian is, but it defines who the convention subjects are, and thus determines the limits of civilianism. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions establishes as "persons who do not take part directly in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have surrendered their arms and persons who are placed outside of combat due to illness, injury, detention or other reasons", and Article 4 provides that "persons protected by this Convention shall be persons who, in the event of an armed conflict or occupation, are at a particular time and within the power of the conflicting State or the occupying State, regardless of their form... (omitted)... No person protected by the Geneva Convention on the Improvement of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of the Armed Forces on Land, the Geneva Convention on the Improvement of the Condition of the Wounded, the Sick and the Distressed in the Armed Forces at Sea, or the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War shall be considered a protected within the meaning of this Convention." It is revealed.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was just after international interest in the protection of civilians in wartime became widespread and it was stipulated in international law. As the Korean War took the form of an all-out war and took the form of an international war with the participation of the United Nations, the international community's attention was focused on the Korean peninsula on whether the protection of civilians in wartime was properly implemented. For those who fought in the war, the Korean War was an important test of the application of post-World War II humanitarian laws.

However, the Geneva Fourth Convention for the Protection of Civilians limited the scope of protection to States Parties to the Convention by Article 2. None of the countries involved in the Korean War had ratified the Fourth Convention, and the Korean War did not apply to this clause, so the participating nations were not obligated to abide by this clause. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the South Korean government, United Nations forces, and the North Korean army, headed by MacArthur, pledged to abide by the Geneva Third Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. It was unclear whether this would extend to the Fourth Convention.⁹ The Korean government ratified the entire Geneva Convention of 1949 only in 1966, a considerable time after the war.

⁹ There is some controversy over whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the Korean War. Some argue for examining the applicability of the convention through a comprehensive interpretation (Cho Si-hyun, 2001, Lee Jae-gon & Jeong Gu-do, 2008), while others argue for its inapplicability through a limited interpretation of the article (Kim Myung-ki, 2006).

However, the fact that the convention did not have a direct effect did not mean that the need for the protection of civilians had disappeared. The high command of the war was also sensitive to the massacre of civilians in the war, and had no choice but

to deal with civilian issues carefully. This was because there was a possibility that civilian issues could undermine the legitimacy or cause of the war.

When the Korean War broke out, the countries participating in the war conducted a war damage survey and a civilian damage survey at the same time. Surveys of civilian casualties provided good evidence to show how harshly the other country treated civilians. Investigations of civilians have uncovered violations of international humanitarian law. And the United Nations has become a forum for warring parties to complain about how cruel the other side has been to civilians and what kind of war crimes their actions have been.

(2) The United Nations and Humanitarian Aid The Korean War broke out as a civil war, and the actual fighting took place only in the areas of the Korean Peninsula, but with the intervention of the United Nations forces, the political arena of the war shifted to the United Nations. As soon as the Korean War broke out, the United Nations reacted quickly to the war. On the day of the outbreak of the war, the Security Council adopted a resolution declaring North Korea's attack a "violation of peace," and two days later, on June 27, the Security Council decided to intervene in the Korean War in the name of the United Nations. Thus, the Korean War became the war in which Yu Yen participated.

The process of creating the United Nations was an extension of the liberal war management scheme that had led to the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations

(Kim, 2013: 126). In the process of reshaping the post-war world after World War II, the United Nations emerged as a global organization responsible for war and peace, preventing large-scale wars that the post-World War I treaties had failed to prevent.

C. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by nations, as well as war, was considered illegal, and the United Nations was entrusted with the responsibility of mediating and resolving such armed conflicts. And the outbreak of the Korean War was a test of the United Nations' ability to fulfill this role.²⁰⁾

Because the United Nations intervention was based on the principles of peace and defense against unlawful attack, the United Nations was also the venue for the practice of international humanitarian law after World War II. Shortly after the UN intervention, the Soviet Union pointed out the illegality of the UN resolutions, argued that the UN intervention was unjustified, and that UN intervention in the war was causing inhumane civilian killings. In particular, since August 1950, North Korea, together with the Soviet Union, has officially raised the issue of civilian killing, especially aerial bombardment by the U.S. military, at the United Nations. In response, the U.S. and South Korean militaries said that the U.S. bombing was directed at military facilities, not civilian areas. I had to excuse myself by saying that I was warning them through the press before the bombing.^[21] The United Nations also provided humanitarian aid at the same time as the military intervention. The United Nations, which had recruited relief supplies through a Security Council resolution on intervention in the Korean War, decided to carry out relief efforts for Koreans under the direction of the United Nations Command through the Security Council resolution of 31 July.^[22] Accordingly, the United Nations sought to implement the principle of providing relief to civilian victims and protecting civilians from war.

In the Korean War, the United Nations sought to apply humanitarian principles to the treatment of prisoners of war in addition to assistance to refugees. Civilian Coverage
During the Geneva Conventions

20) On the liberal nature of the creation of the United Nations and the debate over the intervention in the Korean War, see Hakjae Kim, 2013, "The Korean War and Liberal Peace Planning," Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University. See.

21) Transcription Society, 1951, *The First Year of the Korean War*, p. C8. 22) Transcription Society, 1951, *The First Year of the Korean War*, p. C103.

This is because the Convention on Ships did not apply in the Korean War, but the Convention on POWs did. The issue of POWs in the Korean War became the most important issue surrounding the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War, as the issue of the treatment of POWs and the treatment of POWs, such as detention, and in particular, the issue of the repatriation of POWs came to the fore. Compared to the issue of

prisoners of war, the issue of refugees, which is the issue of war victims, has not become much of a political issue. Although North Korea argued that the refugees who had been evacuated from North Korea in large numbers were forced or illegally evacuated through intimidation or the threat of atomic bombing, and that they should be returned to North Korea in the same way as the repatriation of prisoners of war¹⁰, the issue of repatriation of abductees was not only confronted, but also became a secondary discussion due to the seriousness of the POW issue. Nonetheless, the large-scale reception and relief of refugees was an important device to show the United Nations' humanitarian involvement in the Korean War. It emphasized the role of the United Nations not only to mediate wars, but also to solve civilian problems.

The expansion of international humanitarian law and the United Nations' involvement in the war made the Korean War an experimental ground for a new kind of international politics. It was necessary for the United Nations to realize through the Korean War that a new world system of international consensus on the protection of civilians in wartime and opposition to illegal war was possible. The failure of the Korean War was also a testament to the failure of the liberal world order. However, it was not easy to put humanitarian law and humanitarianism into practice in the field of war. Furthermore, the political importance of humanitarianism was already weakened in the Korean War as a proxy war in the Cold War. In this context, the investigation of civilian casualties has become a reactive approach to the damage that has already occurred.

2. Investigation and propaganda of North Korea's war damage

North Korea suffered severe war damage due to the Korean War. Unlike South Korea, where there was little fighting outside the front line after the front line reached a stalemate, in North Korea, air strikes continued until the last point when the armistice was signed and entered into force due to bombing by the U.S. Air Force. As a result of the fighting and bombing, major cities in North Korea were irreparably destroyed, and in Pyongyang the damage was so severe that no buildings taller than two stories were left to be used as a target for the bombing. Continuous bombing has focused North Korea's war damage on civilian areas. In the early stages of the war, the U.S. Air Force adopted a

¹⁰ Korean Central News Agency, 1952, 『Korean Central Yearbook 1951~1952』, Korean Central News Agency, pp. 113~115.

precision bombing policy conscious of international public opinion on the protection of civilians, but it was practically

impossible to bomb industrial and military facilities except civilian areas with the bombing technology of the time (Kim Tae-woo, 2013: 146). In addition, as the war progressed into the second half of the war, the U.S. military expanded its bombing area and shifted to a scorched-earth strategy that destroyed all infrastructure, causing widespread and lasting damage. In response to this, North Korea has been investigating and responding to the war damage very actively from the beginning of the damage. The 1951~1952 edition of the Korean Central Yearbook, published during the war, contains reports on the survey results of the Fatherland Reunification and Democracy Front (Fatherland Front), which played a pivotal role in the war damage survey, and through this, we can examine the history of North Korea's war damage survey. Prior to the outbreak of war, North Korea conducted evacuation investigations into various armed clashes that occurred near the 38th parallel. The survey was conducted with the political intent of demonstrating that the Rhee regime and the U.S. military protecting it intended to invade North Korea, and at the same time emphasizing that the attack on North Korean territory by the ROK military was directly harming civilians. The investigation began in 1949 and includes detailed engagements and case-by-case reports of inhumane acts such as assaults, massacres, kidnappings, vandalism, and looting of North Koreans.¹¹⁾

The experience of such damage surveys led to damage survey activities immediately after the outbreak of war. On July 14, 1950, the Central Committee of the Fatherland Front established the Fatherland War Line Investigation Committee, chaired by Heo Hun, and began investigating the damage. The Fatherland Front Investigative Committee continued its investigative activities throughout the entire period of the war, and a total of five investigations were published in the report, which mainly focused on specific cases of civilian harm caused by the U.S. or ROK military. The first issue of the Fatherland Front's report covers the damage survey from July to early August 1950. The report is

¹¹ Korean Central News Agency, 1952, 『Korean Central Yearbook 1951~1952』, Korean Central News Agency, pp. 129~136. The title of the report is "Report of the Commission of Investigation of the Fatherland United Democratic Front on the Investigation Results of the Armed Conflict along the 38th Parallel," and the cases included in the report were submitted along with photographs and other evidence. However, the report of the "Cho Election Central Yearbook" does not contain any evidence.

divided into four chapters, each dealing with the bombing of urban and rural residential areas, the bombing of cultural and other facilities, the peaceful killing of crowds, and the destruction of factories and manufactories. Each case gives details of when, where, who, and what was attacked

or destroyed.¹²⁾ This seems to indicate that the investigation of the Fatherland Front was carried out at the village level, and the results of this survey were synthesized and reported to a higher authority, so that the details of the damage could be investigated. Surveys of the Fatherland Front were carried out in the entire occupied areas of North Korea, as well as in areas of southern South Korea during the occupation of North Korea. Moreover, the Fatherland Front's investigations were relatively accurate. This is because when the bombing cases published by the DPRK were compared with the operational reports of the US Air Force, the number of planes and the details of the damage were found to be quite similar (Kim Tae-woo, 2013: 123), but at least the North Korean damage survey was not merely a one-sided exaggeration or political rhetoric. The purpose of the North Korean investigation was to denounce the atrocities committed against civilians by the South Korean and U.S. militaries, especially war crimes committed by the U.S. military. The Fatherland Front's first report accused the United States of "waging a war in blatant violation of the norms of international law and humanitarian principles,"^[26] while its second report claimed that the U.S. was "waging a war against the Korean people in a blatant violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter" while the U.S. military "continues to commit inhumane atrocities in disregard of international law and humanitarianism in the DPRK."^[27] Further, Reportage No. 4 said that "the American aggressors are concealing their criminal atrocities under the so-called peaceful flag of the United Nations" and compared them to Hitler's atrocities. It sought to accuse the U.S. military of committing war crimes through a list of specific cases of damage. In particular, North Korea's accusations in the Fatherland Front's report initially focused on the bombing and shelling by the US military, but as the war progressed, the targets became more diverse. Reports from 1951 onwards show massacres and rapes committed during the U.S. occupation of North Korea, It investigates looting and killings in areas reclaimed by U.S. forces. From mid-1951 onwards, the United States claimed that it was using three bactericidal and chemical weapons, and actively went on the offensive. In addition, the

¹² For example: "On July 4, six U.S. military aircraft raided the Mun-ae-ri farming village near Nampo and fired four rounds of machine-gun fire on the farmers who were weeding in Chongqing. As a result, 15 farmers, including a female farmer named Kim Mo, who was nursing a young child in a paddock

clearest demonstration of North Korea's intentions is the formation and investigation of a multinational investigative team to prosecute war crimes committed by the US military. The report on war crimes, which is similar to the report of the Fatherland Front, denounces the U.S.

military's use of germ warfare, chemical warfare, massacres, and bombings, and presents the Hague Land Warfare Act of 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as the basis for the accusation of war crimes.²⁸⁾

ibid., p. 152

26) Ibid., p. 149

27) Ibid., p. 157

28) Ibid., pp. 212-213. North Korea's judgment also shows that the Geneva Treaty of 1949 on the protection of civilians is unlikely to be applied to the Korean War. North Korea Abuses Prisoners Furthermore, North Korea chose the United Nations as the place to prosecute and define these civilian casualties as war crimes. North Korea's foreign minister, Pak Hun-yong, sent a letter to Malik, the president of the UN Security Council, on August 5, when the bombing was in full swing, stressing that the U.S. bombing was a violation of international law and inhumane.^[29] Starting with this, Pak sent a total of eight letters to the United Nations in 1950 alone, arguing that the U.S. military's attacks on civilians were unjustified. At least once every two months until the end of 1952, a document condemning war crimes such as bombings, massacres, and germ warfare by U.S. forces was sent out.

As China and the Soviet Union agreed with North Korea's concerns, there were also demands at the United Nations to ensure that the US military's actions comply with international law and humanitarianism. In response, the United States accused the Soviet Union of using its presidency of the UN Security Council to help North Korea fight for aggression, and responded by saying that it recommends the evacuation of civilians through a bombing system before the bombing, and that there is no problem because the bombing is limited to military objectives.^[30] While the U.S. did not respond to all of North Korea's subsequent allegations, at least the protests against the killing of civilians served as a political rhetoric. The United Nations, led by the United States, continued to ignore North Korea's incessant accusations and accusations, but it was not free from such accusations. The U.S. military has always chosen the latter when it comes to operational needs for civilian protection, but the resulting political consequences have been forced to be ignored or refuted.

North Korea conducted a full-scale and full-scale investigation of civilian casualties and prepared a detailed report on the damage. And it has been used as an effective tool in the political arena of the international community. Nonetheless, it is impossible to know the full picture of the civilian casualties suffered by North Korea. This is because North Korea has not yet presented this through statistics. The only statistical data on North Korea's human casualties that have been made public so far are estimates of population changes, data revealed by the Cho Chongryon-affiliated Unification Chosun Sinmun, and data revealed by the release of documents from the former Soviet Union. The total number of human casualties officially announced or disclosed by North Korea is unknown. However, since the Soviet data cites North Korean statistics, it is indirect

Only when it was mentioned, did it use the Geneva Accords as a basis. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Hague Land War Statutes (Articles 23, 27, 46, 52, etc.) and the Geneva Protocol contained grounds for defining U.S. military actions as war crimes.

29) Ibid., pp. 93~94. Considering that the case of the bombing under investigation in the first issue of the Fatherland Front report appears only until August 3, it appears that the United Nations was informed as soon as the first investigation into the damage caused by the bombing was completed. 30) Transcription Society, *A Year of the Korean War, 1951*, p. C8. Busan Ilbo, 1950.08.13.

We can only estimate this¹³). North Korea has officially disclosed the figures and disclosed the details of the massacre of about 170,000 people who were allegedly killed by the US military during the Korean War. North Korea characterizes this as a massacre by the US military and has maintained this until recently. However, it has not disclosed any concrete evidence to support this figure.

The reason why North Korea cites the cases of civilian war damage as an active propaganda tool but does not disclose the extent of the damage appears to be because the damage has been so great. In arguing for victory or defeat in the war, there was no need to admit and publicize the fact that the South suffered far greater damage than the South. In addition, in order to accuse U.S. and South Korean forces of violating international humanitarian law, it was more effective to present concrete and provocative examples than to reveal the extent of the damage.

¹³ Lee Shin-chul, 2010, "Massacre of Civilians in the North during the June 25 Civil War," *The Korean War through the Eyes of Historiography*, The Humanist, According to the data from the Russian Foreign Policy Archives presented by Lee Shin-chul, the total number of North Korean casualties is 1,798,000. The data indicates that these statistics are from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

3. The Rise of the Wartime State and the Politics of Exclusion

As soon as the Korean War broke out, the Korean government began a preliminary inspection. In accordance with the preliminary inspection order, prosecutors from

all over the country were detained, and political prisoners and disobedient elements, including members of the Bodo Union, were targeted for inspection. And as a result of these preliminary inspections, thousands of civilians were massacred one after another throughout the country. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Bodo Union members died in the first month or so of the war. Systematic massacres could have taken place all too easily and without much resistance throughout the country.

The South Korean government used legal mechanisms such as the National Defense and Security Act, the National Security Law, and the Decree on Special Measures for the Punishment of Crimes under the State of Emergency to kill civilians through preliminary inspections.

All of them.¹⁴The various laws that made the massacre possible were ambiguous in their legal justification and applicability, but they did not hinder their application in times of war. The massacre was carried out as thoroughly as if it had been prepared. And what made this possible was the background of war and martial law.

With the outbreak of war, the Korean government entered a wartime system. On June 28, the Presidential Decree on Emergency Order No. 1 issued a Decree on Special Measures for the Punishment of Crimes under the State of Emergency, and on June 2, a Special Measures Decree on the Payment of Deposits in Financial Institutions, etc., was issued to secure wartime security and the cost of waging war, and on July 8, martial law

¹⁴ Regarding the structure and nature of these laws, the following studies have been conducted. Kang, Sung-hyun, 2012, "The Legal Structure of the 'State of Exception' in Korea's State-Forming Period: Focusing on the National Security Law (1948, 1949, 1950) and the Martial Law Act (1949)," *Society and History* 94. Kang, Sunghyun, 2014, "Legal Structure, Operation, and Results of Preliminary Inspection in the Korean War Period," *Society and History* No. 103. Kim Duc-joong, 2010, "A LawHistorical Approach to Investigating the Truth of the Massacre of Civilians: Focusing on the 'National Defense and Security Act'", *Asia Studies* No. 142. Kim Hak-jae, 2011, "Presidential Emergency Orders and Legislation of Exceptional States During the Korean War: Decree on Special Measures on the Punishment of Crimes under the State of Emergency

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was declared.¹⁵) Even as the front continued to be pushed back, the Korean government issued various legal measures to reorganize the country for the conduct of the war. There were 10 emergency orders before the recapture of Seoul.

The initial situation of the Korean War was the most indicative of the vulnerability of the South Korean state, and the top leadership, including the head of government, failed to properly prepare for or predict the war, and was therefore slow to respond. Even after the fall of Seoul, the situation was so urgent that only a few people, including President Rhee Seung-man, managed to escape secretly, and it was impossible for the state to function properly in such a situation. In the first place, the war broke out less than two years after the government was established. Before the establishment of the state, the collapse came first.

However, what was essential for a wartime state was the use of the military for war and the police for rear management, and the Rhee government still held both in its hands. On the contrary, wartime conditions made it easier for the military and police to exercise power beyond the law. As a result, there was no problem with the massacre of civilians. Paradoxically, war has created a powerful state, or at least a powerful state capable of controlling the lives of its citizens.

The massacre of civilians by the South Korean government was the extreme exclusion of a part of the population. Such exclusions had already occurred in Jeju and Yeosu before the war. The extermination of the "reds" in Jeju and Yeosu was an example for the people of how to deal with an enemy who had already resisted the state.¹⁶The war only served as a catalyst for its expansion to the whole country. The exclusion of some people was also an attempt to encompass others in a violent way. Civilians had to be loyal and dependent on the Western state to preserve their lives. This "policy of exclusion" of civilians served as an important foundation for maintaining the Korean government throughout the war. The nationwide arrests and punishments of collaborators after the recapture of Seoul were an extension of this.³⁵⁾

¹⁵) For the contents of each emergency order, see the Korean War Journal, 1951, pp. C43~C49. Reference.

¹⁶) The 'reds' in the Yeosu case were the process of creating non-citizens who were not citizens, non-human beings who were not human beings, and at the same time the process of creating communists as enemies (Kim Deok-joong, 2009).

What the politics of exclusion shows is how the state viewed its citizens during the Korean War. And for the state, the people were objects of suspicion. It was considered that he betrayed the state at any time, or was likely to do so, such as a press league or a collaborator. Citizens had to be checked at any time, and they had to be checked to make sure they were not spies or leftists. Absolute loyalty to the state was required, and the people had to live up to it.

The investigation of war damage during the Korean War should be approached with this relationship between the state and the people in mind. The fact that the South

Korean government was "investigating" civilians was because it involved a certain point of view, even if it was a damage survey. Therefore, how the process of exclusion and inclusion, suspicion and verification of civilians in the process of damage investigation proceeded should be examined in a later chapter.

But was the massacre of civilians considered war damage? This is the most difficult point to answer. It is unclear whether the people killed in the punishment of collaborators in the South during the invasion of the North, including leftist political prisoners and members of the Bodo League, whom the South Korean government targeted in the early days of the war, were accepted by the South Korean government as part of the "civilian harm." The massacres of civilians by the South Korean government's military and police were clearly a key part of the killing of civilians in the early stages of the war. If these massacres had been included in the war victims, the government's investigation of civilian casualties would have been a process of packaging the massacres it had committed as if they were the inevitable causes of war. And if it hadn't, the damage to so many would have been covered up. The process of investigating war damage was the process of collecting and organizing all the damage caused by the war.

It was also a process of dividing and classifying the enormous amount of war damage. The investigation of civilian victims was also a means of triaging and controlling civilian victims. In the process, the state was making political judgments about including and excluding the victims of war, acknowledging the damage or not seeing it as a victim.

[35] Park (2002) describes this as negative integration.

III. Investigation of Primary Damage: Classification of Civilians

1.The main body of the damage investigation

Surveys of war damage during the Korean War were conducted by various ministries of the Korean government. The ministries investigated the damage in areas of responsibility, such as industry, infrastructure, telecommunications, and public facilities, and reported it to higher authorities to synthesize the damage. In order to grasp the damage situation in all civilian sectors except for the military and to control and manage the damage, it was important for government departments to conduct proper surveys in each area. However, in the case of civilian victimization, no investigation was carried out by a single ministry. Personal damages, such as death and injuries, and matters related to food, clothing, and shelter, such as loss of housing and clothing, which are generally the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, were basically recognized as the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, but when it was limited to human casualties, various agencies such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Public Information Office participated in the investigation of civilian casualties, and the subject of the investigation and the subject of the investigation changed depending on the passage of time. The involvement of various ministries in the investigation of the damage is related to the direction in which the government wanted to deal with civilian casualties. This is because the content and purpose of the investigation appear differently depending on the nature of the subject of the investigation. In particular, in the case of war damages, the government is the only institution that has access to the comprehensive picture of the damages, and intellectuals and civil society outside the government have not intervened at all in the investigation and publication of the findings. Therefore, how the victims were investigated and announced was entirely up to the will of the government.

C. In such a situation, the purpose of the investigation and the content of the investigation by the ministries in charge of the investigation would have been an important factor in determining the form and content of civilian casualties.

(1) Social Affairs Department

The Ministry of Social Affairs was created in accordance with the Government Organization Act of 1948, and was placed in charge of health, welfare, labor, housing, and

women's affairs under the Ministry of Social Affairs of November 4 of the same year.¹⁷⁾ Accordingly, it operated under the system of one office and five bureaus, including the secretary's office. Among them, the health and welfare functions were transferred with the establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1949, and the Health Bureau was abolished and the Welfare Bureau was transformed into the Social Affairs Bureau. Among them, the Social Affairs Bureau was composed of the Social Affairs Division, the Welfare Division, the Relief Division, the Military Assistance Division, and the Facilities Division.¹⁸⁾ In addition, on April 1, 50, just before the war, the Facilities Division was changed to the Housing Division.

Among them, the Social Affairs Division was in charge of matters related to the uplifting of the democratic spirit, democratic enlightenment, national organizations, and matters not belonging to other departments in the country, the Welfare Division was in charge of matters related to the welfare of the people, the Relief Division was in charge of matters related to disaster relief, public relief and relief facilities, the Military Assistance Division was in charge of matters related to the protection of soldiers and their families and other military assistance, and the Housing Division was in charge of matters related to the establishment of housing reform plans, the construction, distribution and disposal of state-owned and public housing, and the selection of original buyers of vested housing. This is because the Ministry of Health at the time limited its work related to epidemic prevention and hygiene management (Kwon, 2011: 14).

The existence of the Social Affairs Department and the Social Affairs Department within the Ministry of Social Affairs shows what the government's "social" work was at the time. As the English name of the Ministry of Social Affairs suggests, the role of the Ministry of Social Affairs was to handle all matters related to society. At that time, the concept of 'society' was interpreted both broadly and narrowly (Jung Keun-sik and Joo Yoon-jung, 2013: 23).

As the Ministry of Social Affairs' relief, welfare and housing affairs show, before the outbreak of the war, the Ministry of Social Affairs dealt with matters related to the

¹⁷⁾ <Presidential Decree No. 25, Nov. 4, 1948. Article 1 of the Enforcement > the Ministry of Social Affairs shall administer affairs related to health, welfare, labor, housing and grants.

¹⁸⁾ <Presidential Decree No. 188, October 95, 1949. Article 6 of the Enforcement > establishes the Social Affairs Division, the Welfare Division, the Relief Division, the Military Assistance Division, and the Facilities Division in the Social Affairs Bureau.

welfare of civilians, which were related to the relief of the displaced persons after World War II. After Japan's surrender, many of the Koreans who returned from Japan and Manchuria lost their property in their original places of residence and returned to Japan, and because of the large number of Koreans, relief for them had become an important social issue since the period of the US military occupation. The issue of relief for the victims of war will be dealt with in detail in Chapter IV.

This role of the Ministry of Social Affairs led to the fact that the Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of all matters related to civilians immediately after the outbreak of the war. It was given the role of controlling, managing, and protecting civilians from the rear, such as the movement of civilians during wartime, relief, and housing issues. In addition, as the front line moved north, damage surveys became the main task in order to assess the situation of the civilian population in the restored areas. It was necessary to assess the damage to the people who were to be rescued, including the destruction of their homes and the loss of their property.

Local administrative organizations of the Ministry of Social Affairs were mobilized to investigate the damage. In the case of the damage in Seoul, the Social Affairs Division of the Seoul Metropolitan Government was in charge of the investigation, and as such, the social bureaus and departments at the municipal and provincial levels became the direct subjects of the investigation of civilian casualties. They investigated the damage at the local level and reported it to higher authorities, and the Ministry of Social Affairs, the central ministry, collected the reports. The results of these surveys were published in the name of the Minister of Social Affairs[38] or the Minister of the Interior.³⁹⁾

The Ministry of Social Affairs' damage survey focused on dealing with the problems faced by civilians during the war. The war led to a shortage of housing along with acute food shortages, and it became a serious social problem as a significant number of civilians became refugees or war victims. Dealing with civilian casualties was an important task because if the civilian issue was not properly resolved, the immediate conduct of the war would be severely hindered, and the civilian casualties caused by starvation, cold, and epidemics would show the incompetence of the ROK government and the UN forces.

However, in the case of primary civilian casualties, i.e., damage related to death or injury, this was somewhat different. Although the Ministry of Social Affairs was investigating the primary damage, the resolution of this issue was ambiguous because it was not considered to be a matter under the purview of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Investigations into dead and wounded civilians were important, but this did not mean that the Ministry of Social Affairs had a separate relief policy or plan for the dead or wounded. Therefore, the importance of primary damage was not great within the

Ministry of Social Affairs, and damage surveys were excluded from the main projects of the Ministry of Social Affairs. As a result, the role of the Ministry of Social Affairs in the primary damage survey was limited. Although civilian casualties were within the work of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of the investigation because it had an organization capable of investigating the damage, the Ministry of Social Affairs was passive in dealing with the primary damage. Throughout the war, the Ministry of Social Affairs continued to report the damage and was in an important position to synthesize the findings, but it was up to other government departments to politicize the findings.

38) Past ministers of social affairs have been: The first Jeon Jin-han (1948.8~1948.12), the 2nd Lee Yun-young (1948.12~1950.11), the 3rd Heo Jung (1950.11~1952.1), the 4th Choi Chang-soon (1952.1~1952.10), and the 5th Park Sul-eum (1952.10~1955.2).

39) In the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was not a key actor in the investigation of civilian casualties. However, it seems that the Ministry of the Interior had a cooperative relationship with the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Security Bureau in special cases, such as the abduction or murder of civilians and the issue of volunteers, which is why the Ministry of the Interior assisted in the investigation of civilian casualties.

(2) Public Information Office

Existing research suggests that the Public Information Office was the main body of the civilian casualties survey, but this is only half true (Jung Byung-joon, 2010: 475). While it is true that the damage survey in the second half of the war was led by the Bureau of Statistics, and that the official announcement of the damage survey was issued in the name of the Office of Public Affairs, the role of the Bureau of Statistics in the early stages of the war was limited. This was due to the separation of the two roles: the investigation and the publication of the survey. If the Ministry of Social Affairs conducted a survey through a local organization, Based on these results, the Office of Public Information prepared and compiled a statistical table. On the other hand, this also shows that the work of producing and editing categories in the compilation of war damages was all done by the Public Information Office. In particular, among the public information offices, the department entrusted with the handling of the damage results was the Bureau of Statistics. In the following, we will look at the structure, change process, and personnel composition of the Public Information Office, focusing on the Statistics Bureau. The Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information was the first agency dedicated to statistics in the Republic of Korea, and it was in charge of various surveys and statistical production from 1948 until it was transferred to the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry

of Public Information in 1955.²¹ The Statistics Bureau was created in accordance with the Public Information Office system that came into effect on November 4, 1948¹⁹. The first Statistics Bureau consisted of the General Affairs Division, the Planning Division, the National Census Division, and the Personnel Census Division, and was a foursection system. The first Director of Public Information was Kim Dong-sung²⁰²¹, and the first Director of Statistics was Kim Bong-kyu⁴³).

The Bureau of Statistics took over the work of the Statistical Office of the Transitional Government, which was in charge of the regular statistical activities of the U.S. military, and also took over the work of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which was in charge of population statistics. The National Census Division was in charge of the overall national census, the Census Division was in charge of population statistics,

²¹ The Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information was not in charge of all statistical work within the government. For example, in the case of economic statistics, the Bank of Korea Research Department was in charge of most of them, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was in charge of agricultural statistics. In addition, other government departments, apart from the Bureau of Statistics, also had their own statistical departments. These departments produced statistics related to the work of each ministry, which was a continuation of administrative statistics from the colonial period. The Bureau of Statistics was primarily responsible for collecting, compiling, and publishing statistics produced by other statistical departments. In the 1950s, many of the statistics included in the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea, except for population statistics, were administrative statistics produced in this way.

¹⁹) Government Organization Act < Law No. 1 of 17.07.1948. Article 32 of the Enforcement >, the Director of Public Information shall promulgate, information, and propaganda of the law. Statistics, printing, publication, and copyright affairs.

²⁰) Past directors of public affairs are as follows: First Kim Dong-sung (1948.8.) 2nd Lee Cheol-won (1949.6.) 3rd Kim Hyeong-ran (1950.8.) 4th Lee Cheol-won (1950.11.) 5th Gal Hong-ki (1953.3.) Among them, Lee Cheol-won, the longest-serving director of public affairs, graduated from Columbia University's School of Journalism and was close enough to accompany Lee Seung-man to Pusan during the Korean War. For Lee Cheol-won, see Kim Hak-jae (2011).

²¹) Past statistics directors are as follows: The first Kim Bong-kyu (1948.8.) the 2nd Park Hyun-wook (1950.4.) the 3rd Takjang-je (1951.8.) the 4th Kim Chang-mo (1952.10.) The 5th Takjang-je (1953.5.) The longest-serving of the Statistics Bureau, Tak Jang-je was retained as the head of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior. In 52~53, during the war, he was a central figure in the formation of the first statistical system to the extent that he went to Cambridge University in England to study statistics at a government expense.

the Planning Division was in charge of planning and researching various statistics, and preparing statistical monthly reports and demographic statistics, and the General Affairs Division was in charge of domestic personnel, budget, and other tasks not handled by other departments. On April 1, 1950, the Office of Public Information was reorganized, and the General Affairs Division was abolished and became the Planning Division, the National Census Division, and the Census Division into three divisions. The work of the existing General Affairs Division was absorbed by the Planning Department, and it was effectively integrated. At this time, as the size of the Statistics Bureau was reduced, the number of employees decreased, and its status seems to have declined somewhat.

As can be seen from the title of the Public Information Office, the main work of the Statistics Bureau at that time was to conduct various census. The government promulgated the Census Act on January 27, 1949, and the first census was conducted on May 1 of the same year. At the time, the census was the first census since the establishment of the government, and it was planned to be conducted every five years from 1950, but it was brought forward by one year due to the urgency of the issue. In addition to the census, the government also started a census of the population and the movement of people in 1949, but these censuses were suspended due to the Korean War and resumed in 1952 when the front began to stabilize due to the loss of data.

If we look at the composition of the staff of the Statistics Bureau at that time, we can see that it was difficult for the Bureau of Statistics to perform tasks other than collecting statistics and taking censuses. When the Bureau of Statistics was established in 1948, it was said to have had about 1,000 employees, and by 1950 it was said to have dwindled to around 600 (Statistics Korea, 1992a: 202), but most of these employees were not full-time employees. For example, in 1955, when the Bureau of Statistics was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, it had a total of about 400 employees, of which only 8 were permanent employees, and about 400 other employees were all temporary employees. 1961).²² This shows that, with the exception of the director and section heads of the Bureau of Statistics, all the remaining employees were temporary workers. Most of the temporary employees

²²) As for the size of the Statistics Bureau's staff, different studies often give different figures. Kwak Chang-kwon (2008) gives Kang's 1955 figure by listing the 1949 Census Bureau staff as 8 permanent employees and 400 temporary workers, but instead claims that there were 58 permanent employees and 195 temporary workers in 1955. However, Kwak's figures appear to be a misquotation of the 1957 staff composition of Statistics Korea (1992a: 213).

were census enumerators, which was the main job of the Tongxi Office.²³ Employees who were not in charge of the census were mainly responsible for collecting and organizing administrative statistics. The method of producing administrative statistics at that time was an extension of the "reporting ordinances" of the colonial period, and just as the colonial authorities produced various yearbooks, the Bureau of Statistics also collected administrative statistics with the aim of producing the "Korean Statistical Yearbook".⁴⁶⁾

However, the Korean government unusually placed the Census Bureau, whose main task was to take the census, as a subordinate department of the Ministry of Public Information. Considering that the Bureau of Statistics was transferred from the Office of Public Information to the Ministry of the Interior after the Korean War, and later to the Economic Planning Agency, the nature and position of the Bureau of Statistics of the Public Information Office during this period was ambiguous. This is also true considering that the Office of Public Affairs is the successor to the U.S. Army's Periodic Public Information Department, because during the U.S. Military Period, statistical work was assigned to the Planning Section, not the Public Information Department.

When the Public Information Office was established in 1948, the predecessors of the Public Information Office were the Public Information Department of the U.S. Military Government, which had been in existence for 45 years, and the Public Information Service, which was established in 47. The U.S. Military Government's Public Information Department was a representative body for collecting information on Korean people and promoting policies, as well as organizing and spreading anticommunist ideology. After the establishment of the government, the Ministry of Public Information became the Office of Public Information, but its status was somewhat lower than during the period of the US military administration, and its role and importance also decreased (Kim Hak-jae, 2011).

From the establishment of the government until the outbreak of the Korean War, the activities of the Public Information Office were to carry out anti-communist propaganda in a very hostile form against communism and to suppress it at the

²³ Director of Public Affairs, "Matters Concerning the Treatment of Temporary Employees of the Statistics Bureau on the Agenda of the State Council," 1952.05.10. (National Archives of Korea)

If you look at the proposal submitted by Lee Cheol-won, director of the Office of Public Affairs, to the State Council to hire temporary staff of the Statistics Bureau, you can take a look at the treatment and work of temporary employees in the city. In this document, the Director of Public Affairs stated that in 1949,

same time. For example, the Public Information Office censored all newspapers that reported on the incident and subsequently closed many newspapers and detained its journalists. It also required new political party registrations, outlawing communist-affiliated political parties such as the South Korean Workers' Party. Anticommunist propaganda was also actively carried out, such as holding anticommunist lectures and broadcasting broadcasts.

They are asking for the passage of a budget for 32 temporary positions for the census, which was started but stopped in 1950. According to him, just before the 1950 incident, there were about 900 temporary workers, and they were in charge of the census. It is also stated that even temporary employees were treated the same as regular employees, and that it was customary to select temporary workers outside the quota and conduct surveys. The bill was passed at the 41st Cabinet Meeting. As can be seen from this proposal, most of the Census Bureau employees before and after the Korean War were census enumerators.

- [46] Compared to the colonial period, it seems that it was much more difficult to collect reports in the early days of the establishment of the government. Staff from the Bureau of Statistics had to go to each ministry to complete the collection of data and the preparation of the statistics, and publish them in the Statistical Monthly Bulletin (Statistics Korea, 1992a: 204). This is due to the fact that in the period between liberation and the establishment of the government, the reporting method through reporting was not properly organized and there was no central ministry to control it. During the colonial period, there was a final stop point for reporting ordinances, such as the Documentation Division and the General Affairs Department, so the reporting style was unified among the departments of the Governor-General's Department, but after the liberation, this was not properly maintained, and even if it was maintained, it was only done by department. On 'Bogorye', see Park Myung-kyu and Seo Ho-chul, 2003, 『Colonial Power and Statistics』, Seoul National University Press, pp. See 48~51.

He also produced various propaganda songs. Therefore, this form of public affairs took the form of psychological warfare rather than a normal one (Kim, 2010: 330). The propaganda activities of the Public Information Office will be made more active with the establishment of the Propaganda Task Force. The Central Committee of the Propaganda Corps was established on November 30, 1948 by Presidential Decree No. 35, and soon expanded to the municipal and provincial levels throughout the country. The Propaganda Task Force was a kind of official organization formed by prominent figures from various fields such as culture, journalism, and academia, and served as a mobilization mechanism to effectively support the government's propaganda efforts (Chung Yong-wook, 2007: 35). Even after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Central Committee for Propaganda became the Committee for Wartime Propaganda and was in charge of all front-line warfare, and as the war progressed, its organization was further expanded. Compared to the activities of the Office of Public Affairs, the work of the Bureau of Statistics seems to be somewhat distant. This is because the main task of the Bureau of Statistics was the census, which was carried out with the more practical goal of providing basic data for

economic revival. Neither the collection of administrative statistics nor the survey of population dynamics were linked to the main activities of the Office of Public Affairs. However, compared to the US military period, both the Public Information Office and the Statistics Bureau have reduced their status and organizational scale, and the activities of the Statistics Bureau have not been recognized as important within the government, so it can be inferred that the statistical work has been pushed to the Public Information Office.

On the other hand, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the Bureau of Statistics ceased most of its existing work, such as the census and the publication of the Statistical Yearbook, and made the war damage survey its main task. In the chaos of the war, the Bureau of Statistics lost most of the data on the projects it had been preparing, and the building of the Bureau of Statistics was burned down to the point of being replaced by another ministry, but it seems that the work of investigating the damage caused by the war was relatively active. As soon as the restoration of Seoul was completed, it issued its own damage survey. Considering the manpower of the Bureau of Statistics, it is believed that the surveys were carried out in cooperation with other government departments, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, but they nevertheless produced results that were separate from those of the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 1952 and 1953, a nationwide survey was also conducted and the results were published in the capacity.

However, unlike before the war, the Bureau of Statistics during the Korean War seems to be conducting damage surveys as an extension of the work of the Office of Public Affairs. If the Ministry of Social Affairs' survey was merely tallying the amount of victims, the Bureau of Statistics was giving political significance to the findings. In particular, in the case of the various damage lists prepared by the National Bureau of Statistics, it shows that the damage surveys were carried out with clear political intentions. Publications such as the Free Korea, sponsored by the Propaganda Task Force of the Ministry of Public Affairs, also provided statistics for ideological propaganda work, and were supplemented with anti-communist commentary.

The fact that the Office of Public Information is in charge of investigating civilian casualties in the second half of the war, rather than the Ministry of Social Affairs, is related to the political use of these statistics. Regarding civilian casualties, the various statistics and lists produced by the Tonggye Bureau were specially designed and produced as a tool to emphasize the damage caused by North Korea and to hold it politically responsible. Of course, the Bureau of Statistics was in charge of investigating and organizing the entire disputed damage, and civilian casualties were investigated as part of it, but the fact that the damage statistics produced by the Public Information

Office on its own were focused on those related to civilian casualties shows that civilian damage was treated in a special way.

As the war continued, the primary civilian damage survey was changed from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Office of Public Information. While the Ministry of Social Affairs conducted the damage survey for the practical purpose of identifying and resolving the damage, the Public Information Office wanted to give political significance to the damage and use it politically in the process of making it an official statistic through the Bureau of Statistics.

C. However, it should be said that the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Office of Public Information during the war did not have the independence or autonomy of government departments to investigate the war damages, but rather the ministries in charge of the investigation and handling them were transferred by the central government according to political and military needs.

2. Time for damage investigation

Surveys of war damage vary depending on how the damage is being caused and how the damage is to be managed. In understanding the damage of the Korean War, changes in the front line and the response of the military and the government to it are important variables, because the investigation of the damage is not only related to the purpose of understanding the damage, but also to the idea of how to end the war and how to organize the post-war society. There is some debate about how the war began, but from the perspective of the South Korean government, the Korean War broke out by surprise. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Korean government was unable to plan and respond militarily in a situation where the front line was rapidly pushed back, and the administrative functions were effectively paralyzed. With the abandonment of Seoul and the relocation of the capital to the city of Lim, and the urgent wartime administration continuing, the general administrative functions of the people could not function properly. Thus, no survey of war damage was carried out during the first three months of the war.

(1) Electrical Survey: Recognition of Damage

The war damage survey began in October 1950, when Seoul was recaptured and the country crossed the 38th parallel and marched north. The restoration of the central administrative apparatus centered on Seoul and the reconstruction of local administrative power based on it made it possible to conduct a nationwide survey. When the administrative bodies returned to their positions, the first thing they carried out was

a survey of the damage done by each government department, followed by a survey of the damage in each province.²⁷ This is because it was only on the basis of a damage survey that it was possible to decide what to rebuild and restore. However, the survey at the beginning of the war was not a planned survey. Damage surveys were carried out sporadically and immediately in each province. There seems to have been no uniform format for damage surveys, and there seems to have been no manual on what to do and how to do it. In addition, since the departments in charge of the investigation differed depending on the type of damage, the content and format of the investigation were bound to be different. Therefore, the contents of the damage surveys published during this period are somewhat confusing.

Although the process of surveying the damage is not clearly described, it is possible to estimate the timing from the relevant data. It can be seen that the Rhee Seungman government first dealt with the war damage at the State Council meeting in midOctober, and that government departments are investigating the damage and formulating reconstruction plans, and ²⁸ on October 19, ministers from various ministries were appointed as the people in charge of investigating the damage situation in South Korea, and the damage survey began in earnest. ²⁹³⁰ On

²⁷ According to Sohn, the Seoul Metropolitan Government Office resumed work on October 4. It can be said that it was the time when administrative power was restored nationwide. Sohn, Jung-mok, 1996, "The Korean War and the Damage of the West (Prize)," 『Land Information』 7, p. 86

²⁸ 103rd Cabinet Meeting, "Report on the Progress of Reconstruction Plans to Investigate the Damage," October 17, 1950. (National Archives)

²⁹ 104th State Council Meeting, "Matter on the Selection of Investigators for the Damage Situation in South Korea," October 19, 1950. (National Archives of Korea) However, the surveys selected at the meeting were related to national infrastructure such as industry, agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries, transportation, and communication, and the relevant ministers or senior officials were appointed for each sector.

³⁰ 113th State Council, "Investigation of the Situation of Damage in North Korea," October 30, 1950. (National Archives of Korea) Damage survey teams were dispatched to major cities such as Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Hamhung. They were part of the Ministry of Finance.

September 28, Seoul was recaptured, and the South Korean region was gradually taken control, making it possible to survey the damage. Furthermore, as the North occupied the North Korean region, a damage survey was planned for the North Korean region. Just as the North and South Korea surveyed the war damage in South Korea during the period of occupation of South Korea, they also considered the North Korean occupied area as

South Korean territory and tried to conduct a damage survey when the war returned to a victorious mood.⁵⁰⁾

Media reports of war damage have been appearing since the end of October. The fact that the results of the investigation are announced in the media means that the investigation has already begun before that date and the results have been comprehensively summarized, so it can be inferred that the timing of the damage survey is even earlier. The first areas where damage surveys were announced were Seoul and South Gyeongsang Province at the end of October. However, in the case of Seoul, it seems that there was already a damage survey of the victims on October 12. The damage survey itself began first, but the results appear to have come later when it comes to the primary damage.⁵¹⁾

The Seoul Shimbun report on October 30 clearly states that the Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for investigating the war damage, and the fact that the base date is October 25 but states that it is already the result of the second round of the survey indicates that the investigation was already well underway by the end of October.^[52] It can also be seen that the survey was conducted not only in Seoul and South Gyeongsang Province as reported, but at the national level, as reported by the Busan Ilbo on October 27, which stated that the war damage would be summed up at the National Governors' Conference on October 30, and as a result, the reports in early November covered this comprehensive national level of human casualties.

Press	Presenter	Survey Area	Survey (Announcement) Base Date	Posted on
Busan Ilbo	-	Gyeongsangnamdo	October 26, 1950*	October 27, 1950
Seoul Newspaper	Social Affairs Department	Seoul	October 25, 1950	October 30, 1950
Seoul Newspaper	Seoul Metropolitan Government	Seoul	November 1, 1950*	November 1, 1950
Donga Ilbo	Social Affairs Department	National	November 4, 1950*	November 4, 1950
Daesang Daily Newspaper	Social Affairs Department	National	November 4, 1950*	November 5, 1950
Donga Ilbo	-	Gyeonggi-do	October 28, 1950	November 6, 1950
Donga Ilbo	Interior	National	October 25, 1950	November 16, 1950

Donga Ilbo	Office of Public Information	Seoul	October 25, 1950	November 28, 1950
Seoul Newspaper	Office of Public Information	Seoul	October 25, 1950	November 28, 1950
Donga Ilbo	Social Affairs Department	National	January 19, 1951*	January 19, 1951
Busan Ilbo	Office of Public Information	Seoul	September 28, 1950	April 14, 1951
Chosun Ilbo	Spokesperson of the Republic of Korea	National	June 24, 1951*	June 26, 1951
Kyunghyang Newspaper	-	National	August 31, 1951	November 29, 1951
Donga Ilbo	Social Affairs Department	National	January 8, 1952	January 31, 1952
Daesang Daily Newspaper	-	National	May 12, 1952*	May 15, 1952
Kyunghyang Newspaper	-	National	November 1951	June 25, 1953
Seoul Newspaper	-	National	November 1951	July 30, 1953

Table < 2> Remarks on Media Reports on Primary Damage During the Korean War : The

base date of the investigation is the base date of the investigation mentioned in the article, but if the base date is not displayed, the * is marked and the base date of the announcement is

indicated. The presenter was indicated only when the article mentioned it.

51) "The Number of Victims and Victims of the War in Seoul," Dong-A Ilbo, October 12, 1950. 52) "Ministry of Social Affairs, Survey Results of Seoul Metropolitan Government's War Damage Situation," Seoul Shinmun, October 27, 1950.

All of them.³¹ Thus, it can be seen that the war damage survey was conducted nationwide in late September or early October, and the results of this survey were first announced in November.

There is also a record in the National Assembly records that show when the damage survey was carried out. On October 31, 1950, at the Extraordinary National Assembly meeting held in the annex of the Civic Center, the members of the National Assembly held a meeting to report the war damage in their respective provinces in private. The 10 members of the National Assembly who were selected for the investigation committee explained the situation in each province of the country, including Seoul, and some of them used war damage statistics as data. Cho Kwang-seop, a member of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, cited data from the Seoul Metropolitan Government's Social Affairs Bureau, which is exactly the same as a report by the Seoul Shimbun on Oct. 30. In addition to Seoul, Gyeonggi-do, The number of North Chungcheong Province and others has been reported at least roughly. However, in the matter of time, the National Assembly briefed the report and the statistics were submitted in the form of a report, which has not survived.³² The figures reported in the media in early November will be consistent with those reported in the National Assembly. It seems that the damage survey did not stop there, but continued until

³¹ "Results of the Disaster Situation in Gyeongsangnam-do," Busan Ilbo, October 26, 1950.

³² 2nd National Assembly, "Proceedings of the Extraordinary Session of the 8th National Assembly, No. 39," October 31, 1950.

mid-December. The results of the survey during this period were compiled by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and included in the "Annual Journal of the Korean War" statistics, and the statistics on civilian casualties remaining here are based on December 15, 1950. In other words, this would have been the time when the primary investigation of war damage was completed throughout the country. This is because the media coverage has also been drastic and winding since November 1950. Meanwhile, during this period, the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information published the Seoul Metropolitan Government Victims' Directory on December 1, 1950.³³ This booklet was created to compile a list of patriots who were killed or kidnapped in Seoul during the occupation by the People's Army after the reconquest of Seoul, and it was made into a list of victims because it was virtually impossible to identify patriots.³⁴ This list is divided into two parts, the first part contains the list of

victims, and the second part is an appendix titled 'Temporary Population and Damage Survey Results (as of October 25, 4283)' and presents the damage statistics of the Seoul Metropolitan Government. The results of the damage report in the appendix were conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information, but the exact circumstances of the investigation are unknown. However, when compared with the results of the damage survey by the Ministry of Social Affairs, different figures appear, even though the base date of the two surveys is the same, all the numbers including the detailed items ²⁴are different. There is also a large numerical difference between

³³) hereinafter referred to as "Victim List".

³⁴) Bureau of Statistics, Public Information Office, 1950, 『List of Victims of the Seoul Metropolitan Government』, Legend, "4. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is a member of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has been deemed to be a victim of the Crime of Justice."

the list and the appendix. On the list In comparison, the damage of the appendix is much greater. This discrepancy can be attributed to confusion in the counting or to the inaccuracy and lack of organization of the survey itself (Jung, 2010: 489), but it is more correct to say that the statistics in the list and appendix are due to the fact that the purpose of the survey of the damage was different and the contents of the survey were different. The legend of the victim registry also states that only those surveyed on the list were 14 years of age or older, excluding volunteers, but the statistics in the appendix show a comprehensive picture of the victims. In addition, the results of the investigation by the Public Information Office and the Ministry of Social Affairs are different.

This shows that there were several subjects involved in the damage survey, and the actual investigation was carried out separately.⁵⁷⁾

²⁴ The Free Korea magazine publicizes the activities of each government department for a year, and if you look at the activities of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information, you can see that the "Victim List" was prepared and the temporary population of the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the damage survey were carried out. Other activities of the Statistics Bureau included a temporary census in Busan (as of October 1949), the collection of data for the Statistical Yearbook, and a survey of the retail prices of daily necessities in Busan. This indicates that the nationwide survey of civilian casualties was conducted separately from the survey of damage in Seoul by the Statistics Bureau of the Public Information Service.

Central Committee for Propaganda Measures of the Ministry of Public Affairs, ed., 1951, 『Record of the First Anniversary of the Six and Iosa Incidents in Freedom』, p. 178

The official statistics that appeared in 1951 were the "Records of the First Anniversary of the Freedom of Korea Army-Iwo Incident", compiled by the Central Committee for Propaganda Measures of the Ministry of Public Information²⁵. The Central Committee for Propaganda Measures was created in 1948 to assist the Office of Public Information and continued its activities after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Free Korea was part of a propaganda campaign, edited by the Central Committee for Propaganda Measures, but published by the National People's Assembly, and published in September 1951. In the case of "Free Korea", the statistics on war damage are titled "Incident Damage Relief Situation" and the results of the survey by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information are presented. There are a total of 11 statistical tables, which are small in number, but they show a comprehensive picture of the damage. This In the booklet, there is a statistical table that summarizes the list of statistics presented in the "Victim List", but unusually, there are reasons and explanations for the investigations that are not shown in the list. According to him, the reason for the investigation is that Seoul was occupied in a short period of time and the damage was great, and the Korean People's Army's cruel humanity was well heard in Seoul, and the attention of the world was focused. It also clarifies that juveniles who were forcibly conscripted into the People's Army are excluded from the compilation of this list.²⁶ In addition, the Free Korea states that all the statistics, except for the figures in the "Victim List", were conducted in accordance with the "Minister of Social Affairs", which shows that the

damage survey was basically led by the Ministry of Social Affairs. However, the base date of the statistics is presented differently in each table, and in the case of human casualties, the reference date is not given, so it is not clear which period the survey was carried out. However, the statistics contained in 『Free Korea』 are not much different from the statistics of 『One Year of the Korean War』. The press in mid-1951, when the Free Korea was published, still cites surveys from the end of 1950, so it appears to be from the end of 1950.⁶⁰)

The period from October to December 1950, when the first damage survey was conducted, was the first time that all kinds of damage were identified in the country. The government's objective, of course, was to determine the scale and kind of damage that

²⁵) All of the following are written as "Free".

²⁶ Central Committee for Propaganda Measures, Ministry of Public Information, 1951, Liberal, p.157

had occurred during the occupation. For this reason, the damage statistics during this period show the amount of damage in absolute numbers. For example, several buildings were destroyed, several schools were burned, and the extent of the damage was determined. And the extent of this damage was calculated as the amount of damage. The same was true for human casualties, with the primary victims mainly investigating the dead, wounded, and missing. Cases of kidnappings and massacres were investigated only in Seoul by the Office of Public Information, while the Ministry of Social Affairs' nationwide surveys focused on casualties and missing persons.

This is because the purpose of the damage survey at the time was to focus on recognizing the damage in order to solve the immediate problem of social turmoil caused by the war. At the time, the South Korean government was planning post-war reconstruction in October and November 1950, when the North was in progress, in an atmosphere of confidence in victory in the war. Therefore, war damage was more important than an object of propaganda as a social problem that Korean society should solve.

The United Nations had set up the United Nations Committee for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea (UNCURK) to deal with political and economic issues in South Korea in order to resolve the Korean issue, and North Korea was also halting its propaganda campaign against the damage that had been going on until September amid the collapse of the front. Therefore, the damage caused by the war during this period needed to be objectively understood. Therefore, during this period, the government frequently announced the results of damage surveys, and the results were frequently published in the media.

However, the survey of the damage was halted in December when the war situation worsened again, and the government was forced to re-plan evacuations instead of repairing the damage. As the war entered a new phase with the entry of the Chinese army into the war, the issue of resolving the damage caused by the war became a political issue again.

[60] In other words, the statistics of "Free Korea" are prepared by the Ministry of Social Affairs and can be said to be a revised version of the statistics of the "One Year of the Korean War". This is because if you compare the figures of the two statistics, they are generally similar, but the number of "free" is slightly higher than the previous one. In addition, although it was published in a booklet by the Public Information Office, it would be correct to say that the investigation itself is the result of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Moved away from the core.

(2) After-study : Utilization of damage

Unlike in 1950, when damage surveys were actively conducted and reported, after 1951 there was much less mention of war damage or damage surveys. This is because large-scale evacuations occurred with the evacuation of the 1.4 post-war period, and as the war dragged on, it became more important to survive the immediate wartime situation than to repair the damage to the pre-war situation. After the recapture of Seoul in March 1951, and the front stabilized after July 1951, the battle began to be limited to the front. However, there is little data to show when and how the primary damage investigation was carried out during this period. There is very little media coverage during this period, and most of what is reported is a reference to the situation at the end of 1950. Even in the Council of Ministers, there is a lot less mention of the damage. There are even few official statistics for this period.

All of them.

However, on June 25, 1953, on the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the *Kyunghyang Ilbo*, the *Donga Ilbo*, and the *Seoul Shimbun* simultaneously quoted the government's statistics, which stated that they were prepared as of November 1951. However, the figures shown here are almost i.e. to the official government statistics from 1952~1953. This is because the number of abductees differs considerably from the 1952 statistics, and the other figures are the same or have only a slight error. If the reference date of this report is to be believed, it means that by the end of 1951 the first civilian damage survey was almost complete. This is probably the result of damage surveys in the rear areas of the front since mid-1951.

Since 1952, the government has published the results of its war damage surveys in the form of statistics and lists, so that people can understand the process. First, in 1952, in the process of preparing for the armistice talks, various lists were compiled.

They include "June 25 事變 被殺者名簿 (List of Persons Killed in the June 25 Incident)", "June 25 事變 被拉致者名簿 (List of Abductees in the June 25 Incident)", and "June 25 事變 越北者名簿 (List of North Korean Persons Killed in the June 25 Incident)". These lists were compiled by the Bureau of Statistics of the Public Information Service. It is mainly a detailed list of damages caused by North Korea during the occupation of North Korea in 1950. In the case of the abductee lists, the figures are consistent with the figures in the damage statistics of the Korean Statistical Yearbook 1952, which shows that the lists were used as the basis for the reporting of the victims. Unlike later statistical yearbooks, the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952 has a separate chapter on the damage caused by the Korean War, and the statistics contained here can be said to be a comprehensive version of the damage survey results up to 1952. The government's final summary of the war damage is the "Comprehensive Survey of

Damages in the Land and Iosa Incident."²⁷⁾ This booklet was published in 1954 by the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information, and it is a survey of all the war damage caused by the Korean War and divided it into areas such as human life, industry, and public facilities. This booklet, which consists only of statistics without much explanation, shows the damage in the major sectors in detail and shows them in terms of the amount of damage.

According to Gal Hong-ki, director of the Office of Public Information, the war damage survey conducted by the Office of Public Information was divided into two main phases in order to prepare the "Comprehensive Damage Survey Table." The first survey was conducted in Busan in March 1952, and the second survey was conducted again at the end of 1953 on the occasion of the return of Seoul. It also explains the reason for the big difference between the results of the two surveys, which is due to the addition of previously omitted parts and new collections.²⁸⁾ The progress of the first survey conducted in Busan is recorded in the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952, so you can see the difference between this

and the statistics from the Comprehensive Damage Survey Table. In the case of house damage, the total amount of damage increased by 5 times compared to the previous survey, and it can be seen that the survey of material damage was carried out intensively, while the number of people who suffered damage increased by only 25,000, or 4%, in the case of house damage. Newspaper articles promoting the 1953 Public Information Office's investigation, It says that the survey is intended to focus on the damage caused to businesses and other businesses, and to be used for aid and reconstruction plans under the U.S.-Korea Economic Agreement.

All of them.²⁹⁾ In 1953, in the course of further investigation by the Office of Public Information, human casualties were treated as insignificant. If so, was the first survey in 1952 an important period in the investigation of the damage? As mentioned above, newspaper articles from June 25, 1953, give the base date of the census as November 1951, which differs from the March 1952 survey by only 40,000 people. And most of the

²⁷⁾) hereinafter referred to as "Comprehensive Damage Survey Table". The same statistics appear in the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1953 (1955) and the Economic Yearbook 1955 (1956), but this is a transcription of the internal version of the Comprehensive Damage Survey Table.

²⁸⁾ Gal Hong-ki, Director of Public Information, 1954, Preface to "Comprehensive Survey of Damage in the Land-Iosa Incident", 六二五事變被害調査發表

²⁹⁾ "Survey of Victims of the National Uprising," Dong-A Ilbo, December 21, 1953.

difference between those 40,000 people was kidnappers. The large discrepancy in the number of abductees was due to the fact that the list of abductees had not yet been compiled, so the figures were excluded from the tally.³⁰ If this is the case, then the first and second investigations conducted by the Public Information Office do not seem to be of great importance in relation to civilian casualties. This is because the results of the investigation are only being summarized. However, there is no data to show which ministry the 1951 survey centered on. What can be inferred is that during this period, the focus of war damage investigations was shifting from individual government departments to the Public Information Office. This is because the two surveys conducted by the Public Information Office in 1952 and 1953 were conducted separately by the other ministries and were taken the initiative by the Public Information Office. In addition, in the case of human casualties, it should be taken into account that at the end of 1951 the compilation of various lists was being carried out mainly by the Public Information Office.

In summary, the later survey of the primary damage was carried out intensively from mid to late 1951, and the basic skeleton was completed, and the survey was completed with some additional investigations from 1952 to 1953. Although it is not clear what the specific progress of the damage survey was or who was the subject of the survey, it is likely that the human damage survey was carried out as part of a comprehensive war damage cleanup centered on the Public Information Office. And it was published in the form of a booklet after a list and statistical preparation process centered on the Bureau of Statistics. Compared to biographical surveys, the process of post-mortem surveys raises many questions. This is because if the earlier survey was conducted with the relatively clear purpose of recognizing the damage, it is unclear what the government was focusing on in the later part of the survey. The survey of the damage would have been carried out as an extension of the electrical survey, and although there would have been a need to confirm the war damage after 1951, the need to properly investigate the

³⁰ In November 1951, the Korean War Abduction Case Archive (2006a) reported to the U.S. Department of State that Ambassador Mucho reported to the U.S. State Department in December 1951 that "the provincial authorities are currently compiling a list, but only Gyeonggi Province and North Gyeongsang Province have been completed, and other provinces are still in the process of compiling the list." In other words, the statistics for the November base date were prepared on the basis of only partially completed lists.

damage would have been less than before in the uncertainty of the end of the war or the return of Seoul. Rather, the government's purpose, as the Public Information Office did in compiling the list, was more of an attempt to re-investigate the damage to civilians that had already occurred and to attribute it to North Korea. In addition, as the 1953 war damage cleanup was done in anticipation of U.S. aid in the post-war reconstruction process, the government would have wanted to clearly present the civilian casualties in terms of numbers and write them in a form that emphasized North Korea's cruelty or denounced war crimes.

However, there was a gap between the government's intention to take advantage of the damage and the results that were utilized. Lists showing massacres and abductions of civilians have been produced, but North Korea's war crimes and civilian casualties have been relegated to the side of armistice talks and the international political arena. This is because the issue of prisoners of war, rather than civilians, has become a key point of contention. The South Korean government has not given much importance to the damage caused by war at the United Nations like North Korea. The results of the war damage survey were also included in the Statistical Yearbook and published in the press, but they were not actively promoted by the government.

3. Content and Category of Damage

The format of the civilian damage survey varied depending on the subject and time of the survey. The South Korean government frequently published the figures in the media while conducting damage surveys, or compiled them into statistical tables and included them in various government publications. Although the process of investigating civilian casualties is not clearly defined, publicly available statistics reveal when and for what extent the surveys were conducted. This is because the production and reporting of statistics has been carried out in accordance with the government's intentions and objectives in dealing with the damage caused by war. Table 3> < is a collection of all the statistics reported or published by the primary civilian casualties during the Korean War. In cases where the same statistics appear in multiple sources, the blessed statistics are excluded, and in the case of media reports, the first published statistics are prioritized, and in the case of government publications, the original statistical production agency takes precedence. Table <Table 3> shows how the pattern of civilian casualties is changing. It can be seen that the damage to the people is being counted cumulatively as the survey is conducted. In the case of the biographical survey, because the survey was conducted in a chaotic situation, the scale of damage caused by deaths and injuries decreased and then increased again, showing that it was not properly organized. However,

the overall scale of the damage has not decreased, but is steadily increasing, indicating that the investigation has continued. In Table 3> <, the distinction between the early and later surveys is between the statistics of the Free Korea and the Dong-A Ilbo report. While the former includes investigations up to December 1950, the Dong-A Ilbo's surveys include investigations from thereon.

Table3>AspectsofPrimaryCivilianCasualties

death ProductionInstitutions	slaughter	injury	Missing	abduction	guitar	sum	source	Standard(announcement)date	
109,417 Announcement	-	-	-	-	41,904	151,321	Dongallbo	(1950.11.04.)	SocialAffairs
109,313 Announcement	-	89,137	79,936	9,744	-	288,130	DaesangDailyNewspaper	(1950.11.05.)	SocialAffairs
111,400 theMinistryofHomeAffairs	-	57,700	106,000	-	-	275,815	Dongallbo	(1950.11.16.)	Announcementby
172,560	-	102,900	93,203	18,492	-	387,158	SocialAffairsDepartment	1950.11.15.	UNCACK
163,461	-	104,722	166,483	-	-	434,666	KoreanWar Annual	1950.12.15.	Interior
178,000 theRepublicofKorea	-	-	-	-	291,400	469,400	ChosunIlbo	(1951.06.26.)	Spokespersonof
174,218	-	143,910	170,524	-	-	488,652	Free	(1951.10.)	SocialAffairSurvey
236,475	122,799	228,580	298,175	42,732	-	928,761	Dongallbo	1951.11.	-

Ministry of Public Information 214,663,128,936,229,621,303,212,81,532-990,968	ive Damage Survey
Bureau of Public Information Statistics	
*Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Information, 1954 ¹ , Comprehensive Survey of Damage to the Land-lo Incid	
Bureau, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1952, 『Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952』, pp. 321-322	
Propaganda Measures, Ministry of Public Affairs, ed., 1951, "Freedom of Korea (Record of the First Anniversary of the J	
159. Ministry of Social Affairs, 1950, "Matters Concerning the Introduction of Refugees and the Settlement	
Archives of Korea).	

236,475 122,799 225,582 298,175 82,959 - 965,990 Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952 1952.03.31. Bureau of Statistics,

ent], p. 5, Statistics
al Committee for
ine 25 Incident)," p.
Messages" (Nationa

The disconnect between the two points is most evident in the first instance of the extent of the damage. The results of the 1951 survey show a pattern of about twice as much damage as in the previous period. Considering that there were no significant civilian casualties outside the front lines after mid-1951, this period does not reflect the time of the damage, but rather the time when the damage was surveyed. Another disconnection is the change in the number of victims. Massacres and kidnappings, which did not appear as general categories in earlier surveys, have become important categories in later surveys. It is also characteristic that the subject of the announcement is changing from the Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Public Information.

This chapter analyzes the pattern and content of damage with a focus on the category of statistics. This is because the categories in statistics are constructed in advance of the survey according to the purpose and intention of the subject of the survey, and the setting of a specific category in the investigation of civilian damage reflects the nature of the damage survey.³¹ 1) Kidnapping, massacre

The most characteristic categories of primary civilian casualties during the Korean War period are "massacre" and "abduction." The two categories were created by the South Korean government to highlight the civilian casualties of the Korean War, which distinguish them from other wars, but especially to highlight the war damage caused by North Korea. The Korean War was a civil war and an international war at the same time, but it has strong civil war characteristics in terms of civilian casualties. The clearest example of this is kidnapping. Because it was a war between the Korean people, a considerable number of ordinary people, apart from politicians and prominent figures, were forced to move to North Korea or become soldiers in the war. The context of the massacre shows the ideological nature of the Korean War, which began with the purpose of occupation and domination, and ended in a massacre.

Massacre refers only to the killing of civilians (including civil servants) who are not soldiers by the North Korean military or leftists. Naturally, massacres or killings by

³¹ According to Jung Byung-joon's definition, death is a non-political and accidental sacrifice in war, and massacre, on the contrary, is a sacrifice made with political intentions and purposes. The abduction was the victim who was taken to the North regardless of the person's intention, and the missing persons were wartime whereabouts, which did not include voluntary defection or voluntary or forced deportation (Jung Byung-joon, 2010: 473-474).

the Armed Forces or right-wing are excluded from this category. In the previous survey, only deaths appeared without the category of massacre, except in the "Victim List", but in the later surveys, deaths and massacres appeared at the same time. Considering that genocide is a subcategory of death, it can be seen that the intention was to highlight genocide among the various reasons for death. And the category of massacre was, of course, meant to emphasize the brutality of North Korea. Massacre Category The "List of Murdered Persons" defines the slaughtered as "public officials and ordinary people who have been murdered by a brutal puppet party."^[66] Abduction refers to being taken to North Korea for various reasons. The issue of abduction was an important issue from the beginning of the war, and on October 20, 1950, after the recapture of Seoul, the President issued his first directive on human casualties to facilitate the rescue of family members from North and South Korea (Jung Byung-joon, 2010: 474). In addition, the Personal Information of the abductees is also examined in the "Seoul Metropolitan Victim List" prepared in 1950 by the Public Information Office. The number of kidnappings varied greatly depending on whether they included volunteers or laborers, so they were the most fluid of the victims. In addition, the family members of the abductees actively participated in the abduction investigation. For this reason, there is only a civilian investigation into war damage. The categories of massacres and kidnappings are based on a list prepared by the Public Information Office. The Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Affairs compiles three lists in 1952 in preparation for the armistice talks. These are the "List of Murdered Persons", the "List of Abductees", and the "List of North Koreans".^[67] The first two are included in the war damage statistics, and in particular, the number of abductees in the "List of Abductees" is 82,959, which is completely consistent with the results of the 1952 census of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea, 1952). It can be seen that the list was prepared as a basis for creating categories. However, in the case of massacres, the total number does not correspond to the lists, and the number of murdered persons on the list is 59,964, more than double the 122,799 in the 1952 census. This means that the list that has been excavated is not the whole but a part of it, or In the case of the massacre, it was probably because there was an additional investigation apart from the registering. Although government investigations led to the creation of lists, categories such as kidnappings and massacres remained political and controversial. In particular, in the case of kidnapping, it was difficult to determine whether or not it was considered a kidnapping, depending on the fact of the abduction and the intent of the abduction.

At that time, the number of kidnappers at the door easily increased or decreased depending on the investigation. Table 4> < shows the number of abductees during the Korean War in chronological order. According to the table, 『Seoul

66) Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1952, 『六·二五事變中 被殺者名簿』, Legend.

67) During this period, several more lists were created by the Korean government. On December 15, 1952, President Yi Seung-man instructed the Ministry of the Interior at a cabinet meeting to prepare a list for the Korea-Japan talks, and as a result, the "List of Persons Killed in the March 1st Movement," "List of Persons Killed in the War in Japan," and "List of Prisoners Drafted at a Certain Time" were prepared. The National Archives of Korea published the "List of Victims of the March 1st Movement" in 2014. These lists were created at one-year intervals with the lists of victims of the Korean War and have a similar purpose in that they serve as basic data for the talks.

The Special Municipal Victims' List and the List of the Families of the Abductees show 2,500 abductions, but this number suddenly rises to 20,000 in the Kidnapping List. This is because the Seoul Metropolitan Government limited the target to those over the age of 16 and excluded all those who were conscripted into the volunteer army and defined abductees as abductees, but in preparing the "List of Abductees," it included volunteers and laborers who were not included in the previous survey. In 1954, the Ministry of Interior's Public Security Bureau again excluded volunteers and laborers.⁶⁸⁾

<Table 4> Change in the number of abductees according to the survey

title ³²	Investigation, author	Date of investigation (issuance)	Number of abductees	
			Seoul	National
Seoul Metropolitan City Victim List	Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Information	(1950.12.1)	2,438	-
June 25 Incident List of abductees	June 25 Incident Families of Abductees	1951.08.27	2,527	-
June 25 Incident List of abductees	June 25 Incident Families of Abductees	1951.09.01	2,316	-
June 25 Incident List of abductees	Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Information	(1952.10)	20,517	82,959

³² Korean War Abduction Case Archive, 2006a, 『Korean War Abduction Case History Collection 1』, p. 693

Comprehensive Damage Survey	Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Information	1953.7.27	20,738	84,532
List of abductees caused by the June 25 uprising	Public Security Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs	1954	-	17,940
List of Displaced Persons Registered	Korean Red Cross	1956	-	7,034

*Source: Jung Byung-jun (2010) p,478

When it came to the creation of the abductee list, volunteers were particularly controversial. For example, when Ambassador Mucho reported to the U.S. State Department on the investigation of abductees, he believed that the two lists of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, which examined about 2,500 people (the Seoul Metropolitan Government's List of Victims and the List of Abductees of the June 25 Incident), were reliable, but that the list of abductees conducted by province (the list of abductees of the June 25 incident) would have included North Koreans who voluntarily went to North Korea and those who became communists.³³ The bulk of those added between the two lists were volunteers or laborers. He had taken a suspicious stance toward the volunteers. However, at the time of the armistice talks, South Korea had demanded that the North release the forced volunteers and recognize them as prisoners of war, that is, abductees.³⁴ In this way, attitudes toward the volunteer army changed according to the circumstances and the time of year.

At the first State Council meeting in 1952, the Public Security Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior reported the total number of abductees, of which 36,472 were civilians, 73,613 were forced volunteers, and 16,340 were non-forced volunteers.³⁵) The

³³) Ibid., pp. 944-945

³⁴) Ibid., p. 976

³⁵) Minutes of the 1st State Council, "On the Number of Abductees in the June 25 Incident," 1952 (National Archives of Korea)

³⁶ Considering the size of the volunteer army in South Korea as a whole, the list including the volunteer army would not have included all the volunteers. Of course, there is no data that clearly tells us about the size of the volunteer army, and North Korea claimed that there were 40~600,000 volunteers after the war, but it seems that there were 100,000 volunteers in South Korea, as Kim Il-sung and Pak Hunyong said (Jung Byung-jun, 2013: 11-13). Meanwhile, a survey by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information and a report by the Public Security

report puts the total size of the volunteer army at about 90,000 people, and breaks them down into forced and non-coercive soldiers. The question of whether to consider the volunteers as abductions or to divide them based on whether they were forced or unforced was the subject of interest. Although the number reported by the Ministry of the Interior differs greatly from the 82,959 in the abductee list, it can be said that it is the number of civilian abductees excluding volunteers and volunteers estimated by the government at the time.^[72] Compared to kidnapping, massacres were comparatively clear in character. Only when civilians were killed by North Korean soldiers or leftist forces were massacres, as *pan-jus* were created with the intention of highlighting North Korean massacres while covering up massacres of civilians by South Korean troops or right-wing forces. However, in the actual investigation process, there were cases where the identity of the perpetrators of the massacre was not properly identified. Studies that analyzed the roster in detail According to the report, there were cases in which the same name and the same name were listed sequentially or the name could not be found (Shin Chang-hwa, 2007:19, Park Jung-seok, 2004).³⁷ In addition, the list included left-wing enlistees and volunteers who joined the army. Jung Byung-joon, 2010) During the investigation process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it was also found that the victims of the Korean military were registered in the "List of Murdered Persons" (Jung Byung-jun, 2010; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2008: 103).³⁸ In the process of making the list, the massacre by the South Koreans was easily attributed to the North Koreans. This was possible because the list was created by the needs of the government, and there were no other investigators who could question or verify the accuracy of the list.

Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior have revealed a gap of nearly 65,000 people,

³⁷ In this regard, Yang Young-jo's (2013) study comparing the list of murdered persons with the findings of the US War Crimes Investigation Team (KWC) is also interesting. In the case of Yeonggyeong, South Jeolla Province, the list of those killed is recorded as the highest number of victims in the country, with 21,225 victims, but only 58 people are found by the War Crimes Investigation Team. This is also the case in other parts of Jeolla Province, where the list of victims is known to have caused a lot of damage. However, in other cases, the reports of both sides are complementary.

³⁸) The region with the highest number of murders was South Jeolla Province, and this case was also in South Jeolla Province. A total of 69,787 people were killed in South Jeolla Province, accounting for 54% of the total number of 128,936 killed. For reasons for this, see Shin Chang-hwa (2007) and Choi Jung-ki (2008).

but it is not possible to confirm whether this indicates further progress in the investigation or if it is an approximate figure.

In addition, the period when the list was prepared is 1951~1952, while the period of the victims included in the list is concentrated between June ~ October 1950, during the period of North Korea's occupation of South Korea. For example, if you look at the "List of Victims" in detail, the total number of people killed in Jung-gu, Seoul, was 223, of which only two were killed after the restoration of Seoul on September 28. He had been murdered on October 1. The timing of the damage is also shown in the "List of Abductees". <As shown in Table 3>, war damage is cumulative, and other categories such as deaths and missing persons have not been reduced through surveys, but in order for the damage of 50 years to suddenly be added to the statistics of 52 years, the existing duplicate counts had to be excluded. However, it is questionable whether such an operation was carried out when kidnappings and massacres were created as independent categories. There was an exaggerated intention to inflate the damage caused by North Korea. Massacres and kidnappings constituted war crimes, so this issue was important throughout the Korean War. From the beginning of the war, North Korea denounced the bombing of North Korea as a massacre of civilians, and after the US military moved north, it strongly condemned the Sincheon massacre as a war crime, referring to it as a massacre by the US military.³⁹ When North Korea condemns the massacre of civilians while citing international law, South Korea would also need a means to respond. In the early days of the war, he denounced North Korea's brutality, citing the massacre of prisoners in South Korean prisons and the execution of the Korean National University Hospital at Seoul National University Hospital during the occupation of Seoul, but he did not accuse North Korea of committing war crimes, citing systematic massacres of civilians like North Korea. Nonetheless, the reason why the "List of the Murdered" was prepared was because it was necessary to respond to North Korea's propaganda campaign against the victims. Regarding the timing of the survey, the list was made in the two later surveys. It was also the role of the Public Information Office that emphasized the category of massacres. This was also the case in the case of kidnapping.

At the armistice talks, the issue of kidnapping was dealt with as an issue. The South Korean government submitted a "list of abductees" to the armistice talks and demanded the repatriation of the abductees, but North Korea, on the contrary, insisted that the abductees should be returned ^{as well.}^[76] With the issue of prisoners of

³⁹ North Korea has strongly condemned the massacre of U.S. troops in North Korea, citing the same examples from the time of the Korean War to the present day (Park Myung-rim, 2002: 386).

war becoming an important topic in the armistice talks, the question of abduction fizzled out because it was difficult to exchange large numbers of civilians or to recognize them as abductees or prisoners of war.^[77] On the other hand, there were internal factors in the preparation of the list. The results of a survey conducted by the Public Information Office immediately after the restoration of Seoul were shown in the "Seoul Metropolitan Victim List", which was intended to distinguish "patriots". However, the Public Information Office, which was the subject of the investigation, could not clearly determine who was a patriot and could not name them as patriots. The 1951 Free Korea magazine refers to the victims as "patriotic celebrities and innocent people".⁷⁸ As such, the original purpose was to identify patriots. The scope of investigation in the "Seoul Metropolitan Victim List" is abduction, Murdered and missing, which shows that patriots in Seoul during the North Korean occupation were those who fell into the above category, that is, those who could prove that they had resisted North Korea. All those who had not been victimized or had not followed the Rhee Seung-man government to the South were regarded as potential collaborators, and in a situation where the political attitudes of these "remnants" were questioned, the easiest proof to prove that they were "citizens" was to be victims of war by North Korea.

Investigations of the murdered, the abducted, and the North Koreans may have had a similar political effect. In particular, unlike the list of murdered or abducted persons prepared for submission to the armistice talks, the list of North Koreans was an attempt to clearly define the North Koreans. During this period, apart from these lists created by the Public Information Office, there were numerous lists to classify people, and these lists were the tools for dividing the boundaries between the public and the non-nationals at the same time, which were the killing and killing departments that killed and saved people. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has compiled various "Executioner Lists" and "Left Lists" as evidence of massacres in each province, all of which list people who were the main targets of inspection or execution, and the people whose names appeared on these lists and their families may have died or suffered lives. These detailed lists were the state's means of governance, classifying and controlling individual citizens.

76) Korean War Abduction Case Archive, 2006, 『Korean War Abduction Case History Collection 1』, pp. 974-975.

77) This was partly due to the fact that South Korea's voice in the armistice talks was not strong, and also because the abduction issue was not important to the United States, which was a negotiating party. On the contrary, when North Korea aggressively raised the issue of abduction,

it failed to respond properly. It also shows that the ROK does not prepare for the issue of civilians in contrast to efforts to repatriate abducted foreigners (Heo Man-ho, 2013: 132),
 [78] Central Committee for Propaganda Measures, 1951, Freedom, p. 157

(2) Death

If kidnappings and massacres are politically planned categories by the Public Information Office, the other categories are general categories of human casualties during war. In general, death is a category that includes all deaths as a result of war, and refers to all people who die regardless of the cause or reason of death. However, in the category of the Korean War, death is a special category. This is because it has come to mean "non-political" deaths, excluding "political" massacres by North Korea. The Office of Public Information sought to emphasize the brutality of North Korea by separating the massacre from the deaths, but this left the category of death rather ambiguous. In the sense that it is distinct from massacres, kidnappings, and missing persons, it has become a category of the same nature as "the rest of the deaths" or "deaths that belong nowhere."

Despite the exclusion of massacres, deaths still account for a very large proportion of primary damage. Table 6> < shows the number of civilian deaths announced during the Korean War.

C. In the previous survey, deaths were not separated from massacres and kidnappings, so they accounted for the largest proportion of the total total, and in later surveys, they were the second largest after missing persons. The 'non-political' death toll from the war was 244,663.

<Table 5> Change in the number of civilian deaths

death	Amount	source	Standard (announcement) date	Production Institutions
109,417	151,321	Donga Ilbo	(1950.11.04.)	Social Affairs Department
109,313	288,130	Daesang Daily Newspaper	(1950.11.05.)	Social Affairs Department
111,400	275,815	Donga Ilbo	(1950.11.16.)	Interior
163,461	434,666	One Year of the Korean War	1950.12.15.	Interior
178,000	469,400	Chosun Ilbo	(1951.06.26.)	Spokesperson of the Republic of Korea
174,218	488,652	Free	(1951.11.)	Social Affairs Department

236,475	928,761	Donga Ilbo	1951.11.	-
236,475	965,990	Statistics of the Republic of Korea 1952	1952.03.31.	Bureau of Public Affairs Statistics
244,663	990,968	Comprehensive Damage Survey	1953.07.27.	Bureau of Public Affairs Statistics

*Source: Transcription Society, 1952, 『A Year of the Korean War』, p. D5. Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Information, 1954, 『Comprehensive Survey of Damage to the Land-Iwo Incident』, p. 5, Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1952, 『Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952』, pp. 321-322. Central Committee for Propaganda Measures, Ministry of Public Affairs, ed., 1951, "Freedom of Korea (Record of the First Anniversary of the June 25 Incident)," p. 159.

In investigating the deaths of civilians in the Korean War, the most important question is who caused the deaths. The division of the category of genocide around this subject shows this well. In other words, it is possible that "non-political" deaths included those killed by the Armed Forces, the U.S. military, or right-wingers. Of course, there is no list of these deaths as basic data, such as murders or kidnappings, and only the results of investigations, so we cannot make premature assumptions. Nonetheless, even if the actual nature of the deaths by the ROK military and police was concealed, it is highly likely that the deaths themselves were investigated as part of the war damage.

Table < 6> Comparison of Categories of Civilian Deaths in Seoul

*Note: 1) 20,526 appears to be the fault of 20,516. 2) 9,498 appears to be the fault of 9,488, which is the sum of the above items.

*Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Information, 1950, 『List of Victims of the Seoul Metropolitan Government』, Appendix. Seoul Shinmun, October 25, 1950.

Amount	death				Missing name	injury	Base date	Production Institutions
	Void Width	Gunsmith	fire	Bloody				
22,241	4,250	2,378	445	1,721	8,333	5,114	1950.10.25	Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Information
20,516	Sosa	有 P flesh	guitar	Bloody	Abduction/ Hangbul	7,008	1950.10.25	Social Affairs Department
	2,935	4,160	594	1,799	4,020			
20,516	Bombing/ Sosa	Flinders/ Grenade	Han River Bridge	Bloody	Abduction/ Hangbul	7,008	1950.10.25	Seoul Social Affairs Bureau

	2,935	4,160	594	1,799	4,020			
20,5261)	9,4982)				4,020	7,008	1950.12.15	Interior

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 1951, "Transcript of the 39th National Assembly," 1952, The First Year of the Korean War, p. D5.

As such, what is more important than the category of death is the specific reason and content of death, and although there is not much data to show this, there are two statistics that investigated the cause of death in Seoul immediately after the restoration of Seoul. Table <Table 6> shows several causes of civilian deaths. First of all, the 'Provisional Population and Damage Survey Results Specification', which is attached as an appendix to the 『Seoul Metropolitan Victim List』 of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information, classifies the causes of death into four categories. These are air bombing, gunfire, fire, and bloodshed, respectively, but first, killings are killings by North Korean soldiers or leftists, as in the category of massacres, and gunfire and fire are deaths that occurred during the war in the city.

What is characteristic here is air bombing, which means heavy air bombing.

The data in the appendix is almost the only government statistic that shows the damage caused by the bombing of cities by the U.S. military, while the North Korean military has virtually lost air superiority, and it shows how the bombing of cities by the U.S. military has caused civilian harm. In particular, if missing persons are excluded, the most damaging cause of death is air bombing, and even if missing persons are included, more than 1/4 of all deaths were caused by aerial bombardment. The most damaging aerial bombardment of Seoul by the U.S. military was Yongsan, where 1,587 people were killed. This was the bombing of the Yongsan Railway Station on July 16. Son Jung-mok, who witnessed the U.S. bombing from the hills of Namsan, and Kim Sung-chil, who testified to the bombing of the Yongsan Liberation Village, both write about the horror of the bombing.⁴⁰ A study of U.S. bombing during the Korean War shows that there were regular bombing operations in Seoul during July (Kim Tae-woo, 2013 :

243-250).

⁴⁰ Sohn, Jung-mok, 1996, "The Korean War and the Damage to Seoul (Prize)," National Land Information 7, pp. 87-92,; Kim Sung-chil, 2009, In Front of History, Changbi, p. 122

Early damage surveys were not conducted under a set set of guidelines that were categorized and planned, so they reflected the causes of the damage. As a result, categories such as bombings were allowed to remain intact and be reported. However, if the cause of civilian deaths, such as the bombing, was shown, it was possible that the responsibility would be placed on the U.S. Air Force, which was the main body of the bombing. Even if it was "collateral damage" from the bombing, it was clear that this was a political burden. President Rhee also acknowledged that the U.S. military bombed civilian areas in response to a foreign media interview about the U.S. bombing, but claimed that the public would think that such bombing would be better than being taken by North Korea (Kim Tae-woo, 2013: 383), indicating that aerial bombing of civilians in urban areas in South Korea was a problem. As a result, subsequent investigations only published the number of deaths, eliminating all causes of damage, such as bombing. There is another statistic that examined civilian casualties immediately after the recapture of Seoul. The investigation was reported by the Seoul newspaper and also reported by the National Assembly on the damage situation in Seoul. The base date of this survey is October 25, the same as that of the Victim Register, but the figures are somewhat different, presumably because the subjects of the two surveys were different, and the subjects and scope of the investigations were different. The Seoul Shimbun reported the findings on October 30, and the National Assembly reported on October 31. Statistics reported by the Seoul Shimbun divide the categories of deaths into deaths, murder of Yu, murder of others, abduction, and misdeeds. What is interesting is that the categories of damage reported in the Seoul Shimbun are different from the names of the categories mentioned by Rep. Cho Kwang-seop in the National Assembly when he cited data from the Seoul Metropolitan Social Affairs Bureau.

In the National Assembly, the category of Sosa in the newspaper is reported as "crushed to death by bombing," the murder of Sosa as "death from shrapnel and stray bullets," and the other as "cutting of the Han River Bridge." Deaths caused by bombing, shrapnel, or grenades are in a similar category to bombing and gunfire in the Victim Register, and are deaths caused by bombing and street warfare by the U.S. Air Force. The new category is the amputation of the Han River Bridge, where 594 people are estimated to have died as a result of the Han River Bridge bombing. This is almost identical to the estimate of 500~800 people who died in the explosion in the previous study (Kim Dong-chun, 2000: 91).

It is not clear whether the change in the categories in the Seoul Shimbun report was intentional. However, the deletion of the word "bombing" from Sosa and the change of the damage caused by the cutting of the Han River Bridge to "other" damage obscure the

issue of responsibility for civilian casualties. In particular, the unannounced blowing up of the Han River Bridge, which the refugees were crossing, was an important incident that showed the South Korean government's irresponsibility and shamelessness, and it would not have been announced even after investigating the death toll.

Aside from Seoul, the cause of death does not appear to have been specifically investigated, and in the case of war damage in other regions reported by the National Assembly, only the usual categories such as death and injury appear. In addition, after the survey during this period, there are no more statistics that specifically show the cause of death^{52,41}. On the contrary, even if there are existing detailed categories, such as the statistics of the "One Year of the Korean War" in >Table 6 of <, they are deleted and all of them are merged into "deaths".[81] Thus the category of death contained within it various causes of death. Then, with the exception of some of the early investigations in Edo, the results of the survey were published in a form whose contents were completely unknown. Since no records have been found by the Korean government in the production of statistics, it is impossible to dismantle the existing statistics in detail. However, it is hoped that the results of recent detailed research on the massacres and deaths of civilians during the Korean War will⁴² fill the

⁵² This also obscures what the South Korean government considered to be war deaths. For example, the epidemic death toll in 1951 was 41,897, compared with 1,578 in 1950 and 620 in June 1952. An epidemic that occurred during the mass evacuation had killed many of the evacuees. If these deaths were included in the government's death tally, deaths from infectious diseases would account for about one-sixth of all deaths. For the number of deaths due to infectious diseases, see Chung Hoon Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, 1953, "The Second Year of the Korean War," p. D45.

⁴¹ In this way, the work of obscuring the causes of civilian deaths through the deletion of existing categories continues. The War Memorial of Korea's "Consequences and Lessons of War" exhibit presents statistics on civilian casualties, citing statistics from the Comprehensive Damage Survey Table, and combines the categories of death and massacre into a new category of "massacre and death." In addition, abductions and missing persons are also grouped under the category of "abduction and missing". This has the effect of emphasizing the two categories of massacre and kidnapping, while at the same time obscuring the nature of the deaths and disappearances.

⁴² In recent years, many cases of massacres of civilians have come to light, and work has been done to estimate the overall scale of the massacres of civilians by the military and police. One casebook killed 250,000~300,000 civilians

gap. It remains to be seen how those who were not "slaughtered" by North Korea were killed, and how those who were killed by South Korea's military and police were treated in the category of death.

The non-politics of the death category clearly shows the politics of the category. Death in the war is thought to be as unfortunate and inevitable as death by a blind bullet, but the more it was, the more specific it was to be heard. The deliberate exaggeration of the massacres and kidnappings resulted in the unintentional concealment of the deaths. The government did not take the issue of the dead as serious and was only recognized as part of the damage caused by the war, but to this day it has not been properly explained is the question of how to view these "deaths." (3) Missing or injured

Compared to other categories, categories such as missing persons and injuries have been treated as less important in terms of primary damage. This was not so much because of the diminished importance of the damage, but because the damage had not been properly investigated since the time of the war. The Korean War was a war in which there were many missing and missing. According to the results of the Comprehensive Damage Survey Table, 303,212 civilians were missing due to the war, which is about one-third of the total damage of 990,968. Since missing literally refers to people who disappeared for unknown reasons during the war, the fact that a large number of civilians went missing in the Korean War shows that civilians who disappeared silently on the edge of the war accounted for the majority of the victims.

If we speculate on the cause of the large number of missing persons, there are many people whose whereabouts are unclear due to evacuation due to the rapid changes in the front line at the beginning of the war, there are still people who disappeared through volunteers, laborers, mountain entrants, North Koreans, and forced migration to North Korea, and there are also people who disappeared due to massacres of civilians (Jung Byung-joon, 2010: 485; Seo Jung-seok, 2000).^[83] However, with today's estimates, it is virtually impossible to determine the exact cause of the disappearance. The area with the most damage caused by the missing was Gangwon Province. In Gangwon Province, the number of missing persons increased rapidly from the beginning of the war, according to <Table 7> in November 1950.

It claims the massacre of 1 million civilians. Compiled by the National Committee on the FactFinding of Civilian Massacres Before and After the Korean War, 2005, Report on the Massacre of Civilians Before and After the Korean War, Hanul.

[83] The NAHM estimates that about 200,000 of the 300,000 or so missing may have become volunteers and North Korean victims. Spencer C. Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Korean War Volume I, ABC-CLIO, 2010, p.101

The number of missing people, up from 5,000 in the company, has risen to 75,000 in December. This is 89% of the total damage in Gangwon Province and 45% of the total number of missing persons, and 7% of the total population of Gangwon Province in 1949. Considering that Gangwon Province has been a battleground since the beginning of the war, this figure of one in 14 people has disappeared is too high. However, there is still no research that reveals why there are so many missing people in Gangwon Province. Compared to massacres and kidnappings, where the reason

is relatively clear, the whereabouts This is because it is difficult to explain, and in fact, it is difficult to find the cause.⁴³) However, it can be taken into account that Gangwon Province was the site of fierce battles from the beginning of the war, and after the landing operation at Incheon, it was the main escape route for the North Korean army. Alternatively, it is possible that the administrative power of Gangwon Province was not functioning properly and the damage was simply estimated to be unexplained. <Table 7> Change in the number of missing persons in Gangwon Province

Missing	Gangwon-do damage total	Total missing damage	Base Date	source
5,255	17,860	93,203	1950.11.15	Social Affairs Department
75,203	84,816	166,483	1950.12.15	One Year of the Korean War
76,271	86,084	170,524	-	Free
80,203	127,202	298,175	1952.03.31	Republic of Korea Statistical Yearbook 1952
80,189	130,777	303,212	1953.07.27	Comprehensive Damage Survey

*Source: Transcription Society, 1952, 『A Year of the Korean War』, p. D5. Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Information, 1954, 『Comprehensive Survey of Damage to the Land-lo Incident』, p. 5, Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1952, 『Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952』, pp. 321-322. Central Committee for Propaganda Measures,

⁴³ The fact that Gangwon Province was not the center of the massacre of civilians compared to other regions is also a factor that makes it difficult to estimate the cause of the disappearance.

Ministry of Public Affairs, ed., 1951, "Freedom of Korea (Record of the First Anniversary of the June 25 Incident)," p. 159.

Ministry of Social Affairs, 1950, "Matters Concerning the Introduction of Refugees and the Sending of Relief Guidelines" (National Archives of Korea).

In terms of categories, what is more important than the number of missing persons is how to find and deal with them, which is a temporary category of missing persons. During the Korean War, the number of civilians missing did not decrease, but only increased, indicating that there was no effort or attempt to locate the missing. If we compare this with military casualties, it becomes even clearer. Table 8> < shows how the number of Korean military losses during the Korean War has changed from more than 150,000 in April 1952 to less than 20,000 in recent statistics. Instead, the number of war dead is increasing by about 100,000. This is due to the fact that the number of missing persons is gradually being found to be war dead, and the figure is changing. However, in the case of civilian casualties, there are no statistics compiled after the Comprehensive Damage Survey, making it virtually impossible to locate more than 300,000 missing people.

<Table 8> Change in Soldier Casualties

category	death	injury	Missing	Vision	system
1952	30,180	109,269	150,198	127,448	417,095
1996	135,858	443,634	19,321	-	598,813

*Source: Transcription Society, 1953, 『Second Year of the Korean War』, p. D2. National Defense Research Institute, 1996, "Korean War Conflict Damage Statistics," p.37.

If there are too many missing in civilian casualties, too few are wounded. The total number of civilian casualties in the Korean War was 229,625, accounting for only 23% of all civilian casualties. If we consider all deaths, massacres, and missing persons as deaths, the ratio of dead to wounded is about 3:1. In other words, the number of deaths is three times higher than the number of wounded. This ratio has been almost constant from the early days of the war to the later stages of the war. On the other hand, according to the 1996 figures in Table 8> <, the proportion of wounded in the total losses of the Armed Forces is 74%. The ratio of dead to injured is about 1:3 in contrast to the civilian population. Considering that the proportion of wounded is generally higher than the number of deaths caused by war, the number of civilian casualties in the Korean War is too small. This is likely due to the lack of thorough investigations into the wounded civilians and the failure to properly count the wounded as war victims.

In the case of kidnappings and massacres, the government used them for political purposes, and in the case of deaths, if adjustments were made to obscure the causes, the government's response to injuries and disappearances was not properly investigated. A large number of civilian injuries incurred in the war were excluded from the category of 'damage'. This is because the injured were not a priority in the investigation of the victims or in the settlement of the damage. The missing person was left with an unknown cause. Whether they were alive or dead was no longer the subject of question. They could have been volunteers, North Koreans, or people who had been massacred by the South Korean military and police, but the state left them missing rather than find out. As a result, the wounded and missing were left in a silent zone.

4. Utilization of damage survey results: Census

Population decline due to war was a serious problem because the primary damage to civilians, such as death, was directly linked to population loss. The population loss suffered by the North and the South through the Korean War was not only fatal for the reconstruction of post-war society, but also because the population was the basis of the productive forces and an indicator of national power, and ultimately an indicator of national defense capabilities. In addition, the increase or decrease in population due to the war was also an indicator of victory or defeat in the Korean War. In addition, the United Nations forces continued to demand accurate population data. The government sought to determine the population by conducting a census in 1952, when the front line was stabilized. The first census conducted immediately after liberation was the 1949 census. During the U.S. military administration, a census was conducted in 1946 by the Bureau of Health and Welfare and was used for elections to the Constituent Assembly, but the results were judged to be insufficient.⁴⁴) immediately after the establishment of the government, a detailed census was required, and accordingly, on January 27, 1949, the Personnel Rescue Act was promulgated. The census was to be conducted every five years from 1950, but due to the urgency of the issue, only the first census was scheduled to take place one year earlier in 1949. Accordingly, the first census was conducted on May 1, 1949. At the same time, the Public Information Office planned a census and a census in

1949. However, with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the census was discontinued. This was resumed in 1952.

⁴⁴ Imha Lee, 2010, "Census and Control of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command during the Korean War," *Battlefield and People*, Sunin, pp. 84-87

The May 1949 census was the benchmark for population damage throughout the Korean War. The human toll statistics sought to determine first and foremost how the population was declining compared to pre-war times, and the reference point was the survey of '49. However, there was an important weakness in using the '49 survey as a reference point. That is, the survey was in '49 instead of '50, and it did not capture the population due to natural increases and decreases between '49 and '50 or the influx of people from North Vietnam or abroad at that time.⁴⁵⁾ has resulted in the exclusion of population growth in one year from population decline. In addition, it is not possible to accurately capture the growth of urban population or other population movements within a year.⁴⁶⁾

Although no official census was conducted after the outbreak of the war, the process of arbitrary population estimation continued. In particular, the UNCACK reports were monthly at the survey of population trends in each province, so the overall size of the population was also roughly outlined. However, this was only a temporary measure that reflected the movement and reception of refugees, so it could not be said to be accurate. There is also an article that a provisional census was conducted on August 31, 1951, but the results of the census are not available, so the exact details are unknown.[88] In 1952, a total of two censuses were conducted. The first census was based on March 31, 1952, and the next was the current census at the end of the year, with December 31 as the base date. Of these, the March 31 census was a provisional census, and the December 31 census was conducted by the Bureau of Statistics of the Public Information Office. The results of this survey are shown in < Table 9>.

Table < 9> Census before and after the Korean War

Total Population	Survey Base Date	source	Remarks
20,188,641	1949.05.01	Korea Statistical Yearbook	Including foreigners
20,166,756	1949.05.01	Korea Statistical Yearbook	Excluding Foreigners

⁴⁵ For this reason, 石南国 (1972) and others estimate the population in 50 years by calculating the average population growth rate from 45 to 49 years. According to this, the population in 50 years is 20,306,000.

⁴⁶) For this reason, the population of Seoul immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War is controversial. The outbreak of war

18,855,678	1952.03.31	Kyunghyang Newspaper	1952.06.31
20,526,705	1952.03.31	The second year of the Korean War	Exclude military personnel
19,104,192	1952.12.31	Three years of the Korean War	Materials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs
19,410,657	1952.12.31	National Archives of Korea	Actual Survey Population
21,546,248	1952.12.31	National Archives of Korea	Estimated population after correction
21,546,248	1953.12.31	Korea Statistical Yearbook	Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Internal Affairs
21,526,374	1955.09.01	Korea Statistical Yearbook	Including foreigners

*Note: The results of the survey conducted by the Office of Public Information stored in the National Archives of Korea are from the National Statistics Portal (www.kosis.kr), "Matters Concerning the Conduct of the Year-End Census" (1953), and the Statistics Yearbook of the Republic of Korea

The results of the survey in <Table 9> differ from each other even though the base date is the same. In particular, the March 31, 1952 census showed a difference of more than a million people. It is not clear whether the results of the "Second Year of the Korean War" were further corrected or whether additional investigations were actually conducted, which remains a question mark. However, as for the results of the year-end census, which was conducted on December 31, 1952, the data of the Office of Public Information provide some insights.

It is estimated that the population of Seoul in June '50 was much higher than the figure in the survey in '49.

[88] Census, Dong-A Ilbo, December 28, 1952.

The census of December 31, 1952, was an ambitious wartime preparation by the Office of Public Information, intended to resume the census, which had been suspended since 1949, and to obtain a complete picture of the wartime population. The Public Information Office emphasized that the census would be an important basis for identifying the state of human casualties and devastation and for post-war reconstruction and national mobilization. ⁴⁷⁾ Accordingly, an investigation was conducted, but ironically, the results of

⁴⁷⁾ Public Information Office, 1952, "Matters Concerning the Conduct of the Year-End

this investigation were not published. Therefore, the statistical results shown in the "Three Years of the Korean War" in Table < 9> are from the Ministry of the Interior, but it is not clear whether these are the results of the investigation by the Public Information Office. Even before the results of the Public Information Office were announced, questions were raised about the results at the State Council and it was decided to keep them private.⁴⁸ On April 16, Prime Minister Paek Doo-jin revealed that the census results were unreliable, and the Minister of Public Information also announced that they were unofficial and inaccurate.⁴⁹ The survey was reported several times in the media, and it appears that some of the findings were published in April. Reports by the Dong-A Ilbo and Kyunghyang Sinmun emphasized that although the results of the survey were not disclosed as confidential, the population is around 21 million, the sex ratio of men and women is about 400,000 more women, and there is no problem with the population in a perfect pyramid shape when tabulated. This is quite far from the actual results of the survey. In addition, these articles commonly estimate that North Korea's population is only 3 million. This only emphasizes that there is no problem with South Korea's population and that it is much higher than North Korea's.⁵⁰ However, in July, critical articles appeared stating that the survey at the end of December was completely shambolish.⁵¹ In the end, the 1952 census was deemed a failure, and the Office of Public Information was forced to re-establish the current census at the end of December 31, 1953. The National Archives of Korea still has a plan for a census as of the end of December 31, 1953, which was presented to the Council of Ministers by the Office of Public Information.⁵² However, it is very unclear whether this census was conducted. The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1954 shows the census results of December 31, 1953, because the results of

Resident Census" (National Archives of Korea)

⁴⁸) Minutes of the 24th State Council, 1953, "Announcement of Census Results" (National Archives of Korea)

⁴⁹ I'm Ha, op. cit., p. 117

⁵⁰ "Statistically Estimated Population of Korea Nine Million in North and South Korea," Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1953.04.13. "South Koreans Total Twenty Million Names," Dong-A Ilbo, 1954.04.12.

⁵¹ "Household Census and Propaganda Enlightenment," Dong-A Ilbo, 1953.07.23.

⁵² Public Information Office, 1953, "Matters Concerning the Conduct of the Year-End Current Census" (National Archives of Korea)

this survey are exactly the same as those estimated by the Public Information Office in Table 10> of <. Considering that the revised population will be estimated according to the calculation formula and not the survey, it is very likely that the 1953 census was not conducted but was prepared by estimate. In addition, considering that there was no mention of the census in the press at the time, unlike in 1952, the 1953 census was frustrated at the planning stage. Right. Thus, the next census became the second census in 1955.

No census was conducted, but even so, the 1953 plan contained many important details. The 1953 plan characterized the late 1952 census as a failure and strongly criticized it. According to him, there were several problems with the 1952 census, first, the survey was conducted by the indirect report of the head of the household rather than the direct report of the head of the household, second, there was a problem with the notification form, third, the training of the enumerators was incomplete, and lastly, there were many omissions because the surveyor did not visit the households in person and surveyed only the registered households. The points pointed out as problematic show how the census was actually conducted at the time.⁵³ The Office of Public Information planned to conduct a complete investigation by correcting the points pointed out above, but this was not possible because it was a large budget project.

population	entry	Remarks
19,410,657	Actual Population	(1)
21,335,094	Estimated Population (推定人口)	A Table
1,064,658	Calibration Table Ba	(+)Correction
853,504	Correction Table Bb	(-)Correction
21,546,248	Estimated population corrected	(2)
19,410,657	(1)	
2,135,591	(2)-(1)	Decrease in the number of people in the field

⁵³ The process of the first civilian damage survey would have been similar to that of the 1952 census. This is because the 1952 census did not involve the dispatch of enumerators, but rather the local administrative agencies conducted their own surveys and reported on them.

Table < 10> 1952 "Present Census at the End of December" by the Office of

Public Information (Public Information), "Matters concerning

the conduct of the current census at the end of the year," 1953 (National

Archives of Korea)

The 1953 proposal analytically points out the problems with the statistics of 1952. Therefore, this data sheds light on what points were considered problematic in the census at the time. First, in the December 1952 census, the actual population was 19,410,657. First of all, the estimated population shown in Table A is an estimate of the population that will naturally increase in December 1952 by applying the average natural increase rate from 1940 to 1944 as of May 1949. In other words, the estimated population is the population if there had been no war. According to Table B, the (+) increase in correction is the population of the restoration district plus the estimate of the people of Vietnam, and the population of the restored district is 64,658, which is estimated to be 1 million

people in Vietnam, according to Dr. Oliver's estimate. Conversely, the decrease in (-) correction is Gyeonggi-do. The number of people lost in the loss of wealth (331,000), the murdered (122,799), the abductees (82,959), the North Koreans (10,271), the dead (236,475), the dead volunteers (50,000), and the detainees (20,000) were added. In the case of the population of Gyeonggi Province, half of the population in May '49 was thought to have remained, and only half of that was added, and the number of murders, abductions, and deaths is the same as the results of the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952. The revised estimated population (2) takes into account both the decline due to war victims and the increase in the number of people in Vietnam, and is the current population that is expected to be this population. However, the estimated population (2) differs by 2 million from the actual population surveyed. The Public Information Office has given detailed reasons for the discrepancy, and those who have been detained include soldiers, military personnel, laborers in the armed forces, prison prisoners (17,528 prisoners, 10,665 detainees), wounded (255,582), missing (298,175), prisoners of war, anti-terror prisoners (34,000), public servants and other missing investigations. The number of injured and missing here is also the same as the number of statistical annuals.

Nonetheless, for the South Korean government, the number of surveyed people relative to the estimated population was significantly lower than expected. The sheer loss of population from the war is more than 2 million. This was 10 percent of the population based on the 1949 population, and it was much lower than the original estimate, so there was concern that the war damage would be too great if the survey were published. In particular, as can be seen from the revised estimated population, the government was expecting that the population would have increased due to the large number of Vietnamese, about a million people. This is the first time that a new^[96] ^[97] In the end, when the desired results were not obtained, the Office of Public Information concluded that the survey at the end of 1952 had omitted procedures in order to expedite the investigation, which led to inaccuracies. A new census was planned for 1953 to compensate for this. However, the census was thwarted by budgetary and other reasons, and the population changes caused by the war were not officially announced. As the Office of Public Affairs points out, the 2 million people who have been statistically reduced are all substantial

96) UNCAK's estimates were similar to the South Korean government's expectations. A report dated September 30, 1951, estimated that the population would have increased by about 180,000 by 650,000 due to the loss of death and disappearance from the 1949 census of

20,373,000. Therefore, the results of the census must have come as a shock. National History Compilation Committee, 2013, 『Korean Economic Policy Data 8』, p.446

97) UNCACK was attempting to do its own population count independently of the Korean government's census. The UNCACK had a population of 20,427,658 in November 1952.

The Korean government's census results differ by as much as 1 million. I, op. cit., p. 118 There would not have been any casualties. As stated in Amendment B, the areas that the government recognized as war damage due to population decline were only actual population, killings, abductions, abductions, deaths, and volunteer soldiers, but if we think about this in reverse, it means that it was reserving judgment as actual civilian damage in the case of those who did not fall under this category, such as those who went missing. However, even so, the government was in a hurry to conceal the population decline rather than reveal the exact population decline through a re-survey. It was at this moment that the census plan's claim that the census was "an important element of the composition of the nation, and that its statistics were also the driving force for the planning of the basic national policy," was overshadowed. 5. Meaning and Effect of Primary Damage Survey

(1) Hierarchy of damage and damage categories

The primary damage survey was conducted with the aim of understanding the reality of civilian casualties, but at the same time, it was also a task to relocate the affected civilians according to categories and assign them a hierarchy. Unlike the Ministry of Social Affairs, which investigated and announced the damage in general, the intention to hierarchize civilian casualties was the creation of a "patriot list" by the Public Information Office. The first thing the government did when it took over Seoul and returned to the government was to punish the citizens who remained in Seoul as traitors. Before the occupation of Seoul, there was a perception that the rebels who destroyed Seoul were patriots, and those who remained in Seoul were suspected of treason (Park Won-soon, 1990: 174). Because of this, Kim Sung-chil, who remained in Seoul and was constantly suspected of treason, was furious about this situation, saying, "The slogans of many 'South Koreans' are like abstractions, saying, 'Only those of us who followed the government to the South are patriots, and you who remain in the depressed earth are all impure elements.' Will there ever be another such injustice?"⁵⁴⁾ and sighed.

Under these circumstances, the only way to prove that he was a "patriot" in Seoul was to emphasize that he was a victim of North Korean occupation. The government likewise

⁵⁴⁾ Kim Sung-chil, op. cit., p.266

praised those who were victimized by North Korea during the occupation of Seoul as "patriots."

The intention of creating the "Patriot List" was to ensure that people were killed or kidnapped (or disappeared) by North Korea.

It was to emphasize that those who were killed were the true patriots. Volunteers were excluded from the list of patriots partly because they could not be considered patriots even if they were forcibly mobilized. Of course, the list of patriots was published as the "Victim List" because it was difficult to identify the real patriots, but the government repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the list was to identify patriots. This "patriotism" was an important keyword in classifying the primary civilian victims. In his speech on September 28, the day of the recapture of Seoul, Rhee said: "The military police, youths and other civilian leaders who have made many contributions to the country in this war, and the ardent doctors who have gone to the country, and all the compatriots and other compatriots who have suffered the brutal massacre and damage in the civilian sector, are indeed bone-numb and bloodcurdling. ... (omitted)... The blood of all our innocent patriotic compatriots has paid this price considerably, and our descendants will commemorate and commemorate it with the blessing of heaven and age."^[99] Many people were harmed by the war, but not all of them could become patriots. But if he had been massacred or kidnapped by the North Koreans, that was the most convincing proof that he was a patriot. The police classified the bodies found after the recapture of Seoul as follows: The 2,489 bodies found between September 29 and October 16 were identified as 1,322 patriots, 784 government officials, and 383 unknowns.^[100] Thus the dead were divided into patriots and reds. The various lists prepared by the Office of Public Information in 1952 also clearly showed the government's concern for civilian casualties. At that time, there

were the "List of Murdered Persons," the "List of Abductees," and the "List of North Koreans," which were attempts to distinguish between deaths and massacres by North Korea, and to distinguish between abductees and North Koreans. The investigation of the murdered and abductees was an attempt to emphasize North Korea's war responsibility for civilian casualties, while at the same time making these damages more important than other harms through the creation of a list. What is unusual here is the government's change in attitude toward the abductees. This is because the government, which had only targeted civilian abductees at the time of the recapture of Seoul and did not recognize them as abductees in the case of volunteer soldiers, recognized all of them as abductees

in 1952. This was an attempt to get them repatriated, including volunteers, when the issue of the exchange of civilian prisoners of war was raised during the armistice talks. However, the government at the time seems to have classified the abductees according to a set standard. At the first State Council meeting in 1952, the Public Information Office reported on the number of abductees, according to which "The Six and Io Incidents

99) "President Rhee Seung-man Issues Letter Calling for Prohibition of Killings and Baccesses of Private Grudges in Recaptured Areas," Busan Ilbo, September 29, 1950.

100) "Seoul Metropolitan Police Station Buries Victims Found in Seoul," Donga Ilbo, October 16, 1950. According to the latest census by the Public Security Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior, the total number of abductees is 126,425, including 36,472 semi-civilian abductees, 73,613 forced volunteers, and 16,340 non-forced⁵⁵ volunteers.) in the 1959 list, so it is not possible to know how this figure was investigated, but it shows that the abductees are classified as "ordinary civilian abductees-forced volunteer soldiers." This figure was also reported in the press at the time, and the article at the time referred to all of these abductees as "patriotic compatriots⁵⁶." However, these "patriots" were again excluded from the list of abductees when the armistice ended without much gain, and they disappeared from subsequent discussions of homecoming.

In this way, the process of investigating civilian casualties was a process of identifying and classifying certain damages. And at the same time, a certain hierarchy was established in the damage. The victims were either patriots who were victimized by North Korea, or they were good and innocent people. And the rest of the victims became enemies, rednecks, and collaborators. The very act of investigating the damage was a kind of process of "making a nation" to distinguish them.

(2) Incomplete Investigation: Fossilized Damage

⁵⁵) Minutes of the 1st State Council, 1952, "Matters Concerning the Number of Abductees in the Six-Io Incident", (National Archives of Korea)

⁵⁶ "Approximately 120,000 abductees during the war," Peace Newspaper, 1952.01.08. The Peace Sinmun newspaper did not cite an official announcement, but it reported that the number of abductees was more than 126,000, of which 90,000 were volunteers. In particular, half of the volunteers, or about 45,000 people, are believed to be from the Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Civilian protection in the Korean War was poor. Rather, civilians became direct victims of the war. This was ironic given that the Korean War took place after the creation of the U.K., which aimed to end the war, and the enactment of international humanitarian law to protect civilians in wartime. Both the governments of the North and the South did not hesitate to commit violence against civilians from the beginning of the war, and no consideration was given to civilians as they continued to wage wars. The civilian casualties of the war were insignificant. As soon as the Korean War broke out, the definition or justification of protecting civilians was reduced to a political tool. North Korea has defined violence against civilians as a war crime since before the outbreak of the war and throughout the war, and has continued to carry out propaganda condemning it through the United Nations and the media.

On the other hand, they killed or kidnapped civilians in South Korea. South Korea, while similarly condemning North Korea, believed that the massacre of its own citizens in South Korea was justified, and the U.S. military also claimed that it was a legitimate military operation, even when it killed refugees and carried out large-scale bombings on residential areas. The conduct of war and the protection of civilians in the face of the camp were only a means of blaming the other side.

All of them.

The reason why it was not possible to properly investigate the damage to civilians in South Korea was that the issue of civilians gradually lost its political importance in the course of the war. The South Korean government investigated civilian casualties as a source of data for reconstruction, but it lacked the capacity and unwillingness to do so accurately. Rather, they were only interested in politically exploiting the category of civilian harm to denounce North Korea's war crimes. As the concealment of the census results demonstrates, war damage was only something that the government or the U.S. military wanted to achieve.

In the end, the investigation into the damage to civilians remained incomplete. Civilian casualties were actively counted only until 1951, after which the proportion of damage surveys decreased. This was partly due to the fact that the number of civilian casualties did not increase as much as before, but also because of the government's attitude that there was no need to conduct a new survey of the damage. The fact that the final survey in December 1953 showed that the total number of people killed houses surveyed during the same period had increased by 5 times and the area of damage had increased by about 2 times compared to the previous survey, which shows how low the importance of human damage was in the survey at that time. In addition, in the "Comprehensive Survey of Casualties in the Land-lo Incident," which was compiled, only 1 out of 48 statistics related

to civilian casualties were compiled. As the war gradually came to an end and post-war reconstruction began, the human toll of civilians was being relegated to the point of view. Nevertheless, there was no controversy over the validity or inadequacy of the civilian damage survey. The loss of civilian life was simply summed up as "a national loss suffered by the invasion of the Communist barbarians." ⁵⁷ The total number of casualties of 990,968 was neither too much nor too little, but it would have been a reasonable figure that could show North Korea's cruelty to civilians. There was no reason for the government to continue investigating the damage when the purpose of a thorough investigation of civilian casualties had been lost. In addition, the South Korean government was limited in its ability to politically exploit civilian casualties. At the armistice talks, where civilian issues and damages were supposed to be discussed, the issue of the treatment of prisoners of war was pushed aside and could not be properly discussed. Because the U.S. military judged that the discussion of war crimes could have a negative impact on the armistice agreement, war crimes were considered He investigated and did not file a complaint.¹⁰⁴⁾

The damage survey conducted by the Ministry of Social Affairs was aimed at determining the actual extent of the damage. However, efforts to repair civilian damage were rarely carried out during the war or after the war. Of course, enormous amounts of aid and relief were provided, but this was for immediate relief for the refugees, not for the protection of war victims in general. In the process of post-war

reconstruction of society, the deaths or injuries of civilians were excluded from the state's relief. This is because the South Korean government provided assistance only to military personnel and their families. Wounded Soldiers, The families of the deceased military and police officers were subsidized by the state, albeit in small amounts, and civilians had to take care of all the damage on their own. In addition, when it comes to foreign aid, the human casualties of civilians have not been treated as evidence. Compared to the loss of industry, human loss was not treated as an important issue. In this process of restructuring society, civilian casualties were treated as if they were nonexistent.^{[105] [106]} Because the Korean government did not give importance to civilian casualties, the post-war Korean society did not discuss this publicly. This was in contrast to North Korea, which regularly raised the issue of the massacre of civilians by the U.S. military and continued to use the experience of the victims as a political tool, such as the construction of memorials dedicated to massacres of civilians such as the Sincheon Massacre. Statistics

⁵⁷ "Two Million Lives Lost," Kyunghyang Sinmun, June 25, 1953.

on primary damage were also of little importance and were not utilized. Statistics have become the official statistics of the country, This was not to be questioned or challenged.

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- 104) The U.S. military formed the War Crimes Investigation Team (KWC) to investigate war crimes committed by North Korean and Chinese militaries. Since the survey was conducted mainly by examining prisoners of war and conducting field surveys based on their testimonies, it was conducted in a way that was different from the South Korean government's investigation of civilian casualties. U.S. military investigations into war crimes focused primarily on the execution or mistreatment of prisoners of war. On the War Crimes Division, see Yang Jung-Shim, 2010, "Investigation and Handling of War Crimes by the U.S. Military during the Korean War: Focusing on the War Crimes Team (KWC)," *Journal of the History of the Korean National Movement* No. 64; Hwang Yun-hee, 2012, "Documents of the Korean War Crimes Investigation Team (KWC)," *Soongsil History Journal* No. 28, see
- 105) Of course, it is not a universal phenomenon for the state to compensate for civilian casualties after the war. However, in European countries after World War II, there were cases where the state subsidized the war damage of civilians to a certain extent, such as military assistance. In the case of West Germany, almost all war victims were compensated through the Federal Aid Act (Shin, 2011).
- 106) At the time, the South Korean government did not compensate not only for the damage caused by the war, but also for the massacre and killing of civilians by the state during the war. When the murder of civilians by the police immediately after the Geochang incident was discussed in the National Assembly, the opinion that the state should pay alimony to the victims was dismissed as follows. Rep. Kim Kwang-joong said, "If the state reparates in the National Assembly, it is like taking a personal living and helping the state. The people involved in the Geochang incident should pay compensation here, and it makes sense in this situation, but if we follow what Rep. So Seon-kyu is saying, the National Assembly will enact a law and save the lives of each person." *National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Minutes of the 63rd 11th Plenary Session of the National Assembly*, 1951.09.10.

IV. Investigation of Secondary Damage: Control of Civilians

1. Subject of damage investigation: Ministry of Social Affairs, UNCACK

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Korean society became a large-scale "evacuation society." People instinctively wanted to move to a safe place to escape the chaos. In the immediate aftermath of the war, even though the government did not induce or encourage evacuations, immediately after the outbreak of the war, roads and bridges were filled with refugees. Because of this, the South Korean government had to take measures for refugees and war victims from the beginning of the war. In particular, the movement of refugees is associated with problems in military operations. Proper dispersal, control, and acceptance of refugees became an urgent problem. This is because if the evacuees passed through the combat zone or descended south through military roads, it could have a serious impact on the operation.[107] The dispersal and control of

refugees was not the responsibility of a particular ministry, but a matter for the cooperation of both the military and government departments. Consultation with the military was necessary to determine the places and roads on which the evacuees would move, and the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defense was responsible for taking action against the guerrillas who might be mixed among the refugees. The Ministry of Social Affairs was put in charge of the relief of the refugees, and the Ministry of Transportation provided the necessary means of transportation for the evacuees, and the movement, control, and relief of the refugees were possible only when all government departments actively cooperated.

Among these ministries, it was the Ministry of Social Affairs that was in charge of the relief of the refugees and the investigation of the damage. Since the Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of the relief, movement, and control of refugees, as well as the establishment of camps and the registration of refugees, the issue of refugees became the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Ministry of Social Affairs' relief work for refugees also had continuity with the pre-Korean War period. With the liberation of Korea in 1945, the number of immigrant Koreans who returned to Korea from abroad was severe in terms of housing and livelihood, numbering about 2 million between 45 and 49 (Lee Young-hwan, 1989: 46). In addition to the poverty situation after liberation, they became the poorest in society, and the US military government treated them as refugees and implemented relief policies through the Health and Welfare Bureau. The relief work for the war victims was transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs with the establishment of the government in 1948, and this led to the Ministry of Social Affairs taking charge of the relief work even after the outbreak of the war.

[107] Suh Yong-seon, ed., 1997, 『History of Korean War Support』, Korea Defense Research Institute, pp. 228~229.

Although the Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of refugee affairs immediately after the outbreak of the war, it was difficult for the ministry to function properly when the front line was pushed back and administrative functions were paralyzed. Relief for displaced and displaced persons was carried out only on a limited basis. At the end of 1950, the Ministry of Social Affairs took a new phase of the entire line and moved to a full-fledged wartime regime with plans for large-scale evacuations. At the end of 1950, both the Minister of Social Affairs and the Minister of Health were replaced. In December 1950, Minister of Social Affairs Heo Chung reorganized the Ministry of Social Affairs into a wartime system immediately after taking office. It was announced that all the existing miscellaneous duties of the Ministry of Social Affairs would be discontinued and an

Emergency Relief Headquarters would be set up, and the Ministry of Social Affairs would be operated with a focus on the relief of the victims and the issue of refugees.^[108] Accordingly, the Ministry of Social Affairs will concentrate on the work of refugees until the end of the war.

However, the South Korean government was unable to deal with the enormous number of refugees and displaced persons during the war. Most of the relief and food supplies depended on foreign aid. The United Nations collected aid in accordance with Security Council resolutions of 27 June and 7 July, and on 31 July adopted a resolution on the relief of Korean civilians. According to the text of the resolution, the UN Secretary-General will provide aid to the UNC for relief and refueling, and the UNC will provide relief and refueling to the civilian population of the Republic of Korea.^[109] Accordingly, a system of support for relief and aid to Koreans was established.^[110] However, at the beginning of the war, the United Nations forces had few units to provide aid and support to the civilian population, and as the need for this arose, on 3 September 1950, the United Nations Ministry of Health and Welfare (Public Health and Welfare Section) (Kim Hak-jae, 2010b: 51). This organization was later merged with the Civil Assistance Command (CAC) under the Eighth Army, and from December 1950 it became known as the United Nations Civil Assistance

Command (UNCACK) in Korea (Kim Hak-jae, 2010b: 55~56).¹¹¹⁾

UNCACK began its work with refugees in earnest in 1951. UNCACK conducted a census to check the movement status of the refugees, and conducted a survey on the movement of the refugees, relief status, and other aspects necessary for the management of the refugees in each camp, and prepared a report and reported it to the Eighth Army. For this reason, the data on refugees left by the Ministry of Social Affairs remains limited.

108) "Minister of Social Affairs Announces Reorganization of Ministry of Social Affairs into 戰時體制," Dong-A Ilbo, December 7, 1950.

109) Transcription Society, 1951, The First Year of the Korean War, p. C.103.

110) Compiled in Introduction, op. cit., p. 232

111) The UNCACK was nominally an organization for relief and aid, but its actual purpose was to carry out combat-oriented civilian control with military operations at its advantage. Regarding the nature of UNCACK, Hakjae Kim,

2010, "The Korean War and the Myth of 'Humanitarian Salvation,'" Battlefields and People, Sunin UNCACK left detailed reports from 1951 to 1953.^[112] However, UNCACK could not act on its own without cooperation with the Korean government. The total number of personnel at UNCACK was about 2,700, and there were about 700 officers, soldiers, and civil servants, not including Koreans who were assigned odd jobs. They were divided into several field teams, one with 12 soldiers and 9 soldiers, for a total of 21 people (Choi, 1996: 141). Since

this number of refugees could not manage and supervise all the scattered refugee camps across the country, it was essential to cooperate with the Korean government, especially the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was in charge of relief work.

However, the UNCACK had more authority over relief than the local authorities in charge of the refugee camps. They were responsible for the receipt and distribution of supplies, and they were responsible and empowered to audit whether these supplies were being distributed properly (Choi, 1996: 142). As a result, UNCACK officials were responsible for threatening and monitoring officials for not being able to reach the refugees. If the Ministry of Social Affairs did not provide relief, UNCACK staff would step in and distribute the relief materials themselves.^[113] In other words, UNCACK and aid officials were in a relationship of 'supervision and performance' (Heo, 2006: 193).

UNCACK staff were frequently required to submit reports containing statistics to the higher-ups, but it appears that UNCACK did not conduct any direct research in producing these statistics. So they would cite statistics from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the local administration. However, the statistics produced by South Korean government agencies from surveys of secondary damage have always been "unreliable" figures for UNCACK's staff. UNCACK has always demanded more accurate information, and investigations of displaced and displaced persons were frequently conducted at UNCACK's request (Choi, 1996: 146).

2. Evacuation Pattern and Survey Period

Existing research on evacuation has largely divided the period of evacuation into primary evacuation and secondary evacuation (Kim Dong-chun, 2000). The first evacuation was made immediately after the outbreak of the war, and it was considered a "political evacuation," while the second evacuation was an evacuation during the 1.4 retreat period, which is considered an "evacuation for survival."

¹¹²⁾ In this study, we will make limited use of UNCACK statistics. For research on UNCACK, see Seo Jung-seok et al., 2010, 『Battlefields and People』, Sunin ¹¹³⁾ "Famous Relief Measures for Refugees," Chosun Ilbo, 1951.05.08.

If you want to be beaten, you will be able to do this. This distinction may give the impression that there were two wartime evacuations, but it is nonetheless a useful criterion for explaining the framework of evacuation. In this chapter, we will examine how evacuations were carried out in each period according to these periods of evacuation, and

how evacuation surveys were conducted accordingly. (1) Primary evacuation: Sporadic evacuation

The evacuation began with the outbreak of war. As soon as news of the outbreak of war spread on June 25, residents near the 38th parallel began to flee south. As people from the northern part of Seoul began to enter Seoul, evacuations began in Seoul as well. However, despite the influx of refugees to Seoul, the government was in a state of confusion and failed to make proper evacuation plans. At the Cabinet meeting held on the 27th, it was decided on the island of Suwon, but the evacuation of Seoul citizens was not properly discussed.^[114] Thus, the pattern of evacuation in the early stages of the war was such that refugees from the north were driven down to the south under the irresponsible neglect of the government. There was virtually no government responsible for the refugees and the problem to be solved. On June 26, the Minister of Social Affairs announced that he had prepared a plan for the relief of the refugees and that he would create a temporary emergency relief team, but this was only words, and it was unlikely that such a plan would work in a situation where Seoul had to be abandoned immediately.¹¹⁵⁾ Refugees in Seoul drive south

In some cities, relief measures were taken to help the refugees, but these were only temporary measures.¹¹⁶⁾

The issue of refugees began to be dealt with in earnest in July, about two weeks after the outbreak of the war. On July 9, the Civil Affairs Department was established in the military, whose duties included the evacuation and reinstatement of civilians, the relief of refugees, and the liaison with other civilians.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ On July 10, a letter in the name of the Ministers of Society, Agriculture, Forestry, Defense, Interior, Transportation, and Health was sent to the governors of Chungcheong, Jeolla, and Gyeongsang Province to deal with the refugee issue. According to the decree, the Ministry of Social Affairs will set up refugee camps and issue registration certificates, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will increase the amount of grain needed to accommodate them, and the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior will investigate, register and maintain order of refugees.

[114] Yang, Young-jo, 2007, 『The Korean War and National Policy in Northeast Asia』, Sunin, pp. 174-177 115) "Relief Measures for Refugees," Dong-A Ilbo, June 27, 1950.

[116] Ibid., p. 187, Yang, Young-jo, 2010, "The Actual Situation and Relief Activities of Refugees in Daegu during the Korean War",

The Korean War through the Eyes of Historiography, The Humanist, p. 576 117) Yongsun Suh, op. cit., p. 226

The Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Health are ordering them to cooperate with the movement and treatment of refugees.¹¹⁸⁾ On August 4, Law No. 145 was promulgated on the Temporary Measures for the Reception of Refugees, which allowed the Minister of Social Affairs to house refugees on their property without rent.^[119] The number of refugees is first mentioned in a press conference by Social Affairs Minister Lee Yoon-young on July 24. Minister Lee Yun-yong said that as of July 20, there were 1,105,000 refugees in South Korea, and more specifically, 360,000 people were detained in refugee camps, and the rest were found and deposited in search of relatives. Broken down by province, North Chungcheong has 375,000, South Chungcheong has 1,199,000, North Gyeongsang has 152,500, South Gyeongsang has 107,000. North Jeolla announced 28,000 people, South Jeolla 100,000, and finally Jeju Island 4,000 people.^[120] This figure appears to be a rough estimate of the number of people held in the camp, but in the case of Chungnam, the numbers are incorrect and the sum of the details is significantly out of step with the total. Nevertheless, less than a month after the start of the war, it can be seen that the number of refugees was already considerable. The sudden influx of large numbers of refugees into the rear areas caused a number of problems. Housing for the refugees was already scarce, and the supplies needed by the refugees were hastily distributed, but the shortage led to inflation of essential goods.¹²¹⁾^[122] However, the budget set aside by the Ministry of Social Affairs for the relief of refugees was woefully insufficient.¹²³⁾

Moreover, in the early days of the war, when the front was being pushed back day by day, the refugees were suspected of being a mixture of guerrillas and fifth columns. Kim Tae-seon, director of the National Security Bureau, pointed out that the reason for restricting the passage of refugees and introducing them to camps is that the enemy is hiding among the refugees, and accordingly, the police are strengthening checkpoints.^[124] The U.S. military also saw an increase in guerrilla casualties, and guerrillas became popular among the refugees.

118) Transcription Society, 1952, *The First Year of the Korean War*, C.49-50

119) *Ibid.*, C.56

120) "Social Affairs Minister Lee Yoon-young talks with reporters on the current situation and relief situation of refugees," *Busan Ilbo*, 1950.7.25.

121) The Temporary Measures Act on the Reception of Refugees, which was amended on September 25 to address the shortage of housing for refugees, applies not only imputed property but also other houses, inns, restaurants, and other detention centers.

Refugees were to be accepted and could not be rejected without justification. *Ibid.*, C.61 122) "Daegu City's Rice Price Skyrockets," *Daegu Daily*, August 8, 1950.

123) Kang, Sung-Hyun, 2010, "Perceptions and Policies of the Korean Government and UN Forces on Refugees during the Korean War," *Battlefields and People*, Sunin, p. 148

124) "Public Security Commissioner Kim Tae-sun Talks to Reporters on Introduction Issues and Japanese Searches," Dae Dae Daily News, 1950.8.7.

⁵⁸ As a result, checkpoints and searches of refugees have been intensified, and control measures have been strengthened to prevent refugees from moving.^[125] However, the government did not have an accurate picture of the situation of the refugees. This was because it was not possible to properly investigate the evacuees. In the absence of proper information, it was determined that immediate relief for the evacuees was urgent.

C. On August 24, the Cabinet Meeting set the outline for relief measures for refugees, and accordingly, the Central Committee for Relief of Refugees was formed to begin

relief activities for the refugees, and the ministers of various ministries, including the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Social Affairs, also announced relief measures for the refugees.

All of them.⁵⁹Relief supplies were initially distributed mainly to refugees in the camps, but gradually they were distributed to refugees outside the camps and to ordinary citizens.⁶⁰

During the early stages of the Korean War, from June to December 1950, there was no proper survey of refugees. Due to the rapid changes in the front, the government did not have any policies or measures to introduce or evacuate people, and the reception and relief of refugees was carried out on a temporary basis. Refugee camps were also hastily constructed, and relief supplies were immediately distributed as needed. Even if a fact-finding survey of the refugees was planned, it was carried out in a limited area. It was a time when the work of the evacuees was more important.⁶¹The number of refugees at this time is also ambiguous. Minister Lee Yun-young announced at the end of July that the number of refugees was 1.1 million, and the media reported the number of evacuees at the time to be between 1 million and 1.5 million, so it is likely that the number of refugees

⁵⁸ Yang, op. cit., p. 195

⁵⁹ "State Council Decides on Outline for Relief Measures for Refugees," Minju Sinbo, August 26, 1950, "Interior Minister Cho Byung-ok Answers Reporter's Questions on Refugee Relief Issues," Daesang-il, August 26, 1950, "Minister of Social Affairs Yi Yun-yong Delivers Statement on Relief Measures for Refugees," Minju Sinbo, August 30, 1950.

⁶⁰ "Statements Taken by Relevant Authorities on Wintering Measures for Refugees in Busan," Minju Sinbo, September 5, 1950.

⁶¹ "Decisions of the Ministries at the Regional Ministers' Meeting," The Democratic Bulletin, 20 September 1950.

existed somewhere between the two estimates. Despite the sudden evacuation, a considerable number of people were evacuated.

Compared to the 1951 evacuation, the 1950 evacuation was "voluntary" and sporadic. Previous research has viewed the evacuation as a "political evacuation," emphasizing that the evacuation was mainly carried out by North Korean men, military and police families, government officials, right-wing intellectuals, and people with pro-Japanese backgrounds who would be threatened for their lives if North Korean troops entered the country (Kim Dong-chun, 2000: 98). They were forced to flee without being instructed by the government, and this evacuation was directly related to their lives.

C. Those who had to choose to evacuate in order to survive were mainly on the evacuation route.

However, the vast majority of people who did not have to make political decisions did not have to think much about evacuation. Simply to avoid getting involved in an immediate battle, people simply had to leave their homes and climb the surrounding mountains to wait for the battle to end, as described in Kim's diary. Those who had fled the fighting to the outskirts of the city soon returned home.⁶² As a result, it is highly probable that a considerable number of people did not flee in the early stages of the war but remained in their places of residence. In some cases, as in Seoul, the decision to remain was made according to the responsibility of politicians or their political stance, but the majority of the peasants remained regardless of their political anguish. For them, evacuation meant giving up their homes, property, and farmland, and there was relatively little concern that the remnants would threaten their lives in the immediate future. There is not much data to show how many people fled or remained during the first round of evacuation. However, in the case of Seoul, there is still a census on the demographic changes after the outbreak of the Korean War, which leads to speculation about the number of evacuees. This survey was included in the appendix of the "Victim List" prepared by the Statistics Bureau of the Public Information Office, and was the result of a temporary census conducted at the initiative of the Public Information Office after the restoration of Seoul. It was necessary to identify the population for the recovery of Seoul, and this result is shown in Table < 11 >.

Base date	49.05.01	50.12.25	Total Migration Population	6.25-9.28	After 9.29
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⁶²) Kim Sung-chil, op. cit., pp.76-81

Population Numbers	1,446,019		1,202,487		292,038		249,366		42,672
Cause of movement	bombing		angerash		Moving out and evacuating		guitar		
Base date	6.25-9.28	9. After Teeth29	6.25-9.28	After 9.29	6.25-9.28	After 9.29	6.25-9.28	After 9.29	
Population Numbers	22,284	3,687	13,100	10,157	200,698	20,456	13,284	8,372	

Table < 11> Population and Migration Causes of Seoul in 1950

(50.6.25.~50.10.25.) Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Information,

1950, 『List of Victims of the Seoul Metropolitan Government』 , Appendix p. 7

According to Table 11> <, the total population movement in Seoul was 292,038, of which 249,366 were from June 25 to September 28, the period of the North Korean military occupation. Specifically, the number of people who moved out and fled was the highest at 200,698, while the rest left Seoul for bombing, fire, or other reasons.

This survey contradicts previous estimates that the number of people who fled Seoul immediately after the outbreak of the war was approximately 400,000.⁶³⁾

The results of the Seoul Metropolitan Government's survey, shown in Table 11> <, had several blind spots. First of all, the population as of the census was 49 years old instead of 1950, which does not reflect the population growth in one year, but after liberation, the population of Seoul was increasing rapidly every year. Second, it is possible that the census itself was a hastily conducted ad hoc census, so the census was not accurate, and finally, it is possible that the census was conducted in October, when the evacuees were repatriating in October, so it is possible that the evacuees who have already fled and returned will not move.

Even taking these limitations into account, the above estimate that 250,000 people moved during the first three months of the North Korean occupation and the estimate that 400,000 people fled Seoul alone in the first three days of the war are too inconsistent. As of '49, 400,000 people were almost one-third of the population of Seoul, but considering the fact that a considerable number of people remained due to the government's policy of forcing workers to take over rather than systematically induce evacuations, and that there were few means of crossing the river due to the explosion of the Han River Bridge that was carried out earlier than planned, it seems unlikely that a "large-scale evacuation" would have been possible. Large-scale Although it is not possible to know the exact population of Seoul after the occupation, the North Korean military decided to relocate the population of Seoul because it could not cope with the urban population of Seoul and was not in a good enough position to distribute relief supplies. The goal at the time was to reduce the population of Seoul by 500,000. The relocated population of Seoul was planned to be sent to North Korea's agricultural and industrial sites.⁶⁴ A similar record appears in Kim Sung-chil's diary, which states that the North Korean military plans to transfer 500,000 of Seoul's 1.5 million population, leaving only 1 million people.⁶⁵ In the case of the displaced and evacuated population shown in Table

⁶³ Kim Dong-chun, op. cit., p.98, Yang Young-jo (2007), citing U.S. military documents, estimates that 1 million people fled or half of Seoul's population.

⁶⁴ Korean War Abduction Case Archive, 2006, 『Korean War Abduction Case Archive 1』, p.964

⁶⁵ Kim Sung-chil, op. cit., p.110

13> it is possible that a significant number of them moved to North Korea in accordance with the North Korean military's transfer policy.

To sum up, the number of people who fled Seoul at the time of the occupation of Seoul on June 28 would not have been as large as previously estimated. The "Great Exodus of Terror" from the North Korean occupation of Seoul is exaggerated, and it is unlikely that more than one-third or more than half of the city's population would have left the city in three days. Rather, the majority of the population would have fled Seoul after the North Korean military occupied the city, either for relocation or bombing.

Of course, Seoul's evacuation experience was also unique to South Korea. In the case of other areas that were located further back than Seoul, it took a considerable amount of time to evacuate, and in the vicinity of the entire line of the Nakdong River, the evacuation and residual experience in Seoul cannot be interpreted as an evacuation pattern for the entire South Korea, as there were cases where the introduction was required for operational reasons of the military.

On the other hand, at the end of September, when Seoul was reconquered and the front began to move northward, the refugees who had been concentrated in Pusan and the southern provinces of Kyongsang began to return to their original residences, thus resolving the immediate refugee problem. On 27 September, the return to the Masan area began,^[133] and on 5 October, an announcement was made in the name of the Commander of Martial Law and the Minister of Social Affairs on the repatriation of the refugees. According to the announcement, the evacuees will receive a certificate of homecoming and will be provided with food and transportation for their return.^[134] By the beginning of November, a significant number of refugees had already returned home, and the number of evacuees in Gyeongnam and Busan had dropped from more than 1.5 million to 25,000 in Busan alone.^[135] At least in the rear areas, the refugee problem has been virtually eliminated. In this way, the problem of refugees in the rear, which had increased rapidly since the outbreak of the war, was naturally resolved with the northernization of the front. The sudden and unprepared evacuations of the evacuees made it difficult for the government and the UN forces to adequately recruit the refugees, and sought to solve the immediate problem by taking ad hoc measures to control the movement of refugees and provide them with urgent relief. And this problem was thought to be resolved by the end of the war and the return of the majority of refugees.

(2) Secondary evacuation: Control and investigation of refugees

With the entry of Chinese troops into the war at the end of October 1950, the face of the war changed drastically, and the refugee issue entered a new phase. A largescale evacuation from the North to the South had begun. The evacuation pattern in North Korea was the same as at the outbreak of the war.

133) "Kim Jong-won, Martial Law Commander of Gyeongnam District, Issues Statement on the Return of War Victims," Minju Sinbo, 1950.9.28.

134) "Joint Announcement on Measures for the Return of Refugees," Busan Ilbo, October 5, 1950.

135) "Measures for Relief for Refugees," Minju Shinbo, November 11, 1950.

It was as abrupt and confusing as the evacuation from Seoul. There was no evacuation plan for the refugees, and the evacuation was made or not according to the policies of each unit. Refugees were often asked to remain in Pyongyang because they were considered to be a hindrance to the movement of the troops, and some of them were forced to flee in accordance with the movement of the military. Evacuation in some cases There were also evacuees who thought they were being introduced for a while and started moving.¹³⁶⁾

The evacuation of the Vietnamese people was a difficult process. However, for the South Korean government and the United Nations forces, this was a good tool for the South Korean government and the United Nations forces to denounce North Korea's dominance and emphasize South Korea's superiority. The Chosun Ilbo reported on the images of people crossing the broken Taedong River railway bridge to South Korea, saying, "This is how the refugees ... The sight of the citizens crossing over the corpses of the fallen people was a sight of the Pyongyang citizens seeking the freedom and equality of the Republic of Korea through their deaths, and it was also a scene that proved how terrible the evil of the puppet group was to them. ... Their evacuation procession to the South in search of the Republic of Korea by dying in Pyongyang for the last time without taking care of their houses covered in fire was like a procession of people demonstrating the victory of justice."¹³⁷⁾ At that time, the number of people who had fled via the Daedong River railway bridge was about 50,000. In addition, Vietnamese refugees fled with the army on foot or came down to the South by transport ship from Hungnam or Chongjin, numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

<Table 12> Number of Vietnamese Refugees

Number of refugees in Vietnam	Base Date	source	Production Institutions
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889,130	Late November 1951	Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952	Social Affairs Department
618,721	March 15, 1952	The second year of the Korean War*	Social Affairs Department
685,316	Late December 1952	Three years of the Korean War	Social Affairs Department

*The March 15, 1952 census shows the number of North Korean refugees who have fled to South Korea since June 25.

*Source: Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1952, 『Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952』, Transcription Society, 1953, 『The Year of the Korean War』, p. D21. Transcription Society, 1954, The Third Year of the Korean War, p. D7.

Table 12> < shows the number of Vietnamese refugees surveyed by the South Korean government during the Korean War. Statistics from the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1952, which was conducted at the end of November 1951, were reported by the Ministry of Social Affairs to determine the number of refugees in each province.

[136] Yang, op. cit., pp. 213~216, Sunghyun Kang, op. cit., pp. 161~163 137) "View of Pyongyang immediately after the withdrawal of UN troops," Chosun Ilbo, December 13, 1950.

It is a survey of people who can be contacted in China, and it is revealed that some evacuees who fled the South on their own by land are excluded. As of December 19, some additional evacuees had arrived in the islands, bringing the total to 986,891. However, this number has declined slightly in the March 1952 survey of refugees, which has dropped to 610,000. This may have been somewhat overestimated due to the fact that the 51-year survey was reduced due to the movement of refugees. It is also unclear whether all of these refugees fled the country during the 1.4 retreat. The 1949 census puts the number of Vietnamese at 480,000, and the 1955 census puts the total at 730,000, including 280,000 before the war and 450,000 after the war. In 1960, the number of censuses was 630,000, in '66 it was 690,000, and in '70 it was 670,000. Based on the results of existing studies that show that 20~30% of Vietnamese do not properly disclose their place of origin in their responses, the total number of Vietnamese can be estimated to be between 70~900,000. In other words, the number of Vietnamese refugees surveyed in Table 1>2 of < is thought to be the number including the Vietnamese before the war, and

the number of Vietnamese refugees in the 1.4 recession period is probably about 70% of the survey.¹³⁸⁾

With the increase in the number of Vietnamese refugees, evacuation preparations began in South Korea. Unlike in 1950, the South Korean government and UN forces prepared to evacuate people by establishing evacuation plans. There was a reflection that the first evacuation was unplanned and sporadic, which made it difficult for military operations, and accordingly, a systematic evacuation plan was required. On December 14, the Ministry of Social Affairs announced the introduction of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, according to which footbridges were built for crossing the river in Gwangnaru, Mapo, and Seobinggo.¹³⁹⁾ On December 15, the Ministry of Social Affairs prepared the "Refugee Introduction and Relief Guidelines" and prepared a rough framework for the introduction of refugees. This introduction and relief guideline instructs the principles of refugee introduction, evacuation routes, evacuation sites, and refugee camps, and also provides guidelines for refugee registration, relief, and operation of camps. Roughly looking at the principles of refugee introduction, refugees mainly introduce women and the elderly to safe zones, but men and women hold on to their jobs until the end. Refugee camps are to be safe zones and places where relief can be easily supplied, and the evacuees' travel routes should be limited to designated areas, transportation should be provided to the evacuees, and the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should evacuate.

[138] For census data of Vietnamese people, see Kang Jung-koo, 1992, "A Study on the Vietnamese Period and Class Character of Vietnamese Citizens after Liberation," *The Korean War and Social Change in Korea*, Pulvit, pp. 96~98 The 1955 Census and the Response Rate of Vietnamese, and the Proportion of Vietnamese Respondents Before and After the War Kim Gwiok, 1999, "Breaking Down Anti-Communist Ideology from Below."

– Focusing on the Oral History of Vietnamese Settlements," *Economy and Society*, Vol. 43, pp. 247~249 139) "Ministry of Social Affairs Announces Non-Combatant Combat Policy," *Seoul Shinmun*, December 13, 1950.

It stipulates that refugees will be investigated. Once the evacuation policy was decided, the evacuation began in earnest.

However, there was a big gap between the evacuation measures and the reality of the refugees. The evacuees began their evacuation in accordance with the evacuation order, but there was a shortage of food for the evacuees and almost no means of transportation other than walking. Due to the cold of winter, frostbite occurred one after another, and the risk of infectious diseases was also raised. There were quite a few evacuees who were referred to designated camps under evacuation orders, but there were still many refugees

scattered on the streets. In addition, relief for them was not being carried out properly.⁶⁶⁶⁷) The introduction and evacuation as an operation appeared to be successful, but in reality it was an evacuation measure that emphasized only military expediency.^[141] From this point of view, refugees who fled to the Daegu-Busan area were sometimes transferred to other areas. The military judged that the influx of a large number of refugees in the Daegu and North Gyeongsang regions would hinder the military campaign.)⁶⁸⁶⁹ The U.S. military also induced refugees to the Jeolla-do area and dispersed the "general refugees," except for the families of military, police, and civil servants living in Busan, to the Gyeongsang-do area other than Busan and the island areas such as Geoje-do. This was tantamount to "taking away" refugees from the Daegu-Busan area for military needs.¹⁴³)

Once the introduction of refugees began, the Ministry of Social Affairs sought to prepare and implement relief measures for refugees in each local camp. The Ministry of Social Affairs' Guidelines for Evacuation and Relief Measures clearly state that the Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for the relief of refugees. First of all, the Ministry of Social Affairs divided the relief recipients into three groups: A, B, and C, with A being the men, women, the elderly, and women. B was those who were unable to support themselves, and C was those who were subject to other demands. When refugees arrived at the camps, they were required to carry a refugee card issued by the local social affairs bureau, and even if they were refugees, they could not be eligible for relief unless they were identified with a refugee card. These registered refugees were able to receive a certain amount of food and clothing per day.⁷⁰ In order to report on the proper implementation of such relief efforts, a weekly report was prepared from January 1951 onwards. The report, which is prepared on a weekly or monthly basis and submitted to the Council of Ministers, contains all kinds of

information on relief, such as relief tips, relief plans for refugees, relief situation of refugees, accommodation status of evacuees, and distribution of supplies. It also records

⁶⁶) Yang Young-jo, op. cit., pp.225~229

⁶⁷) Sunghyun Kang, op. cit., pp.176~177

⁶⁸ "Military Civil Affairs Department Takes Measures to Disperse Refugees in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province," Daesang-il, January 10, 1951.

⁶⁹) Ibid., p.180

⁷⁰ Ministry of Social Affairs, 1950, "Introduction to Refugees and Relief Outline", (National Archives of Korea)

in detail the number of refugees, the number of people housed in camps, and the number of camps in each evacuation zone.

The survey focused on the number of refugees, their movements, and their reception. The number of refugees was surveyed by each local camp and reported to the local administrative authorities, which were then added together to investigate the movement of refugees in each province. The government was sensitive to the number of evacuees because the number of evacuees was an indicator of whether the evacuation was being carried out properly and whether the evacuees were moving to the camps. In addition, since relief supplies were provided to each camp according to the number of refugees, it was necessary to conduct an accurate survey at the door in order to distribute them efficiently.

The existence of the "Relief Situation Bulletin" shows that the government was investigating the movement of refugees and the relief situation in earnest. This is because the government of a country that introduced refugees according to an evacuation plan needed to know whether the refugees were being properly introduced and whether relief was being provided, and it was also necessary to report this to the United Nations or UNCACK. During the Korean War, the government prepared a weekly report on the evacuees from January when the evacuation began to May~June, when the evacuation was almost complete and the repatriation phase began. This is in contrast to 1950, when little survey of refugees was done. The government of 1950 could not or could not properly control or manage the refugees, but the government of 1951 needed to confirm for itself that it could take control of the refugees. Because the evacuation of 1950 was a situation of sporadic chaos and disorder, the evacuation of 1951 could not repeat the situation. The evacuation had to be carried out in a proper plan for the evacuees. As such, in order to carry out and confirm the plan for the refugees, it was necessary to investigate the refugees on a regular basis.

The evacuees left for local refugee camps in accordance with the government's policy, but they did not arrive at all of them. Refugees did not want to be far from their homes, and they did not want their homes and property to be destroyed or looted, so they often found themselves on the streets not far from their original residences. They wanted to return home as soon as possible and return to their homes rather than stay in exile for a long time. This can be seen from the fact that as soon as there were signs that Seoul was

about to be retaken, the evacuees from Busan began to move in large numbers.⁷¹ As the number of refugees moving north increased, the government established a plan for the return of refugees, provided food to the refugees, and designated roads for the evacuees to go north. According to the report, evacuees were to carry refugee cards and return home in stages under the direction of the government.^[146] However, it appears that not many refugees returned home under government control: more than 2.5 million refugees were thought to be in Chungcheong Province, and many of those heading to Seoul were beggars.^[147] Although the government said it would provide convenience for the refugees to return home, the majority of the evacuees had to return home on the sidewalk, and if they were not accommodated in the camps, they could not receive relief supplies. The reason why the government rushed the return of the refugees without proper measures or preparations for their return was because it was necessary to return the farmers to their farmland before the spring season. It was also aimed at bringing the refugees home, reducing the amount of relief food distributed in the camps, and restoring the devastated habitats.^[148] In the beginning, however, the return of ordinary evacuees other than peasants was restricted, and the area of repatriation was limited to the southern part of Osan-Chungju-Uljin in accordance with the agreement with the military.¹⁴⁹⁾

After June 1951, the front was stabilized and no further refugee introductions took place. The pattern after June '51 was the gradual return of refugees to their original homes. The number of refugees, which reached 500~6 million in May '51, has passed its peak and is on a downward trend. However, the return of refugees to their original places of residence did not solve the problem at all. In Seoul and Gyeonggi provinces, heavy fighting has devastated settlements, leaving few houses or property left behind by the evacuees. When refugees left the camp and returned to their hometowns, they became displaced people. The government tried to provide relief to those in serious circumstances, but only a few of them actually received assistance.

The "Relief Status Bulletin" has not been left since June. It is possible that the monthly bulletin has been lost since then, but in May~June, the weekly bulletin becomes a monthly bulletin and is published on a monthly basis.

⁷¹ "Refugees Prepare to Return to Seoul on News of Recapture," Dong-A Ilbo, February 12, 1951.

- 146) "Authorities Establish Measures for the Return of Refugees," Dong-A Ilbo, February 14, 1951.
 "Minister of Social Affairs Announces Precautions for Refugees' Return," Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 1951.
- 147) Sunghyun Kang, *op. cit.*, pp.186~189
- 148) Ibid., p.188, "Interior Minister Cho Byung-ok Holds Press Conference on the Refugee Returnee and the Clearance of Public Expenses," Dong-A Ilbo, March 4, 1951.
- 149) "Minister of the Interior Announces Statement on Refugees' Return to Native Land," Daesang Daily, April 3, 1951.

It seems that after the primary goal of moving refugees was achieved, no more regular surveys were conducted. This is because the introduction and reception of refugees has been completed, and the urgent refugee problem has been resolved. However, from 1951 to 1953, UNCACK continued to produce weekly or monthly reports on the population of each province and the situation of refugees and displaced persons, which shows that the survey of refugees was carried out continuously. However, UNCACK did not conduct its own investigation. Data from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the local administrative office were received and used. The report includes information on populations, refugee movements, relief for displaced persons, and epidemic situations. Since July '51, the total number of refugees has been on a downward trend. The homecoming was already progressing so rapidly that in August the number of refugees was reported to be 1.46 million and the number of returnees was 2.68 million.⁷²From this time on, the return of refugees became an issue, especially the timing of their return to Seoul. Since Seoul, Gyeonggi, and northern Gangwon were set as combat zones, the limit at which refugees could travel north was set south of the Han River.⁸⁵ As a result, refugees in this area were restricted from returning. In particular, in the case of Seoul, many evacuees wanted to return, but the military severely restricted them, and many evacuees tried to cross the river.

As a large number of refugees return to their original homes, the refugee problem shifts from movement and accommodation to relief. This is because there are a huge number of displaced people who have returned to their places of residence but are still unable to live. In March 1952, the Ministry of Social Affairs, under the auspices of the UNCACK, conducted a large-scale survey of refugees and displaced persons, and as a result, 10,189,301 refugees, displaced persons, and demanders were

⁷² "Ministry of Social Affairs Announces Guidelines for Wartime People's Movement," Democracy Shinbo, 1951.08.11. However, the 1.46 million reported by the newspapers is too small compared to the number of subsequent refugees. ⁸⁵ "U.S. Eighth Military Command Issues Ultimatum to Stop Refugees from Entering the North," Seoul Shinmun, August 22, 1951.

identified. However, compared to the people who received the relief, the actual relief situation of the government was poor. Of these, only about 25 percent received real relief.⁷³ By the end of the war, the number of these demanders continued to be between 9 million and 10 million.

The second phase of evacuation began with the large-scale introduction of refugees from the operational area, passed through the stage of moving and accommodating the evacuated refugees to the appropriate places, and ended with the return of the evacuees from a stable area. The survey of the evacuees was a continual process to ensure that these steps were on track. While the first evacuation process was an ad hoc response to the refugees, the second evacuation was a planned evacuation and return military operation. And this operation could only be accomplished under the constant surveillance of refugees.

3. Stages of evacuation and utilization of investigation

The government's investigations of refugees and displaced persons were limited to the period of the second evacuation. During the first evacuation, there was no capacity to conduct a survey of refugees, and there was no provision for the evacuees because of the unprepared war. The government and the United Nations forces did not want to repeat the failure of the first evacuation in the second evacuation, and introduced the evacuees under the planning and preparation of the relocation of the refugees. The movement of refugees took place in three main stages. The first was the process of moving the refugees from their original place of residence to the refugee camps, the second was the process of placing the relocated refugees in various camps, and the third was the process of rescuing the evacuated refugees and returning them to their homes from the safe areas. In order to proceed with these three phases, it was essential to conduct regular surveys of evacuees and displaced persons. The full scale of the displaced population needed to be understood in order to determine whether the plan was on track, how to respond to the changing movement of refugees, and how many people needed to be relieved. At the same time, a survey of refugees was required to effectively control the fleeing population and to bring them under the control of the government.

(1) Control of refugee movement

⁷³) "Survey of Demanders", Kyunghyang Newspaper, October 17, 1952.

In the second evacuation, the movement of refugees consisted of a process of introduction and rehabilitation. In mid-December 1950, the government began to formulate evacuation plans, and decided to introduce residents of Seoul, Gyeonggi, Gangwon and Chungcheong Province, which were expected to be combat zones, including Vietnamese refugees. As of the 1949 census, the population of the region was 5.31 million in the Seoul-Gyeonggi-Gangwon area alone, and 8.48 million if the Chungcheong-do area was added. Considering that the number of refugees from the South was considerable, an artificial mass movement of the population was required.

The government has set up the areas to be introduced, designated the areas where these evacuees will travel, the roads they will travel, and the areas where they will be accommodated. The evacuation zones of the evacuees were divided into four districts: the first district was divided into the North and South Gyeongsang districts, the second district was divided into the Jeollanam and North Jeolla districts, the third district was divided into the Chungnam district, and the fourth district was divided into Jeju Island districts. The estimated number of evacuees was assumed to be two million people in each district, and the third district, Chungnam District, was designated as an early evacuation zone. The 1st and 4th districts, the North and South Gyeongsang districts and the Jeju districts, were decided to be the last evacuation zones.⁷⁴ In other words, the government's plan was to set Gyeongsangdo, which is expected to be the place where the evacuees would flock, as the next priority district, and to introduce the evacuees to parts of Jeolla and Chungcheongdo. Therefore, the evacuees' movement routes were set to go south along the roads or railways along the west coast so as not to interfere with military operations, and the final destination of the evacuees from Seoul was Anseong, Asan, Nonsan, or Hongseong, and then to Iri and Namwon, and then arrive at each district in Jeolla-do.⁷⁵

Table < 13> shows the change in the number of refugees from January to May 1951. The evacuation began in mid-December, and the introduction to Seoul was already completed

⁷⁴ Ministry of Social Affairs, 1950, "Introduction to Refugees and Relief Guidelines" (National Archives of Korea)

⁷⁵ Ministry of Social Affairs, 1950, "Introduction to Refugees and Relief Guidelines" (National Archives of Korea)

in early January, but the number of evacuees began to be counted in earnest after February. In early February, the evacuees were mainly concentrated in

North Chungcheong, South Jeolla Province, and North Gyeongsang Province, and the large number of evacuees in the South Jeolla region seems to have been due to the fact that many people moved in accordance with the government's evacuation plan. However, the region where the largest number of evacuees still concentrated was North Gyeongsang. Since the South Gyeongsang area was severely restricted to traffic for operational reasons, Most of the evacuees moved to the North Gyeongsang region. At that time, only one part of the Gyeongnam area could enter, including a few Vietnamese refugees who had entered Busan by boat. However, because South Gyeongsang Province was a "safe" area, if you were not a family member of a soldier, police officer, or civil servant, you would be kicked out of the city again, even if you had already arrived in the area. The Eighth Army, in coordination with the Department of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs, introduced "other refugees" to surrounding cities.⁷⁶⁾

This was a similar situation in North Gyeongsang Province. When there were too many refugees in North Gyeongsang, they were reintroduced to Jeolla Province and other areas. In February 1951, North Gyeongsang Province had 4.66 million people, but 3.28 million of them had to move out of the province.^[156] Nonetheless, the refugees instinctively gravitated to the Gyeongsang-do region. The experience of 1950 showed that evacuation

⁷⁶ [edit] Sunghyun Kang, op. cit., p. 180 156) Imha Lee, *ibid.*, p. 108

to the Jeolla region was never safe. As such, there was a discrepancy between the government's policy of dispersing the refugees and the actual movement of the evacuees.

Table < 13> Change in the number of refugees between January ~ May 1951

Region 51.01.16. 51.02.10. 51.02.17. 51.03.10. 51.03.31. 51.04.14. 51.04.31. 51.05.15. 51.05.31. Seoul

6,350 987,160
50,477 728,050
onnam 280,000
77,025 575,292
8 71,228 71,228
it Relief Situation
tuation Monthly

The mass introduction of refugees is expected to be completed in March. This is because the number of refugees has remained at a similar level, with a slight increase or decrease from the 5.75 million on March 10. At the same time, up to 6 million people were evacuated, and the introduction of refugees ended. The government had planned to disperse the refugees and house them in different districts, but had not decided how long and for how long they would be accommodated. With the recapture of Seoul in February, the evacuees rushed to prepare for their return, and a significant number of evacuees were already moving north regardless of the government's instructions. Accordingly, the government also established evacuation measures, and according to the plan for relief at homecoming, which the Ministry of Social Affairs requested approval from the State Council, it was decided to secure a "relay accommodation facility for the returnees" every 30~50 ri, provide water and meals, and provide food and relief money.[157] However, the government's measures were only words, and for most of the refugees, the government's formal repatriation measures were of little significance. This is due to the fact that the relief for the returnees was not carried out properly, and the area targeted for repatriation was limited to the area south of Chungju. Table 13> < shows the tendency of refugees to flock to Gyeonggi Province after March, as refugees from Seoul and Gyeonggi Province were in a hurry to return home despite the ban by the U.S. military and government. By May, the refugee problem stabilized in all parts of the country, and the number of refugees was gradually decreasing. It can be seen that the number of refugees in Gyeonggi Province and Gangwon Province, as well as in the Chungnam region, which is the route from Jeolla Province to Gyeonggi

Province, is rapidly increasing. Table < 14> Change in Population of Seoul

date	01 May 1949	October 25, 1950	April 15, 1951	June 7, 1951	March 31, 1952	December 31, 1952	December 31, 1953
Population	1,446,019	1,202,487	445,449	301,068	676,221	747,951	1,010,416
source	Korean War Annual	Seoul Metropolitan City Victim List appendix	Seoul Newspaper (1951.04. 19.)	Donga Ilbo (1951.06. 11.)	Korean War Biyunji	Korean War Triennial	Korea Statistical Yearbook 1954

*Source: Transcription Society, 1952, The First Year of the Korean War, p. D7. Transcription Society, 1953, "The Second Year of the Korean War," p. D34. Transcription Society, 1954, "Three Years of the Korean War," p. D19. Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1950, 『List of Victims of the Six-lo Incident in Seoul』, Appendix. Statistics Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 1955, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea 1954,

[157] Ministry of Social Affairs, 1951, "Relief Situation Bulletin No. 5" (National Archives of Korea)

However, the evacuees who reached Gyeonggi Province were not allowed to enter Seoul. In Seoul, repatriation measures were made in February, and some evacuees returned, but⁷⁷ in early May, due to the deterioration of the war situation, they had to be reintroduced and moved to the Gyeonggi-do area.

All of them.⁷⁸ After this, the return of refugees to Seoul was severely restricted. As a result, most of the Seoul evacuees were housed in camps in Suwon and other places along the Han River, and as shown in Table 13> <Table 13 the number reached 1.66 million by the end of May. Table 14> < shows how Seoul's population was maintained during the war. The demographics of Seoul at the time of the 1.4 recession are not available, but it appears that most of the population fled the city.⁷⁹ The gradual increase in the number of refugees in Seoul after '51 was not the result of the government's permission, but the result of numerous river crossings. Because UNCACK strictly restricted the entry and exit of refugees from Seoul, they spent the day sitting on the banks of the Han River, and at night they tried to cross the river in rotten boats. In the process, a large number of refugees lost their lives.⁸⁰

The movement of refugees shows how expedient the government was in its refugee policy. Refugees were forcibly introduced, and although the government was conducting surveys and monitoring their movements in detail, there was no real means of rescuing or moving them. Refugees wanted to move to safety or return to their homes quickly, but the role of the government and the military was only to stop and stop these movements.

(2) Refugee Acceptance and Politics of Certificates

⁷⁷ "Seoul Establishes Measures for Citizens to Restore and Return," Donga Ilbo, 1951.02.28.

⁷⁸ "Seoul Metropolitan Mayor Lee Jong-un Says 250,000 of Seoul's 450,000 Citizens Have Remained in the Evacuation," Dong-A Ilbo, 1950.05.01.

⁷⁹ "Kim Chang-ryong Introduces the Situation in Seoul During the January 4th Retreat," Minju Sinbo, January 27, 1951.

⁸⁰ "Refugees Trying to Return to Seoul Die in Ship Capsizing Accident," Busan Ilbo, 1951.08.06.

From the very beginning of the war, refugees were the subject of suspicion. Refugees were unreliable to the South Korean and U.S. forces. The military was obsessed with the idea that the refugees included enemy guerrillas and spies, and in some cases, they carried out attacks on the refugees. However, it was not easy for the evacuees to prove themselves. With the exception of a few with "clear" identities, such as members of the military, police, civil servants, and right-wing groups, most of them were subject to cross-examinations. As a result, the only guarantee of their status was a state-issued refugee certificate ⁸¹. July 1950 On the 10th, the government sent an ultimatum to the governors of Chungcheong, Jeolla and Gyeongsang provinces regarding the dispersal of refugees, and it reads as follows:

***Social Relations**

-Issuance of refugee certificates: Refugee certificates should be issued only to refugees who have no connections or acquaintances and who have moderate ideologies -Acceptance: In principle, the holders of refugee certificates should be accommodated, but they should always be examined and monitored for ideological moderation.

***Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Interior**

- Cooperation in the identification of refugees and the issuance of refugee certificates: In order to weed out impure elements, the status of refugees entering Daejeon City or being detained in Daejeon Camp should be investigated in detail, and only those who are moderate in thought should cooperate in the issuance of refugee certificates.

- Security: To maintain order among the refugees detained in the Daejeon camp or in the refugee camps in each province and to prevent the intervention of ideologically disturbing persons, the camp must be stationed at all times.¹⁶²⁾

Under the conviction that the refugees contained impurities, the fifth column, the refugee policy began. As a result, refugees who did not receive refugee certificates

⁸¹ History Society, 1952, 『One Year of the Korean War』, C.49~50

were always subject to suspicion and scrutiny, and their movement was restricted.⁸²⁾ When refugee certificates became like a guarantee of life, people focused on issuing certificates. As the ills of various identity documents became more severe, the government gave up issuing refugee certificates within a month. "Even though the refugee card is only to prove that you are a refugee, it tends to be misused as a royal identification document and is causing enormous disruption." ⁹⁶ However, certificates other than refugee certificates were still used, such as homecoming certificates and quarantine certificates were required for homecoming during the northern invasion period. Park Hwa-muk, who was a war writer during the Korean War⁸³, pointed out the reality of the proliferation of certificates and said, "Today, the ID card has become like a precious member of the body that has to do with our lives⁸⁴") and "Without the ID card, your existence cannot be established. Cash is the age of certificate flooding. It's a bizarre phenomenon."^[167] In this way, in the time of war, the possession of various certificates was directly related to life. And the refugee certificate was the most basic means of identification, such as the provincial ID card.

For the government during the second evacuation period, the policy of introduction was to create an evacuation on a much larger scale than before. There was a need for an effective way to relocate and control millions of refugees, the simplest way to do that was to get them to the right place for the purpose of giving them certificates. The Ministry of Social Affairs said, "1. Refugees must have a refugee card in all circumstances. 2. The issuance of refugee cards is made by the Cabinet Social Affairs Bureau and the former camp

⁸² "Public Security Commissioner Kim Tae-sun Talks to Reporters on the Problems of the National Security Agency and the Search in Japan," Daesang-il, 1950.08.07. Kim Tae-seon, director of the National Security Bureau, said, "The refugees are always mixed with the enemy's convenience forces, and therefore there is a fifth column..." ⁹⁶ "Busan City Stops Issuance of Refugee Certificates as Refugee Certificates Are Abolished," Minju Sinbo, 1950.08.13.

⁸³) It is believed to be Park Hwa-mok (1924~2005), who was a war writer and poet.

⁸⁴ "Identification Cards", Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1952.06.05. [167] "Identification Cards," Kyunghyang Sinmun, 1952.06.08.

C. 3. Refugee registration should be done in a separate camp for each province, city, and county. 4. Those who have not completed the registration shall not be given the

prescribed materials."⁸⁵), according to which refugees had to go to a camp where they could register and register as a refugee in order to receive a certificate. In addition, since no relief supplies were allocated to unregistered refugees, refugee registration was compulsory for refugees who were absolutely dependent on the state for food, clothing, and shelter. Table < 15> shows how refugees registered in camps and received relief between January and May 1951. It appears that the evacuees moved fairly unregistered in the initial circumstances of the evacuation. Compared to < 13> on February 17, There were 4,978,407 refugees and 5,757,067 on March 10, with a refugee acceptance rate of 25 percent and 55 percent, respectively, far below the total number of refugees. There were two reasons for refugees not registering, one being that there were a significant number of refugees who were able to live without being registered in the camps, and the other was that in the early stages of the evacuation, the refugees were moving from place to place rather than registering in the camps. In South Gyeongsang Province, for example, about 500,000 evacuees have been stationed since the beginning of the evacuation, but no more than 300,000 of them have been enrolled in camps. This was also the case in North Gyeongsang, South Jeolla, North Jeolla, and South Chungcheong, where the number of people

⁸⁵ Ministry of Social Affairs, "Introduction to Refugees and Relief Guidelines," 1950 (National Archives of Korea)

accommodated remained constant since February~March. These were early settlers in the camps.

Table < 15> Change in Capacity (Number of Relief Recipients) Between January ~ May 1951

Region 51.01.16. 51.02.10. 51.02.17. 51.03.10. 51.03.31. 51.04.14. 51.04.31. 51.05.15. 51.05.31. Seoul 274,705 194,450

Gyeonggi 19,930 1	3,610 592,917	592,917 1	55 Gangwon 330,		
Chungbuk 100,000 1	10,000 204,000	204,000 1,105,	100 996,000 83	1,700 465,532	hungnam 112, 100 305,364 30
377,153 390,075 356, 753			1 369,071 414,11		
493,493 493 525	228 525,862 5	31,394 Gyeongbuk 126,000 32,	537 32,537 70	1,711 720,711	29,727 797,47
242,000 194,772 194	772 224,678 2	73,471 284,610	274,746 274,5	12 285,336 Jeju	67,000 28,767
148,794 Total 458,700	1,237,820 1,24	1,475 3,182,985	3,221,213 6,04	1,754 6,055,321	6,169,418 6,12
Status Bulletin No. 5	One Year of the Korean War On	Year of the Korean War Relief	Status Bulletin	No. 12 Relief Sta	us Bulletin
Bulletin No. 15 Relief	Status Monthly	Report No. 16 On e Year of the Korean War	*Remarks: 1)		e varies by region
follow the survey reference date shown in the original statistics.					
2) There may be a discrepancy between the number and the total of items, but the original table is used as it is.					
*Source: Transcripto Society, 1952, 『A Year of the Korean War』			s, 1951 "Relief Situation Bulletin No. 14 (National Archives of Korea)		
Archiv(s); Relief Situation Bulletin No. 12 (National Archives)			Relief Situation Bulletin No. 14 (National Archives of Korea)		
Report No. 15 (National Archives of Korea); Relief Situation Monthly Report No. 16 (National Archives of Korea)			Situation Monthly		

However, since April, the number of people admitted has increased to more than the number of refugees.

C. This appears to be due to the fact that not only refugees, but also former victims and returnees who have returned from their refugee lives have registered in refugee camps in order to receive relief. In particular, since April, the areas where the number of people has increased rapidly are the areas of North Chungcheong, Gyeonggi, and Gangwon, which were examined in the previous chapter, where a large number of refugees from Seoul and Gyeonggi returned but did not return to their original residences. In particular, according to a May 31 survey in Gyeonggi Province, the total number of evacuees was 1.66 million, while the number of people accommodated was 2.58 million, which is nearly 1 million repatriated displaced persons and refugees. It can be seen that it has been used. This shows that the total damage caused by the evacuation and evacuation was concentrated on the people of Seoul, Gyeonggi and Gangwon provinces. Those who lost their assets due to the long evacuation, and who lost their homes or farmland as their residences became combat zones, had to rely on the protection of the state as war victims even if they returned to their original places after the evacuation period. In addition, those who arrived in Gyeonggi Province but could not return to their residential areas of Seoul and northern Gyeonggi were not allowed to cross the river due to the control of the US military and were forced to be held in poor camps.⁸⁶¹⁰¹⁾

The registration of refugees was nominally carried out "for the smooth distribution of relief supplies", but⁸⁷ the reports and testimonies of the time say that the relief was not carried out properly. Even worse was the situation in the refugee camps. In the refugee camp in Jochiwon, "there were 1,088 refugees in four wooden

⁸⁶ The certificates carried by the evacuees were proof of their place of origin, and according to these certificates, evacuees in Seoul and Gyeonggi were unable to move. The Public Security Bureau set up a number of checkpoints at stations where refugees traveled, restricting the movement of Seoul citizens unconditionally. And for those who did not comply, measures were taken to suspend food rationing.

"Public Security Commissioner Issues Warning Statement to Strictly Prohibit Refugees from Returning to Seoul," Daesang Daily Newspaper,

¹⁰¹ .07.05.

⁸⁷ "Ministry of Social Affairs Holds Meeting on Relief for Refugees," Minju Shinbo, 1951.01.19.

warehouses, all of whom were cooking rice in tin cans with bales."⁸⁸) was living a beggar life. This was what the "refugee camp" set up by the government for refugees looked like. Refugees were registered in camps and carried refugee certificates with them under state control. Not all refugees were relocated or confined to camps as the state intended, but they could not continue to live for long periods of time without state protection. For those who had already lost their homes and possessions and could not live without receiving relief supplies, the government's relief was indispensable. The government took advantage of this to try to control the refugees "safely" under the guise of providing relief.

(3) Classification of refugees and differential relief

The Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK began to classify refugees after their movement and reception were complete. It was to approach the refugee issue from the perspective of 'relief'. Various categories were created to classify refugees, and surveys were conducted on refugees and displaced persons. However, it is unclear when these categories of refugees were created. In the case of UNCACK, since 1951, refugees have been divided into natives and refugees, evacuees in the province and those who have fled outside the provinces, and in special cases, according to the occupation or composition of the refugees (Imha Lee, 2010: 94~111), the Korean government's data on the classification of refugees in earnest is based on a survey conducted on March 15, 1952. In 1952, the government changed its relief measures and attempted to classify refugees in earnest. The survey was planned for February and conducted on March 15, 52, with the aim of registering refugees and displaced persons with the government, as well as to classify and differentiate them. First, the refugees were classified according to their region of origin: A. Seoul refugees, B. overthrow refugees, C. Jado refugees, D. North Korean refugees, and the classifications that were distinguished from refugees were Jeon Jae-min, Won Ju-bin people, beggars, vagrants, and orphans. The purpose of the survey was to accurately determine the number of refugees, displaced persons, and people in need across the country, but it was intended to limit the scope of relief and to stop providing aid except for children, the elderly, and those who were unable to support themselves.^[172] The refugee survey was conducted in cooperation with the Korean

⁸⁸ "Refugee Camp Survey," Democracy Sinbo, 1951.04.03.

government and UNCACK. UNCACK obtained refugee registration with the help of the ministry, as UNCACK field teams were in various places, but they were not numerous. The staff at each refugee camp tried to register more refugees during the refugee census in order to receive more aid supplies (Choi, 1996: 146). In addition, if the survey found fewer refugees than the government expected, there was a possibility that external support would be reduced, so the government wanted to register a large number of refugees. At the time of the survey in March '52, the government's estimate of the total number of evacuees and displaced persons was about 7 million, so the survey focused on how many evacuees and displaced persons would be registered.¹⁷³⁾

[172] "Changes in Relief Measures," *Kyunghyang Sinmun*, February 22, 1952.

As a result, the March 15 survey had the largest number of evacuees surveyed during the entire Korean War. As a result of the survey, the total number of refugees, displaced people, the Wonju poor, the former homeless people, and other displaced people and beggars totaled 10,189,301. Half of the population was surveyed as a target for relief. It was the result of the government's policy to get more refugee registrations and the willingness of the former victims and the poor in Wonju to be selected as the target of relief. The March 15 survey was the most detailed in all the years of the Korean War, not only in terms of the size of the survey but also in the classification of refugees. As a disproportionately large number of aid targets were investigated, they became unreliable. Finally, at a press conference on June 12, 1952, the Minister of Social Affairs admitted that the previous survey had not been able to determine the exact number of refugees due to the large number of false registrations.¹⁷⁴⁾

The March 15 campaign for refugees and displaced persons was a big undertaking, costing 200 million won in the preparatory budget for paper printing and other preparations. Large-scale surveys of refugees and displaced persons were not always available. In general, the survey of refugees centered on the refugees registered in the camps, and only the surveys were based on the status of the refugees' arrivals and departures from the camps or the movement of the refugees. For this reason, the March 15 survey, which surveyed almost all refugees and displaced persons, was of great significance to both the Korean government and the UNCACK.

Table < 16> Classification of Refugees and Refugees

category		Refugees from Seoul	Overthrow of South Korea (他道) Refugee	North Korean Refugees	Jado Refugee
Temporary Demander	Number of households	87,632	47,181	47,411	52,407
	factor	409,129	218,098	207,555	248,543
Enduring Demander	Number of households	81,365	46,582	77,315	68,902
	factor	395,851	211,187	358,654	330,368
category		Refugee Section	Jaemin Jeon	Wonju Poor	sum
Temporary Demander	Number of households	234,631	323,741	401,381	959,753
	factor	1,083,325	1,669,051	2,049,724	4,802,100
Enduring Demander	Number of households	274,164	206,464	433,060	913,688
	factor	1,296,060	1,014,120	2,016,071	4,326,251

Source: Transcription Society, 1953, 「Journal of the Second Year of the Korean War」, p. D22

173) "Sick and Disabled Refugees to Register from Today," Dong-A Ilbo, March 15, 1952.

174) "Severe Punishment for Misappropriation of Relief Supplies," Kyunghyang Newspaper, June 14, 1952.

Table <Table 16> shows how the Ministry of Social Affairs tried to classify the refugees at the time. First, according to the Korean government's definition of each category, the former victims were "South Korean war victims who were directly dressed in war" and the Wonju poor were "those who were unable to support themselves."^{175)[176]} Refugees were divided into displaced persons and the Wonju poor, and the refugees themselves were classified into four categories according to their region of origin. This shows that there were a large number of refugees from Seoul who were still barred from entering. North Korean refugees were Vietnamese, who were of interest as a possible spy and who had no possibility of returning to their original place of residence and had to be managed in the long term. The overthrow refugees were refugees who crossed the boundary of the province, and the selfcontained refugees were refugees who moved from within the province. The classification of refugees by place of origin may have been in order to systematically manage them. By the time the survey was conducted in 1952, the front

had already stabilized and armistice talks were underway, and many of the refugees had returned to their original homes. Refugees'

The total number was 2,379,385, down by almost half from the 5.7 million in May '51. As a result, more than half of the remaining refugees were from Seoul, where they were unable to return, and from North Korea, where they were unable to return. In the case of the West UI refugees, many of them had already returned through means such as crossing the river, but about 800,000 people, more than half of the former population of Seoul, were still living as evacuees. These were the ones who could return to Seoul once the war was resolved. However, the rest of the evacuees were refugees who could not return because their original place of residence had been destroyed. In particular, many of the evacuees were living as refugees due to guerrilla or combat activities. In the case of North Korean refugees, almost all of them were in a predicament because they had no property or connections. They were compatriots who escaped North Korea's oppression and crossed over to the "liberal tax system," and they were a symbol of the South's legitimacy in the Korean War, but they were also a potential source of self-doubt among the refugees. Thus, in the case of North Korean refugees, they were collectively confined to a specific place. In order to ensure such efficient management and relief, refugees must be able to

175) Transcription Society, 1953, The Second Year of the Korean War, p. D21

176) For each category, the battalion UNCACK defines as follows: Refugee refers to those who have been displaced from their homes due to combat or military actions, including guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities, or those who fled South Korea for political reasons or other reasons before and after the outbreak of June 25, War Sufferers are those who have suffered losses including those who lost their homes as a direct result of the war but are near their original place of residence, and Residual Needy are those who are unable to lead a life on their own, living in poverty in their original habitat and in need of relief. Finally

Eligible for Relief are those who are designated to receive supplies and assistance in accordance with the policies and guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs. National History Compilation Committee, op. cit., p. 378

There was a need to organize it into

In this survey, refugees were distinguished from displaced persons. At the end of their displacement, a significant number of refugees returned to their places of origin, but few remained intact in their original residences. Especially in areas where the battles took place, the destruction of houses was severe. By March 1952, 414,825 buildings had been burned down and 100,120 had been demolished, for a total of 514,945 buildings, or 15

percent of the pre-war levels.⁸⁹⁹⁰ As a result, a significant number of refugees became displaced as they were, and the refugees were also separated from the Wonju poor. More than 4 million people were surveyed as the Wonju poor, which showed that the effects of the war made it impossible for those who did not directly suffer from the war to live. Due to wartime inflation and the destruction of the industrial base, more and more people were finding it difficult to lead a normal life.¹⁷⁸⁾

The survey also examined a variety of other information about refugees. Reproduction In the case of orphans, 48,322 orphans were identified, and they were housed in welfare facilities. The problem of orphans caused by the war was serious, but the treatment of them had previously been poor.⁹¹ In addition, vagrants and beggars were included in the survey, and 11,857 people were targeted for relief. In addition, the occupation of the refugees, the cause of the displacement of the displaced persons (war or guerrilla), the number of unemployed, and the living conditions of the refugees were also subject to the survey. Refugees, displaced persons, and the poor in Wonju were all divided into temporary and permanent demanders. The essence of the refugee policy was to provide effective relief to the refugees, and in order to achieve this, it was necessary to distinguish the standard of living of the refugees. The UNCACK was likewise asking for accurate information about the evacuees in order to provide effective relief. Relief supplies were limited. From the beginning, the government's policy of providing relief to refugees was to give priority to those who were unable to support themselves, and it was based on this principle. The distinction between temporary and permanent reliefs in this survey was intended to reflect this principle. The intent of the damage survey was twofold. One

⁸⁹ Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information, 1953, •
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea, 1952 • , pp. 325-326.

⁹⁰ It is also possible that this category included a significant number of war displaced persons and demanders who already existed before the war. In the December '48 survey, 2,482,465 people, or 15% of the total population, were classified as demanders. Their lives would have been exacerbated by the war. "According to the results of the Ministry of Social Affairs, 15% of the total population is in favor of demand," Seoul Shinmun, December 12, 1948.

⁹¹ The number of these prisoners was limited to those registered in the camps. In reality, it was assumed that there were many more full-time babies. The National Assembly in 1951 also estimated the number of full-time children at about 100,000. National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Minutes of the 63rd 11th Plenary Session of the National Assembly, 1951.09.10.

was to get more people into the relief bracket so that they could receive aid, and the other was to provide sliding scale to only a small part of the total expanded relief target.⁹² As a result of this survey, the total number of relief recipients, which was only for refugees and war victims, increased to more than 10 million, while the actual number of people who could be aided was only 2 million, even though more than 10 million people were selected.⁹³¹⁰⁹ In the end, the temporary demanders were excluded from the relief, and even in the case of the permanent demanders, many of them were not eligible for relief. Differential relief was a reasonable choice. The government's intention to distribute relief supplies first to those in more urgent need was a no-brainer in a situation where supplies were scarce. However, apart from these principles, supplies were never distributed to the refugees on a sliding scale. In the first place, aid sent from the center often did not reach the camps in the provinces. This is because corruption cases surrounding relief supplies were rampant. Contrary to the recollections of officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs that there was no embezzlement of relief supplies⁹⁴), Relief supplies were often lost along the way. In addition, refugee camps were usually located in places of no military importance, making it difficult to transport supplies, and even when they did arrive, they were often in short supply. The situation of relief was dire as underlying problems such as embezzlement and dissemination were not addressed.

⁹² If the first-class demander was "a person who could only make a living if he received the full ration," the second-class demander was "a person who could make a living if he was supplied with half the amount when necessary," and the third-class demander was "a person who would give a ration if there was a quantity." "Seoul Plans to Accurately Identify Persons Eligible for Demand," Seoul Shinmun, January 31, 1952.

⁹³ "Ministry of Social Affairs Establishes Relief Plan for 2.13 Million Out of 9.3 Million Relief Recipients," Peace Newspaper,
¹⁰⁹ .08.12.

⁹⁴ "Kim Hak-muk, Director of the Social Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs at the time of testimony," Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1991.03.16.

4. Significance and Effect of Secondary Damage Survey

(1) Management and Control of Refugees

The introduction of the refugees was a huge military operation. Mass evacuations meant moving millions of people from their frontline settlements to the rear, building camps to house them, and providing them with months' worth of food. The mass evacuation was a decision made by the government and the UN forces, but it was no easy task to take responsibility for such a large number of people. This was because a lot of supplies and manpower were required to maintain the evacuation life. Moreover, large-scale evacuations would deprive most of the population of the economy of their livelihoods, while at the same time separating them from their economic base (especially farmland). In other words, it was not only the refugees who suffered severe economic damage as a result of the large-scale evacuation, but also the government. If evacuation is seen as part of the damage caused by war, then it was the South Korean government and the United Nations forces themselves that caused this damage in the later evacuations.

Nonetheless, there were a variety of political and military reasons that necessitated such a large-scale evacuation. First of all, from a military point of view, it was impossible to fight in frontline areas while protecting civilians and refugees, and it was not easy to distinguish between refugees and enemy guerrillas. In particular, the U.S. military wanted to remove refugees from the operational area and transport roads in order to carry out the operation. Politically, the government needed to transport civilians to the rear in order to retreat from the front, avoiding accusations that it had abandoned civilians as it did in the early days of the war, as well as justifying its ideological confrontation with North Korea by protecting civilians and guiding them to the free world. It was for the same reason that large numbers of refugees from the North had to be transported to the South, either forcibly or voluntarily.

At the heart of the refugee policy was the movement of refugees. On the premise that the damage caused by the evacuation was inevitable, the government wanted to move the evacuees effectively. For the smooth execution of this operation, it was essential to conduct regular surveys of refugees. The millions of refugees were beyond the South Korean government's control, but surveys of refugees have made them a quantitative statistic, making them something that can be captured and managed. In the process of displacement, the survey of refugees had a double meaning. Surveys were needed to determine the size and number of refugees, the direction of movement of refugees, and the situation of refugees, and at the same time, surveys were needed to check, search,

and control refugees. In the case of both surveys, the former approached the refugee issue as a war victim, while the latter viewed the refugee issue as hostile. For all refugees, the investigation did not begin with the intention of addressing the damage. Nonetheless, surveys of refugees and survey-based statistics have been an important mechanism for the management and control of refugees. Any refugee policy would not have been possible without statistics on quantified refugees. The central government's refugee policy was not really about moving refugees, but about adjusting the number of refugees. In order to achieve the goal of moving a certain number of refugees from one area to another, it was sufficient to expel certain refugees from that area and to restrict their movement.

Thus, the refugee issue has always been statistically successful. The government's findings on the evacuees do not reveal the "problem" of the refugees at all. Even if the evacuees were not moving as planned by the government, it was not out of control or beyond the scope of the government's predictions. The movement, reception, and repatriation of refugees were all under the control of the government. During the second round of evacuations, the Ministry of Social Affairs used to announce that all preparations for evacuation were in place. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, there should be roads for refugees, regular food supply for refugees, and refugee relief headquarters and relief centers should be located on certain streets. At the destination, there had to be a government-built refugee camp or a redundancy house, where they could register and continue to provide relief. However, the reality of the refugees was completely different from what the government had announced. There were no accommodations for the movement of refugees, and they were merely wandering about in the guise of beggars. This is because the refugee measures were planned and implemented in a perfunctory and expedient manner.

The investigation itself called into question the competence of the Ministry of Social Affairs in conducting the investigation. The wartime conditions were harsh, as it was difficult to carry out an accurate census with a large number of people from the Public Security Office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs did not have its own survey organization or professional investigators. The Ministry of Social Affairs' regular survey of refugees was partly due to UNCACK's request for accurate refugee data, and the Ministry of Social Affairs' survey of refugees was also a response to this request. However, it would not have been able to meet UNCACK's requirements. On the contrary, it was not so important to the Ministry of Social Affairs how the survey was actually carried out on the ground or

the methodology and rigor of the survey. More importantly, it was to show that the management and control of refugees was in place, and statistics were a tool to prove it.

(2) Relief for war victims and propaganda for the free world

The Korean War was a difficult war to resolve militarily. The North and the South, the United Nations and the Chinese, each inflicted a devastating military blow on the other, but that was not enough to end the war. The front line was solidified, and the war was prolonged. In the end, the war had to end politically, and the cause of the war and its victory or defeat were interpreted as a pre-war argument. Even in the realm of psychological warfare, such as Pira, a fierce war was fought.

Civilians were not protected in the Korean War. Nonetheless, civilians were an important part of the cause and legitimacy of the war. The choice of civilians in the war was also a device to show the legitimacy and superiority of the system. The reason why the South Korean government actively introduced all residents in the process of evacuation and moved a large number of refugees from North Korea to the South was because the movement of refugees was also a means of denying the North Korean system and showing the victory of the South Korean system. The voluntary allegiance of civilians was also a guarantee of the political legitimacy of the Rhee regime. The procession of refugees descending to the South was portrayed as fleeing the ruthless violence of North Korea and heading to the free world of South Korea and the United Nations. It did not matter whether the refugees themselves had taken the route of evacuation voluntarily. The more civilians head south,

This is because the status of the "free world" would rise even higher.^[183] ^[184] However, simply moving the refugees did not solve the problem.

A large number of refugees had to be targeted for relief, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK, which led the evacuation, needed to carry out the relief work properly. One of the propaganda methods frequently used by the UN forces was to talk about a better food situation, as was often the case during the Korean War (Imha Lee, 2012: 240~249). If prisoners of war or refugees come to the South, they will be able to receive proper relief.

Relief for displaced people and refugees had to be carried out to prove this.

If the relief is not carried out properly, it will show that there is a problem with the Korean government's policy of introducing refugees. In order to achieve relief for the displaced people, it was essential to conduct a survey of the refugees. In investigating refugees and

displaced persons, the Ministry of Social Affairs named them as displaced persons, which at the time

183) In response, North Korea alleged that the refugees were forced and violently sent to the South, and that the South Koreans were living miserable lives in special camps. According to a letter sent to the United Nations, North Korea reiterated that refugees were starving and suffering from disease, based on statistics on the specific number of refugees and those who died of disease in the camps. The basis for these statistics seems to be based on data produced by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Korean Central News Agency, 1952, 『Korean Central Yearbook 1951~1952』, Korean Central News Agency, pp. 113-115.

184) This was just as acute after the war. Unlike prisoners of war who were repatriated at will under the armistice talks, no civilians were repatriated in either the North or the South. In North Korea, only a handful of foreigners who had been kidnapped returned. "No Hope to Return to South Korea," Kyunghyang Sinmun, 1954.02.17.

It shows how the Ministry of Social Affairs approached it.

However, the South Korean government could not afford the relief itself, and it had to rely entirely on foreign aid. The main sources of aid came from UNRCA and the U.S. ECA, which in the case of about 70 percent came from the U.S. Aid was given in the name of the United Nations, but most of it was provided by the United States. Nonetheless, foreign aid was actively promoted to the people throughout the war. This is because the support of various countries, including the United Nations, was a good way to show who was supported in the Korean War. Humanitarian aid to the displaced was tantamount to political aid. And this is a variety of It was made public through statistics. Statistics on relief supplies were touting how many countries were donating and how many supplies had arrived.[185] Apart from this propaganda, however, relief for the refugees was not being carried out properly. Conditions were harsh because of the war, and relief supplies were scarce. In the first place, South Korea itself did not have the economic power to provide relief to about half of its people.

Even if they relied on aid, there were fundamental limitations to aid. However, it was the government and the military that introduced the refugees, and they were responsible for the relief. Practical difficulties did not escape responsibility.

Therefore, the poor and miserable conditions of the refugees could only be disclosed through news reports, and neither the government nor the UN forces wanted to admit it.[186] Moreover, the problem of relief was not something that could be solved in the short term. At the end of the war, the number of people receiving aid was drastically reduced. In 1955, the number of people receiving relief grain was 2,909,682, a decrease

of one-third from the time of the war.^[187] However, as much as the number of people receiving aid decreased, the number of people receiving aid only disappeared statistically. There was little chance that the lives of the displaced people would automatically improve. Instead, the way to relieve the state of its responsibility to the displaced people and those who demanded it was to "solve it on their own." The decline in aid is due to the nature of U.S. aid since the end of the war, which has affected South Korea's military security.

185) Even during the Korean War, UN support was one of the important topics. In Pira, it was specified how many countries are supporting Korea and how much it is (Lee, 2012: 251). Similarly, North Korea advertises how many aid supplies have been received by foreign countries and which countries are supporting North Korea in the statistics section of the Korean Central Yearbook.

186) Journalists who reported on the poor conditions of the refugees were also denounced by the government. The court acquitted him but found that the plight of the refugees was false. "Seoul District Court Assists Suwon, Acquits Newspaper Publisher Who Reported on Refugees," *Dong-A Ilbo*, 1953.05.06.

187) Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1957, 『Annals of Health and Social Statistics 1955~1957』, It is related to the shift to emphasizing the importance of and supporting it (Lee, Hyun-Jin, 2009). The issue of relief for refugees has not been addressed as an important issue in economic reconstruction. Rather, the UNCACK, which was in charge of relief, was disbanded in 1955 due to the end of its activities. This shows that the nature of the slogans in the Korean War was intended to serve military purposes from the beginning (Choi Won-kyu, 1996: 160; Kang Sung-hyun, 2010: 193).

"Humanitarian purposes" was merely used rhetoric.

V. Summary and Conclusion

In this study, the investigation of civilian casualties during the Korean War was examined with a focus on the process of survey and statistical production. First, civilian casualties were divided into primary and secondary damages based on their type. While primary damage was caused as a direct result of the war and was mainly death, secondary damage was caused by the effects of the war and corresponded to evacuation and displacement. The South Korean government investigated and responded to both types of damage in different ways.

There are international and domestic aspects behind the damage survey. First of all, the Korean War was a war in which international attention was focused on the protection of civilians in wartime, which had intensified since World War II. In 1949, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Geneva Fourth Convention was enacted to provide for the protection of civilians, and the United Nations' intervention in the Korean War and the arrival of humanitarian aid provided the Korean War as a stage for testing the feasibility of protecting civilians in wartime. North Korea seized this point and investigated and announced the situation of civilian casualties even before the war, and actively denounced and publicized the atrocities committed by the US and ROK forces during the war. He also actively raised the issue of civilians to the United Nations and tried to make it a political issue. South Korea, on the other hand, entered a wartime regime and carried out preliminary arrests and massacres of a large number of civilians. The South Korean government's view of civilians was one of distrust. Damage surveys during the Korean War were conducted between external pressures to protect civilians in wartime and internal aspirations to control civilians as citizens. In this study, damage investigation was divided into four dimensions: subject, timing, content, meaning, and effect. First, the investigation of the primary damage was carried out under the leadership of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Office of Public Information. The Ministry of Social Affairs was in charge of all aspects of civilian affairs and conducted investigations aimed at recognizing and resolving the damages, while the Public Information Office sought to use the surveyed damages for political purposes. While the Ministry of Social Affairs led the biographical survey, the post-1.4 survey produced lists and statistics to prosecute North Korea's war crimes under the leadership of the Public Information Office. New categories such as kidnappings and massacres have been created to exaggerate North Korea's crimes. However, the other causes of death were concealed. Injuries and missing persons were

neglected. The South Korean government actively announced the results of the damage survey, which was propaganda for the damage caused by North Korea's invasion of the South. For this reason, the census, which yielded results that the government did not want, was not made public. The results of the investigation were calculated according to the political objectives of the government. In other words, the primary damage survey was conducted in accordance with the purpose of its use, rather than an accurate survey of the damage. The process of investigation and statistical production was to classify the civilians who had been affected. Civilian casualties were categorized and hierarchized according to the cause of the damage or the perpetrator. Those who were harmed by North Korea were labeled patriots, but those who were not were excluded. However, as civilian casualties gradually lost their political importance, the investigation was left incomplete, and the resolution of civilian casualties was lost in the post-war process of social reconstruction. The investigation of the secondary damage was carried out by the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK, which was in charge of the relief of the refugees. The Ministry of Social Affairs and UNCACK were in a relationship of cooperation and tension over relief, and the mediator of their collaboration was information about the refugees. For this reason, surveys of refugees were carried out on a regular basis. Evacuations can be divided into the first evacuation, in which each person fled sporadically, and the second evacuation, which was planned by the government, and the first evacuation process was haphazard and therefore rarely investigated. In addition to reflecting on this, large-scale evacuations were planned and carried out in the second evacuation, and it was the vast amount of information about the evacuees that made it possible.

The survey of refugees and displaced persons was carried out in three phases. The first was to introduce refugees from the frontline areas, and in order to move millions of refugees to the rear and direct them to a specific area, the location and movement of the refugees had to be known. The second was to assess the status of the refugees, and to induce the displaced refugees to register with the refugee camps. Third, a survey was conducted to identify and coordinate the target of relief with the relief of the refugees, and the refugees and displaced persons were classified. Statistics on refugees quantified and made them controllable, and a rule of control over individuals was established through constant surveys. On the other hand, the slogans and propaganda for the refugees and displaced persons were a device to show the superiority of the free world, but it was disconnected from the painful reality of the refugees.

In short, the investigation of civilian casualties was a tool of the state to classify and control civilians in wartime. The greatest effect of the damage survey was the creation of

a national force that forcibly recruited suspicious civilians. The cause of the protection of civilians in wartime was lost in the course of the war, and the principle of civilian protection was replaced by camp logic as the results of damage surveys were reduced to political tools to blame the warring partners. As a result, civilian issues were gradually excluded from the political agenda, and the discussion of civilian casualties disappeared. The civilian toll as a result of the conflict was enormous, with estimates of some one million casualties and ten million displacements, but efforts to address the damage and provide assistance to civilians were insufficient. The responsibility for the damage was gradually shifted to the individual victims, and the resolution of the damage remained an unfinished task. As such, the process of state investigation and statistical production of civilian casualties was basically political. Politics here was, as Schmitt put it, the act of distinguishing between enemies and comrades (Schmitt, 1990: 114).^[188] From the point of view of national formation, almost everything the state did to its citizens during the Korean War was to distinguish between the two countries. In this regard, civilians were only passive objects. Even in the case of damage surveys, the judgment of 'damage' itself could only be made after this distinction.^[189] Civilians in the Korean War were the object of political and military mobilization, but they were not the driving force of war for either the North or the South. It was the armies of foreign countries that made the difference between victory and defeat in the war. Civilians in the Korean War could be civilians in the pure sense of the word because a significant number of personnel, except those subject to conscription, were neither guerrillas nor productive workers. As demonstrated, the government was able to provide aid to civilians and control their lives and deaths. In this way, the state has been able to maintain a hostile attitude toward civilians from beginning to end. It may have been because the people who were supporting the country (or the Rhee Seung-man government) were not civilians. It was also a factor that forced the civilians themselves to be obedient to the state.^[190] The fact that the investigation of civilian casualties did not lead to the resolution of the damage is also due to the fact that there was no strong basis for the civilian population to demand that the state resolve their own damages. In addition, there is the aspect that it was impossible to compensate for the damage because all the responsibility for the war damage fell on North Korea, which was responsible for the outbreak of the war. In a state where the war did not end with a one-sided victory, the damage caused by the war was eventually resolved by relying on U.S. aid

188) Schmitt's conception of politics provides some explanation for the hostilities of the state against civilians in the Korean War. According to Schmitt, the 'enemy' is a public thing, and the distinction

between enemy and comrade does not involve any aesthetic or moral factors. "The concepts of comrade, enemy, and war have their real meaning, especially by holding a relation to the real possibility of physical murder (Schmitt, 1990: 120)."

- 189) This is what the very concept of 'damage' implies. The determination of damage cannot be made unless it is determined who, by whom, and to whom it is targeted. This is especially true in war, since the damage suffered by one side is recorded as the other's criminal record.
- 190) During the Korean War, the people of the country could hardly take collective action unless they were mobilized by the authorities, such as protests against the armistice. The only exception was disabled veterans. Disabled veterans were dissatisfied with the poor treatment and lack of assistance after their discharge, and this was expressed in the Chilgok incident in September 1952, when the disabled veterans occupied the police station by force (Imha Lee, 2011). They shared the idea that they had dedicated themselves to the country, even at the cost of their lives, so they were able to act recklessly.

It had to be determined. However, because U.S. aid was focused on rebuilding the economy and maintaining the country's defense capabilities, it was far from compensating and providing relief to individual civilians. In the end, despite all the investigations, the state was not held accountable for the civilian casualties of the Korean War.^[191] The process by which civilians were also included in the coercive rule of the state, while the state did not treat the victimization of civilians as an important social issue, was repeated in the same form in the postwar formation of Korean society. If we remove the context of the particularity of the large-scale war damage and the economic situation at the time when the country was in the position of the poorest country, and examine the process of damage, investigation, and resolution of the damage from the perspective of how the state and civilians relate to each other, the relationship between the state and the people today may not be much different. The origin of the view that the state cannot be held responsible for an individual's "traffic accident" is, It is not far at odds with the idea at the time of the war that it was not possible to buy individual household items.

On the other hand, neither during the war nor after the war, civilian casualties became a political issue. The system was monopolized by the state, and there was no other entity capable of conducting a nationwide survey. Furthermore, there was no debate or questioning of the state's conduct of investigations or the production of statistics. Even if there were doubts, there was no way to explain them, and there was little political gain to be gained from raising the issue of investigating the damage. War damage statistics could remain unchallenged and official.

Similarly, there are few concrete documents or testimonies that show the process of investigating war damages. Most of the data cited in this study only indirectly show the contents of the investigation. It is not an easy task because a lot of time has already passed since the war, but if additional data related to the process of the investigation and the use of the survey results are discovered, it will be possible to clarify the government's

intentions at the time. What is unusual is that there are not many cases in which official statistics have been produced by countries involved in civilian casualties, such as the South Korean government in the Korean War. In modern warfare, surveys related to damage have always been carried out on a large scale, but civilian casualties have often not been captured in the surveys, in contrast to the detailed reports of military casualties.^[192] This was also the case in the wars after the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

191) Of course, in the process of forming post-war society, it was not uncommon for the state to compensate or assist civilians for "war damages." In countries such as Germany (West Germany), France, and the United Kingdom after World War II, universal compensation for civilian victims was achieved. However, in non-European countries, it is difficult to find examples of assistance to civilians.

192) The biggest problem in civilian investigations is to determine the object of "damage." By War This is also related to the relative indifference of civilians to universal harm in wartime. There is little political or legal review of collateral damages, such as unlucky deaths and unintentional killings in war, rather than genocide and the Holocaust, as well as mass killings of unarmed civilians such as the Holocaust. Between the legal legitimacy of war, the necessity of military action, the status of civilian casualties lies at an ambiguous point. Future research into civilian casualties should begin by clarifying this ambiguity.

In the event of a change in national boundaries (e.g., a world war) or a victory for one side (e.g., the Vietnam War), a formal investigation into civilian casualties would have been virtually impossible. This is also true of today's wars, but the question of the universality and specificity of civilian damage surveys needs to be re-examined at a later date.

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Abstract

Sociological Study on Civilian War

Damage Investigation During Korean War Period

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This study tried to reveal civilian war damage during Korean War period with process of damage investigation and political aspects of producing statistics.

Korean War outbreak soon after Geneva convention 1949 relative to the civilian protection established which was to protect unarmed civilians from indiscriminately violence. United Nation also founded to prevent illegal war and armed conflict. Korean War became a good test of civilian protection at war. North Korea investigated case of civilian mistreatment with this background, while South Korean government massacre

own civilians at the beginning of war. South Korean government govern its nation with a suspicious glance.

Civilian damage can be classified with primary damage and secondary damage. Primary damage is direct result of war such as casualties. While secondary damage is indirect result of war such as refugees and war sufferers. Korean government investigated these two types of damage separately. This study analyse civilian damage investigation with subject, object, period, political effects and social meanings of investigation.

Primary damage investigation was led by Ministry of Social Affair and Ministry of Public Information. The former was in charge of civilian affairs such as relief at early period that they should know the reality of civilians. The latter wanted to use case of civilian killings to blame North Korean government at later period. They made new categories of civilian casualties such as massacre and kidnap to exaggerate war crimes of North Korean army. Korean government propagated the massacre and kidnap as a part of psychological warfare. On the other hand, government investigate wounded and missing people with little importance. Government concealed some statistics and result of investigation to cover up their fault when they killed civilians illegally. They classified patriot, collaborator, reds among war sufferers to give hierarchy by means of the result of investigation. And they made a list of civilian sufferers to control them. However as war go on war crimes like civilian killing and kidnap lose their political importance and primary damage investigation stopped at the moment.

Secondary damage investigation was led by Ministry of Social Affair and UN Civil Assistance Command in Korea(UNCACK). They were in charge of refugee relief and evacuation of civilians from the front line. Korean government and UN army wanted to control refugees in their hands because they thought that uncontrollable refugees disturb military operation and a fifth column may hide among them. Their were three phase of refugee investigation. First, they planned large-scale migration to evacuate millions of civilians. And then, they guide refugees to refugee camps. Lastly, they gave a relief to refugees. They needed specific information of refugees to succeed an operation that they investigate every week. Through investigation refugees were quantified and became easy to control. And to conclude, war damage investigation was means of government which controlled and classified civilians.

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